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t Professor of Law, Boston University Law School. I served as an expert witness on
the ethics of class counsel in this matter, testifying for the objectors to the settlement. I
worked many hours on this case, reading stacks of documents, reviewing case law, writing a
report with Professor Roger Cramton, and testifying both in a deposition and at the fairness hearing. I was paid for those hours and made what for me is a great deal of money.
I did not want to be involved in this case. It felt like volunteering to stand in front of a
moving train. As I saw it, 20 major corporations, leaders of the plaintiffs' bar, the AFL-CIO,
and the judiciary, were all lined up on the other side, rooting for this settlement to go
through. I had testified in court as an expert witness only once before. My dearest friend,
colleague, and coauthor, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., a person whom I respect deeply, was
testifying for the settling parties, and while we sometimes disagree, I had little taste for
taking a stand in opposition to him on such an important and hotly contested matter. In
short, I expected that serving as an expert witness in this matter would be extremely unpleasant, and, even before I was subpoenaed in front of my criminal law class, it was apparent that I was right.
I agreed to be involved for one reason: I believed that what the settling parties had
done was wrong and that someone had to stand up and say so. In an effort to impeach my
testimony the settling parties suggested that I was motivated not by money but by passion.
They got at least that one thing right. Passion is indeed what motivated me to speak out
against what they had done. With their questions the settling parties implied I should be
embarrassed by my obvious passion. I was not and am not. Being passionate does not
mean one is simpleminded or that one's position is not sound. It does not preclude being
right or being effective at communicating that one is right. Aside from a modest honorarium from Cornell for my participation in this symposium, I have not received any payment to write this Article. Like my involvement in this case, however, this work is filled
with my passion about the wrong that was done here by class counsel, by the lawyers for the
defendants, and by the court. I trust that it stands as a testament to the fact that passion
does not rule out reason.
I would like to thank Bob Bone, George Cohen, Roger Cramton, Jack Londen,
Rhonda Wasserman, David Wilkins, and Brian Wolfman for their thoughtful comments on
this piece and all the participants in the Boston University Law School faculty workshop.
Special thanks are due to four friends-Robert Cushman, Henry Howe, Michael Robinson,
and Tom Ross-who pitched in to help me rework parts of this Article, particularly
Michael who helped me edit this work into the wee hours of two mornings. Finally, thanks
go to Bruce Matzkin, Boston University Law '96, for his valuable research assistance and
good cheer, and to Robert Mueller, Boston University Law '94, for donating his time and
providing detailed research memoranda on various aspects of this work.
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I
BEARING WITNESS'

This Article tells the story of Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,2 a
class action involving asbestos-related personal injury claims. Georgine
was filed in federal district court on January 15, 1993.3 On the same
day, class counsel and the lawyers for the defendants filed a proposed
settlement with the court.4 The court authorized notice to the class,
allowed a period for opt-outs,5 recognized objectors to the settlement,
1 See Austin Sarat, Between (the Presence of) Violence and (the Possibility of)
Justice: Lawyering Against Capital Punishment (July 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (describing the important role death penalty lawyers play in witnessing,
recording, and remembering the violent administration of the criminal laws).
2 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
S Id. at 257.
4 Id.
5 Class members had 12 weeks from the time the notice period began in which to
find out about the class action, decide whether to opt out, and mall their requests for
exclusion. Id. at 311-12. The court denied motions to extend the opt-out period and refused to accept requests for exclusion that were signed by attorneys on behalf of their
clients. Id. at 312. Over 13,000 requests for exclusion were denied because they arrived
after the opt-out deadline, and another 14,879 requests were denied because they were
signed by the clients' lawyers. Apart from these 28,652 unsuccessful attempts to opt out,
there were some 235,000 requests for exclusion. Id.
Six months after approving the settlement, the court granted the request of class
counsel and the defendants to void the remaining 235,000 opt-outs. Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 160 F.RD. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The court found that counsel opposed to the
settlement had made misleading statements, which may have deceived people into opting
out. Id. at 485, 498. For that reason, the court held that to be excluded from the class the
235,000 people who had signed exclusion requests before the original deadline would have
to repeat that process. Id. at 502. These people would first be notified by the court that
the court had found the settlement to be fair and reasonable. Id. at 509. People who had
not previously opted out and those who had their opt-out requests voided by the court's
earlier action would not be provided with a new opportunity to opt out. Id. at 503; see also
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5593 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
24, 1995) (denying the requests of people who had missed the original opt-out deadline
for additional time to opt out.).

FEASTING WHILE THE WIDOW WEEPS

1995]

1047

ordered discovery proceedings, held a fairness hearing, and, in Au-

gust 1994, approved the settlement. The objectors to the settlement
retained me to testify as an expert witness on the ethics of class
6

counsel.
The Georgine defendants were nineteen financially viable companies and one company now in bankruptcy. 7 The class action was
brought on behalf of all people who had not filed suit against the
twenty corporate defendants byJanuary 15, 1993, and who had been
occupationally exposed to the asbestos products of the defendants or
who had been exposed to asbestos from those products through the
occupational exposure of a family member.8 The class thus included
all the people who are well now but may someday get sick from their
past exposure to the defendants' products and some of the people who
are sick now from that exposure-that is, the sick people who did not

file suit by January 15, 1993.9
It is a huge class. Although no one knows precisely how large the
class is, 1° this suit may be one of the largest mass tort class actions ever
filed. Georgineis an important case for that reason alone, but it is espeSee supra note t.
7 The 19 financially viable defendants were: Amchem Products, Inc.; A.P. Green Industries, Inc.; Armstrong World Industries, Inc.; Certainteed Corp.; C.E. Thurston and
Sons, Inc.; Dana Corp.; Ferodo America, Inc.; Flexitallic, Inc.; GAF Corp.; I.U. North
America, Inc.; Maremont Corp.; National Service Industries, Inc.; Nosroc Corp.; Pfizer,
6

Inc.; Quigley Co., Inc.; Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co.; T & N, PLC; Union Carbide
Chemicals and Plastics Co.; and United States Gypsum Co. The Asbestos Claims Management Corp., formerly the National Gypsum Company, is the entity subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. It is also currently seeking to withdraw from Georgine. See Other
News, LA TiMEs, Nov. 26, 1994, at D2. For the implications of this development, see infra
note 30.
As to the financial viability of the 19 companies, see the court's discussion of the testimony offered on their insurance coverage and their ability to fulfill their uninsured obligations under the settlement. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 288-91. On whether these companies
would have remained viable had Georgine or some comparable settlement not been approved, see infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text (detailing concerns of the Georgine
class representatives, members of the plaintiffs' bar, the settling parties, and the court that
without Georgine or its equivalent, the defendant companies might not remain financially
viable).
8 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 257 (defining class).
9 Consider, for example, Mervin Baylis. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., No. 930215, 1994 WL 637404 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1994). Mr. Baylis first started feeling ill in October 1993. Id. at *6. Between January 3, 1993, and January 13, 1994, he was hospitalized
and diagnosed with mesothelioma. Id. After release, he found a suitable physician to treat
him on January 24, 1994, the day that the two week opt-out period in Georgine ended. Id.
Mr. Baylis did not receive actual notice of the class suit, was busy seeking treatment for his
fatal disease during the entire opt-out period, and is now considered a member of the
Georgine class. Id. at *7. The court denied his request to opt out on the ground that he
filed it after the opt-out period was closed. Id.
10 157 F.R.D. at 261 (conceding that no one knows exactly how large the class is, but
acknowledging that it includes "tens of thousands"). See also id. at 325 (noting that objectors have estimated that the class consists of between 20 and 30 million people, so as to
suggest that 235,000 opt-outs does not signify broad class dissatisfaction).
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cially important because it is already serving as a model for other class
actions," and the model is fundamentally flawed. Georgine is important because it is big, because it is being copied, and because it is
wrong.
I write to bear witness to what went wrong in this case: the collusion between class counsel and the defendants; 12 the district court's
willingness to turn a blind eye to the facts' 3 and neglect the law; 14 the
spectacle of lawyers telling contradictory stories about their actions to
a tribunal that didn't seem to care which story the lawyers told or how
often the story changed; 15 the presentation and admission of testimony at the fairness hearing on what result other federal judges
might like to see in this case; 16 and the mistreatment of the widows
who served as named representatives for the class-people whose experiences illustrate how the interests of class members were
7
subordinated to the interests of persons not parties to this suit.' I

also write to expose the serious defects in the Georginemodel, a model
that invites defendants who harm large groups of people to pay a premium to the first victims who file claims in exchange for lower and
more limited liability to all future claimants.' 8
I also make several proposals and suggest some new areas of academic and judicial inquiry. For example, I propose that underinclusive class definitions, now mentioned by courts only as a problem that
might plague defendants, 19 be considered by courts as a sign of collusion. 20 I argue that courts should replace ad hoc review of the adequacy of class counsel with more general prohibitions, such as a ban
on simultaneous representation of two classes against a common defendant. 21 I propose that the ethics rules be read to require an increased duty of candor to the court on the part of lawyers presenting
11

See infra text accompanying notes 89-91. See also CCR Asbestos Settlement-Vistory ,

WORLD INs. REP., Aug. 26, 1994 ("CCR has already been approached by several asbestos

descendants [sic] interested in joining a 'second wave' Georgine II settlement").
12 I believe the word collusion is a fair way to characterize the facts set forth in part II
of this Article. I am not using the word to imply that I know of additional facts not explicitly stated in this Article about the interaction between class counsel and defendants.
13
See infra part II.
14 See infra part M.
15 See infta part V.
16 See infta notes 465-75 and accompanying text.
17 See infra part V.
18 See infra part II.
19 See, e.g., McCarther v. Camelot Inn, 513 F. Supp. 355, 356 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1981)
(underinclusive class denied defendant the benefit of prevailing in a class action, to which
the defendant would be entitled under FED. R. Cir. P. 23); Escamilla-Montoya v. Palmer,
No. 79-G-3874 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (rejecting as
disingenuous argument that underinclusive class may subject the defendants to inconsistent requirements).
20 See infra part lI.B.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 362-70.
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settlements that require court approval, and that before granting approval, courts should demand forthright responses from the settling
lawyers on matters within their personal knowledge.2 2 I also question
what role, if any, malpractice suits against class counsel might play in
assuring counsel's fidelity to the class, a possibility that the law and
economics crowd might fruitfully examine. 23 However, my primary
goal in this Article is not to make proposals, but to point out abuse in
the hope of inspiring others to make proposals 24 or to rethink proposals already made.
I write neither to condemn nor praise the efficiency arguments
that might be made to justify the use of class actions to resolve mass
tort claims.2 5 I do not urge that class actions never be used to resolve
mass tort claims, 2 6 nor do I denounce all class actions that are filed
and settled on the same day (known as "settlement class actions").27 I
do not condemn all uses of class actions to resolve the claims of those
who have not yet manifested injury.2 8 Finally, I do not write to propose some macro solution to the ethical problems that plague class
action suits.2 9 Instead, I write to describe how empty the following
safeguards proved to be in one case: adequacy of representation, class
See infra text accompanying notes 371-80, 416-19.
See infra text accompanying notes 457-64.
See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of
Chaos, 80 CoRNEm L. REv. 837 (1995) (proposing amending FED. R. Ow. P. 23(e) to provide courts with guidelines for approval of class action settlements).
25 For an interesting discussion of the efficiency of the class action form as a method
of resolving mass torts, see PETER H. SCHUcK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRuAL 277-97 (1986). On
the "efficiency" of Ceorgine itself, see infra text accompanying notes 187-88.
26
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 298-302 (providing a favorable picture of
the class action settlement of the tort claims of heart valve recipients).
27 I share the concerns expressed by several courts that such settlements provide fertile ground for collusion. See infra notes 67, 33740 and accompanying text (noting need
for careful court scrutiny of settlement process). However, I stop short of calling for a
prohibition on such settlements, arguing instead that courts should take their oversight
responsibilities more seriously. See infra notes 347-49 and accompanying text (same).
28
See infratext accompanying notes 298-302 (generally approving of the settlement in
the heart valve case, which included the claims of those whose valves had not yet malfunctioned). On the other hand, I express serious concerns about class actions that purport to
resolve the claims of people whom I call "unknowing," i.e., people who are not presently
ill, who cannot be individually identified by the parties, and who may not even know that
they have been exposed to the defendants' dangerous product. See infra text accompany,
ing notes 203-05.
29
For an example of such an effort, see Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass
Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rv. 469, 551 (1994) (arguing that the positive law embodied
in traditional ethics rules does not function well in mass tort cases and attempting to construct new ethical standards for such cases based on the concepts embodied in communitarian and communicatarian ethics). UnlikeJudge Weinstein, I neither survey the various
types of ethical problems that plague class suits nor suggest how courts and lawyers might
resolve each of them. I do advocate that courts adopt some general standards to assess the
adequacy of class counsel's performance and that courts use such standards to supplement
the ad hoc review of adequacy that now takes place. See infratext accompanying notes 36170.
22
23
24
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counsel's ethical obligations, and the court's duty to review class action settlements. I write to challenge the academics and judges who
justify their positions by leaning on one or more of those supposed
safeguards. I write to draw attention to the failure of these safeguards
and to stimulate new thought on how more meaningful protections
might be substituted for empty promises.
This Article is long and detailed. It must be. I claim that the
defendants bought off class counsel and other plaintiffs' lawyers and
that the district court deliberately turned a blind eye to what was plain
for all to see.30 I simply could not say that without crossing all my "t's
Indeed, in one sense my approach in this Article is the mirror image ofJudge Weinstein's approach. Judge Weinstein concentrates on ethical obligations, which he culls from
ethical sources, and he uses those obligations to rebuild and reshape the responsibilities of
lawyers and, even more dramatically, the responsibilities of courts. Weinstein, supra, at
485-93. I concentrate on legal obligations, which I find in the constitutional requirement
of due process as interpreted by the courts and other legal obligations articulated in cases
and rules. I use these obligations to critique, debunk, and label "unethical," the actual
practices of lawyers and of courts. I believe there is more than irony in ajudge resting so
heavily on "ethics," and an ethics professor resting so heavily on "law," but I have neither
the space nor the energy to explore that here.
30 My claim is that the factual situation described infra, in part H, deserves to be characterized as buying off class counsel. I do not claim to know any facts that are not explicitly
set forth in this Article. I do not claim or mean to imply, for example, that class counsel
received any payment or benefit other than what is described infra in part II.C. My evidence and arguments are stated fully here, and while one may agree or disagree with my
opinion, the reader must not infer that I am making assertions of fact that are not expressly stated.
Given how much class counsel, the defendants, and the class members have at stake, I
owe them and my readers a fairly full presentation of the arguments presented by the
other side, which I provide along with my response to those arguments. Because it was
necessary to cover in depth the matters I do discuss, I was unable to address all the
problems I see in Georgine. First, I am quite troubled by the relatively short opt-out period
and the court's ruling disallowing exclusion requests signed by lawyers. I find it more than
disingenuous that this court balked at recognizing the power of attorney expressed by lawyers signing exclusion forms when it was otherwise so accepting of the power of attorneys
to control the lives of people-even people like all the absentee class members who had
not retained any lawyers. See infra note 79.
Second, in a settlement designed to bind class members in perpetuity, class counsel
did not negotiate provisions that would allow the medical criteria specified in the agreement to be adjusted based on new scientific developments or that would adjust recoveries
based on inflation. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing at 176-79, Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 1994) [hereinafter Fairness Hearing] (testimony of Susan P. Koniak). Third, while class members are bound in perpetuity, COR
members are not. If one CGR defendant withdraws, as National Gypsum is now seeking to
do, see supra note 7, class members may sue that member, but their Georgine recovery is
reduced by the percentage of that member's contribution. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 28485. National Gypsum's contribution is 10.2%. See CCR Asbestos Settlement-Victoy?, supra
note 11.
Fourth, I testified that counsel's lack of concern for the class was also evident in the
small role class counsel apparently played in overseeing notice to the class and in the way
class counsel encouraged the class representatives to treat CCR's counsel as co-counsel,
having CCR's lawyers sit in on the preparation of class representative testimony. Fairness
Hearing, supra, at 196-97. Fifth, I also find it troubling that class counsel joined the de-
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and dotting all my "is. Detail was also required to present an effective
existential challenge to the current solutions to class action abuse, solutions that may be theoretically sound but that are woefully inadequate in practice.
By plunging deep into the morass of Georgine, I learned a great
deal about what can go wrong in a class action settlement. I encourage you to stay with me through the detail; there are some lessons
about the forest that can only be learned through a careful examination of a tree.
II
GERRYMANDERING A CLASS FOR PROFIT

A. Two Deals
Once upon a time, not so long ago, twenty companies faced the
prospect of defending against millions of legal claims brought in connection with their asbestos products. Many thousands of these cases
were already pending.3 ' The rest would be filed in years to come.
The companies wanted out of this mess, and they found a way. They
settled almost all of these claims-most of those that were pending
and almost all of those that had not yet been filed. The key was to
craft two deals: a class action and another deal. Two deals to cover so
many claims may sound like a triumph of efficiency, but it was one
deal too many, and therein lies the tale.
These twenty companies formed the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR) 32 to coordinate their legal response. In 1992 the CCR
lawyers from Shea & Gardner approached plaintiffs' lawyers Gene
Locks, Ronald L. Motley, and Joseph Rice,33 and suggested working
fendants in a motion to require those who opted out to opt out a second time and were
willing to argue for the abridgement of speech between plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients
in an effort to ensure that the opt-outs do not opt out again. See Court Order, Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1994) (seeking additional argument
on court's power to stop "misleading" communication). Finally, I am concerned that the
settlement gives CCR so much discretion to decide on the awards granted class members.
See infra note 303 (describing how the alternative dispute resolution process Georgineput in
place will give the defendants complete discretion in the vast majority of cases to determine what recovery amount, within a negotiated range, each class member will receive).
3' Approximately 77,000 cases were pending against the defendants in Georginewhen
the class action was filed. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 305. It is unclear whether this figure
includes the approximately 24,000 cases settled once these defendants became confident
Georgine would be filed. Id. at 295-96.
32 As the court explained, "CCR is a not-for-profit corporation maintained by the defendant companies for the processing of asbestos-related claims." Id. at 257 n.3. Two CCR
executives offered testimony on the settlement process in Georgine: Lawrence Fitzpatrick,,
President and Chief Executive Officer of CCR, and Michael F. Rooney, Chief Operating
Officer of CCR.
33 Id. at 329 (noting the "fact" that CCR approached Messrs. Lock, Motley, and Rice
to begin the negotiations that led to Georgine).
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out a deal to resolve the CCR defendants' asbestos liability.M Mr.
Locks practiced in the firm Greitzer and Locks; Mr. Motley and Mr.
Rice were partners in Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole.
These firms together represented over 14,000 asbestos claimants.3 5
The lawyers sat down and worked out two deals: the class action
settlement that became Georgineand another deal. Both deals covered
people with a wide range of diseases caused by asbestos: mesothelioma,3 6 lung cancer, and the full range of nonmalignant asbestos diseases-from disease that seriously affects one's ability to breathe to
disease that leaves marks on the lungs but does not result in severe
breathing impairment. Although the deals covered the same sorts of
37
people with the same sorts of diseases, the deals had different terms.
For example, it appears that the people covered by the class action got
considerably less money than the people with the same diseases who

38
were covered by the other deal.

Who ended up outside the class-with the other deal? Messrs.
Locks, Motley, and Rice designed a class that excluded over fourteen
thousand of their clients and many, if not most, of the clients of other
asbestos lawyers.3 9 These clients-and their lawyers-got the deal
with more money.
Before Georgine, the CCR companies saw no end to potential lawsuits against them. In the first years of its existence, CCR made "inventory settlements." An inventory settlement is an agreement with a
plaintiffs' law firm to settle the firm's inventory of cases according to
specified terms. 4° These settlements typically involved large blocks of
cases, but as soon as one inventory was settled, the plaintiffs' law firm
would start building another inventory of cases. 4 1 CCR thus changed
its settlement strategy in 1991. Although it was willing to settle the
relatively small number of asbestos cases that could get scheduled for
trial,42 it now refused to settle the bulk of the existing cases without
some guarantee about the future. 43 The CCR companies did not want
to continue paying people who had marks on their lungs caused by
asbestos but who had no significant breathing impairment-the so34
35
36

Id. at 295.
Id. at 295-96.
Mesothelioma is "a form of cancer of the lining of the lung or abdomen." Id. at

269.
37
38
39

For a more detailed discussion of the different terms, see discussion infrapart ll.C.
See infra notes 103-09, 114-16 and accompanying text.
See infra part I.B for discussion of the odd shape of the Georgine class.
40
Technically, these settlements are offers to settle because the individual clients are
presumably free to reject the offered terms, but most clients follow their lawyers' advice on
settlement.
41 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294.
42

Id.

43

Id.
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called pleural plaintiffs. 44 They also wanted control over the number
of cases they would face each year and, preferably, control over how
much money they would have to pay out each year. 45 They determined that the best way to get what they wanted was through a "settlement class action"-a class action put together solely for the purpose
of achieving settlement.46 CCR approached Messrs. Locks, Motley,
47
and Rice, who agreed to serve as class counsel in such an action.
Messrs. Locks, Motley, and Rice wanted their existing inventory of
cases settled, but apparently not on the terms proposed by CCR for
the class. They agreed that pleural class members would receive no
cash, 4 8 but they disassociated their own pleural clients from the class
and got cash for them. 49 This would assure Messrs. Locks, Motley, and
Rice a return of thirty-three percent of their pleural clients' awards,
instead of some percentage of nothing on their pleural clients' claims.
Acting as counsel for the class, they agreed to require class members
with lung cancer to establish by objective evidence that their cancer
was caused by asbestos,5 0 while their own clients did not have to pro44 Throughout the fairness hearing, the settling parties used this term to refer to people with "pleural thickening or pleural plaques" who do not show "interstitial or
parenchymal fibrosis on x-ray or on pathological tissue analysis and [who have] normal
pulmonary function test results." Settling Parties' Proposed Findings of Fact at 60, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1994) [hereinafter Proposed
Findings of Fact]. In some states, such a person has a cause of action for injury caused by
exposure to asbestos. Id. at 59. In its opinion, the court referred to such people as "nonimpaired pleural claimants." See, e.g., Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 266.
45 The Georginesettlement gives the defendants these benefits, limiting the number of
claimants in each disease category that CCR is obliged to pay each year and setting negotiated average ranges for payments that act as caps on the total dollar amount COR has to
pay each year. Uncertainty over potential liability adversely affects the financial condition
of companies in a number of ways. It diminishes access to capital markets, makes it more
difficult to raise debt in equity, puts companies at a disadvantage in attracting personnel,
and generally affects the ability of companies to compete in the marketplace. See Georgine,
157 F.R.D. at 291 (quoting testimony ofJohn H. Laeri, Jr. of Meadowcroft Associates, a
consulting firm retained by class counsel to advise on the ability of the CCR defendants to
meet the obligations class counsel and CCR's lawyers had agreed to in the Georgine
settlement).
46 While the evidence that the class action was CCR's idea is a little fuzzy, this conclusion seems a logical inference from the sequence of events described by the settling parties. See infra text accompanying notes 158-70.
47
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 329.
48
Id. at 297 (pleural class members do not receive cash unless and until they develop
some more serious form of asbestos disease). See infra text accompanying note 72 for discussion of the "package of benefits" pleural class members receive instead of the cash given
to the pleural clients.
49
Georgine, 157 F.RD. at 298 ("pleural claimants in the inventory settlements received
immediate cash compensation").
50 See genera/y id. at 274-75 (discussing requirements in class settlement for qualifying
for compensation for lung cancer). The settling parties summarized the proof necessary to
recover for lung cancer thus:
[Olne may qualify for compensation.., by showing evidence of asbestosis
.... Alternatively, one may produce evidence of exposure to asbestos suffi-
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duce that proof.5' By disassociating all their lung cancer clients from
the class and insisting that CCR pay them without objective evidence
of causation, more of class counsel's lung cancer patients would be
paid money than might be paid under the class settlement.
Class counsel also agreed with CCR that under the class settlement the average payment made to class members each year must fall
within a negotiated range for each disease category. 52 By disassociating their clients from the class and insisting that the class ranges not
be used to settle their clients' claims, class counsel could make a lot
more money overall than they would make if their clients were treated
as class members. 53 These are reasons to keep as many of one's own
4
clients out of the class as possible, and that's what class counsel did.
Class counsel accomplished all this by carefully drafting the class defi55
nition. They gerrymandered the class for profit.

Why did CCR agree to treat class counsel's clients and the clients
of other asbestos lawyers more generously than the class? 56 This gencient to cause both extensive bilateral pleural thickening and functional
impairment, or evidence of substantial occupational exposure to asbestos
based on the number of years in particular asbestos-related occupations,
accompanied by bilateral pleural thickening or plaques. Finally, one may
qualify by another, more general, route by persuading the Exceptional
Claims Panel that, given all the circumstances, the lung cancer should be
attributable to asbestos exposure.
Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 44, at 65-66.
51 Ness, Motley's client settlement agreements provided:
For each case submitted, Ness, Motley shall immediately make available to
the CCR, appropriate medical verification from a licensed physician upon
whom Ness, Motley relies, to demonstrate that the plaintiff has contracted
the asbestos-related disease claimed ....
For the purpose of meeting this
requirement, a medical record or report from a licensed physician providing a diagnosis of an asbestos-related injury as alleged by the plaintiff shall
be sufficient. A record establishing the existence of a primary lung cancer or a
mesothelioma shall be sufficient in and of itself.
Inventory Settlement at 4.b(2), Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 17, 1994) [hereinafter Inventory Settlement] (emphasis added). Class members have
to establish the existence of a primary lung cancer plus produce objective evidence that
the cancer was caused by asbestos. See id. V.B.2.
52 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 276.
53 See infra text accompanying notes 103-16.
54 See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing how class counsel managed
to keep as many of their clients out of the class as possible).
55 See discussion infrapart II.B, regarding the odd shape of the class. See infra part ll.C
for a detailed discussion of the more generous terms provided to class counsel's clients.
"Gerrymandered" is, I believe, a fair characterization of the way the class definition drew
odd boundaries between members of the class and class-counsel's clients. I do not use the
term to imply any facts other than those discussed explicitly infra, in part J.B. That this
was for profit is my conclusion based on the facts stated, with citations to sources, in part
II.C. I do not mean to imply that I know any other facts, that class counsel received any
profit other than the fees described in this Article, or that I know more than is stated here
about the motivations or the state of mind of class counsel.
56 The precise terms offered to clients represented by asbestos lawyers other than
class counsel are not available in the record, but there is testimony that suggests that other
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erosity was simply part of the price CCR had to pay to get the class
settlement it wanted. CCR needed two deals to accomplish its goal
because plaintiffs' lawyers, including class counsel, would not accept
for their own clients the terms CCR was prepared to offer the largest
57
group of asbestos victims, the future claimants.
Why would class counsel and CCR define a class that excluded
the clients of other asbestos lawyers? Because by offering more generous terms to the clients of other asbestos lawyers CCR could buy thirdparty support for the settlement among the asbestos bar.58 The more
members of the asbestos bar who supported the class settlement, the
better CCR's chances would be of getting the resolution it wanted. 59
The gerrymandered class, the separate client settlements, and the substantial differences between the class settlement and the inventory settlements can all be explained in this way: CCR paid class counsel on
the side, by which I mean outside the class action proceeding through
60
the client settlements, for agreeing to support the class settlement.
Or to put it even more bluntly, CCR bought off the class lawyers.
lawyers who were supportive of Georgine's basic framework received better deals for their
clients than would be available for class members under Georgina Fairness Hearing, supra
note 30, at 96 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of Robert R. Hatten); see infra note 58.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 72-76.
58
For example, Robert R. Hatten, a plaintiffs' asbestos lawyer, who testified on behalf
of the settling parties in support of the settlement, had a written "gentleman's agreement"
with CCR, see Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 67 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of Robert
R. Hatten), under which he agreed to file cases only if those cases met certain medical
criteria, id. at 68-70. The criteria were similar to those contained in the Georgine agreement, and CCR agreed to pay Mr. Hatten's clients amounts that were higher than the
negotiated averages under Georgine. Id. at 95-96. These amounts would ostensibly reflect
what Mr. Hatten had historically collected from CCR. Id. at 68-69.
It appears that CCR used a carrot and stick approach to get plaintiffs' lawyers to sign
on to the basic structure of Georgine,giving sweet settlement terms to those who agreed that
pleural claims should no longer receive cash compensation (the foundational point in the
Georgine deal, see infra note 74 and accompanying text) and no inventory settlements to
those who did not agree. Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 21, 25 (Mar. 30, 1994) (testimony of Mark H. Iola); see infra note 178 and accompanying text.
59 If class counsel and CCR were not worried about support from other asbestos lawyers, defining the class to exclude all present clients would still have been the wisest move,
assuming the aim of exempting class counsel's clients. No plausible reason could be offered for a class definition that excluded only class counsel's clients. Nor could class counsel define the class to include everyone's clients and then opt out over 14,000 of its own
clients, without sacrificing the whole settlement. The settling parties suggest that class
counsel could do this and that the shape of the Geargineclass is therefore irrelevant. However, opting out 14,000 people would be too blatant an admission of what class counsel
really thought of the settlement they were proposing. Would a court actually approve such
a settlement in those circumstances? In a sense this is exactly what the Georgine court did
approve, but excising the clients from the class at the beginning helped to obscure this
fact.
60 To the extent CCR gave preferential treatment to the clients of other asbestos lawyers, the simplest explanation is that they thus quelled potential opposition to the settlement. See supranote 59. Again, I claim that the facts stated here are enough to deserve
condemnation as a buy-off of class counsel. I do not imply that I know facts in addition to
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Why would a district court accept such a tainted settlement on
behalf of so many absent class members? To help rid the court system
of the terrible burden imposed by what appears to be interminable
asbestos litigation. 6 1 To accomplish this end, the court deliberately
closed its eyes to the evidence that CCR and the lawyers for the putative class had colluded.6 2 The court also ignored other serious legal
problems with this tainted deal. 63 That the court would approve such

a deal, despite its obligation to protect the interests of class members
who were not present to protect themselves, is shameful. Without the
court's blessing, the lawyers for the settling parties could not have affected the rights of the class members. Responsibility for this corruption ofjustice must therefore rest, in the end, with the court.64
My claim that CCR paid class counsel on the side in the form of
the client settlements to support the class action is a strong one. Is it
true? Is the shape of the class really odd? Was the class defined to
exclude the clients of other asbestos lawyers? Did class counsel negotiate separate deals for their clients? Did those deals contain different
terms than those provided for the class? Were the terms negotiated
for class counsel's clients more generous than those negotiated for
the class? Why were there two different deals with two sets of terms, if
it was not to buy off class counsel and other plaintiffs' lawyers? And
what did the settling parties (CCR and the putative class) and the
court have to say about all this?
I turn next to these questions, but first a preliminary matter:
throughout this Article, I use "class counsel's clients" to refer to the
over 14,000 people represented by class counsel and excluded from
the class. This phrase may seem ill chosen in that it implies that the
class was not also a client of class counsel, which seems absurd. Howthose stated in this Article, and I do not claim there were any other payments or benefits
given to class counsel other than those provided for by the settlements as described in part
II.C.
61 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 263 (discussing how "asbestos dockets across the country
were growing exponentially"). More specifically, see text accompanying notes 465-75 (discussing testimony offered at fairness hearing about federal judiciary's concern with growing number of asbestos cases).
62 I discuss that evidence in the remainder of this section of the paper.
63
See generally infra part III.
64 The district court issued its opinion in this case on August 16, 1994. The district

court opinion in large part adopts verbatim the settling parties' Proposed Findings of Fact,
supra note 44, and the Settling Parties' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 60, Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 1994) [hereinafter Proposed Conclusions of Law]. Such wholesale adoption of the parties' findings can be problematic. Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1294 (10th Cir. 1974) ("[t]he mechanical adoption of
a litigant's findings is an abandonment of the duty imposed on trial judges"). But seeAnderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1985) (rejecting challenge ofjudge's adoption of parties' findings). For an interesting discussion of the issues involved in court
review of consent decrees and class action settlements, see Judith Resnik, judging Consent,
1987 U. CHI. L. FORUM 43.

1995]

FEASTING WHILE THE WIDOW WEEPS

1057

ever, during the Georgine negotiations-the critical period of timethe class was not technically a client of Messrs. Locks, Motley, and
Rice. As the settling parties and the district court put it "At the time
that class counsel negotiated what became the Georgine settlement,
there was no attorney-client relationship between class counsel and
the unformed Georgine class." 65 The settling parties and the court
used this point to imply that it might be appropriate to hold class
counsel to a slightly lesser standard of faithfulness to the class during
the negotiations. 66 They did not, however, go so far as to argue outright that a lesser standard applies. And how could they, given that
this lesser standard would be one any lawyer could elect by negotiating a settlement before requesting that a court officially recognize a
class? To demand less of lawyers when no court is overseeing the process leading to a class settlement than one would when a court is in
place as guardian for the class is nonsensical and runs counter to the
judiciary's warnings of the potential for abuse in settlement class actions.67 Although the settling parties' and the court's reason for insisting that, during the negotiations, the class was not a client is thus
suspect, they are technically correct, and I am happy to adopt their
language.
B.

The Shape of the Class

The class has an odd shape. It includes all people exposed to the
asbestos products of the twenty defendant corporations except those
who had filed suit against the companies by January 15, 1993.68 This
was the date the settling parties filed the class action and a proposed
settlement with the court. I contend that the definition of the class
was designed to exclude from the class most of class counsel's clients
and many of the clients of other asbestos lawyers. But before we get to
the direct evidence that supports my claim, consider the shape itself.
The shape is suspicious because it is not related to the common issues
of law and fact put forth by the settling parties and adopted by the
65

(ergine, 157 F.R.D. at 327.

After making the "not a client" point, they conclude: "Thus, whether or not Model
Rule 1.7(b) technically applies to this Court's determination ...the general principles of
loyalty and due care are applicable here." Id.
66

67 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that settlements reached before asking a court to certify the class must be scrutinized more closely
than other class settlements because of the increased possibility of collusion), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 818 (1983); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.
1982) (noting that both the class action device and class action settlements are susceptible
to abuse and carry certain structural risks), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983); Ace Heating
& Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[W]hen the settlement is
not negotiated by a court designated class representative the court must be doubly careful
in evaluating the fairness of the settlement to plaintiff's class.").
68 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 257-58.
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court to justify the class action form. The court and the settling parties described the questions of law and fact common to the class as
follows:
The members of the class have all been exposed to asbestos products supplied by the defendants and all share an interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for their claims, while
minimizing the risks and transaction costs inherent in the69asbestos
litigation process as it occurs presently in the tort system.
If that is the reason for having a class, the Georgine class definition
is underinclusive. People whose cases were filed before January 15,
1993, have as much in common with this group as any member of the
class. "Present claimants" have been exposed to the asbestos products
of the defendants just like class members and have an interest in minimizing the risks of the tort system at least equal to that of class mem70
bers. They also have an interest in minimizing transaction costs.
When the line drawn to define a group does not match the reason put
forth to justify the group, the shape of the group is suspicious and
needs further justification.
One need not, however, wonder long about why the class was
shaped as it was. The story told by the settling parties and accepted by
the court makes clear what the shape of the class was designed to accomplish. In July 1991, the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation
issued an order transferring all federal personal injury asbestos litigation to one judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, with the hope that this transfer might foster
global settlement of the "asbestos mess. 7 1 According to the settling
parties, after the cases were transferred, there were settlement talks
between the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Steering Committees to "craft
a national settlement."72 These negotiations eventually broke down.
But out of those discussions, "one possible concept emerged... as a
startingpoint for further negotiation." 73 That concept was that
69
70

Id. at 316.

Even if some or most present claimants already have incurred some transaction
costs, they still have an interest in reducing additional transaction costs. The chief transaction cost is the lawyer's fee. Under the class settlement, this fee is capped at 25%. See infra
note 111. Generally, asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers charge between 33% and 40%. Georginr,
157 F.R.D. at 277 n.23.
71
Georgine 157 F.R.D. at 265 (citing In reAsbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415
(J.P.M.L. 1991) (order transferring cases to judge Weiner)). On January 29, 1993,Judge
Weiner conditionally certified the class in Georgineand conditionally approved the appointment of Messrs. Locks, Motley, and Rice as class counsel. Id. at 257-58. He also granted
the settling parties' motion to have Professor Stephen B. Burbank appointed as a special
master to examine the side settlements made for class counsel's clients. Id. at 258. Finally,
Judge Weiner assigned Judge Reed the task of conducting a fairness hearing on the settlement. Id.
72
Id. at 266.
73 Id. (emphasis added).
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pleural claimants in the future should receive some package of insurance-like benefits, including a waiver of the statute of limitations,
and some reasonable assurance that there would be money, among
other things, in return for deferring their receipt of cash compensation unless and until their condition worsened and they suffered
some actual impairment. 74

CCR thus knew that some, or even most, lawyers on the Plaintiffs'
Steering Committee were willing to accept this insurance package for
future claimants, but not for their present clients. According to the
court, "CCR therefore determined to, and did, continue the discussions with... two of the most respected and active firms in the asbes-

tos litigation, Ness, Motley and Greitzer and Locks."75 Those separate
negotiations, which excluded all other plaintiffs and defendants, resulted in Georgine.76

This chronology demonstrates that when the settling parties began their negotiations, CCR understood that current clients of asbestos lawyers would have to be given terms different from those CCR was
prepared to give future claimants. It thus supports my assertion that
from the beginning of the negotiations between class counsel and
CCR, the settling parties intended to accord different treatment to the
class than to the current clients of asbestos lawyers, including class
counsel's clients.
From the time Georgine was filed, the settling parties have been
careful to call the nonclass members "present claimants" and not "current clients." But this distinction is meaningless. To be a "present
claimant" and, therefore, excluded from the class, a person need only
have filed a lawsuit against the defendants before the class suit was
filed. Because the lawyers determined when the class action was to be
filed, class counsel could transform as many mere "clients" into "present claimants" as CCR would agree to compensate outside the class
action.
There is evidence that class counsel took steps to ensure that
their existing clients were transformed into "present claimants." In
the months before the class action was filed, lawyers from Ness, Motley
advised their affiliated counsel and some other asbestos lawyers to file
all the cases they could. 77 CCR was even generous enough to allow
74

Id. As is clear from the chronology detailing CCR's negotiating posture, see infra

text accompanying notes 161-70, "no immediate cash" for pleural claimants was the sine
qua non for CCR.
75 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 266.
76

Id.

77

First, in a memo dated August 21, 1992, from Mr. Motley written on Ness, Motley

stationery to "All Asbestos Personal Injury Co-Counsel," Mr. Motley urged his co-counsel

"to serve and file as many of your unfiled cases as soon as possible" as a means of having
those cases "considered present claims." Memorandum of Ronald L Motley and Charles
W. Patrick, Jr. (Aug. 21, 1992), Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa.
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class counsel to include some clients whose cases had not yet been
filed in the "present claimant" settlements, 78 making it clear that the
79
line between "present claimants" and "clients" was illusory.
Mar. 17, 1994) (Exhibit 0-16). Second, Mark H. Iola, a plaintiffs' asbestos lawyer called by
the objectors to the Georginw settlement, testified that in late 1992 at a meeting of Ness,
Motley's co-counsel and some other asbestos lawyers in Miami, Mr. Rice and Mr. Locks
briefed the group on the "futures claimants" deal that would soon become Georgine. Mr.
Iola testified that he "specifically recall[edl Joe Rice saying, that the terms as to certain ...
nonmalignant people in the futures deal [the pleurals), are going to be worse than the
terms for those people in the present system and he encouraged people to get their cases
on file." Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 68 (Mar. 80, 1994) (testimony of Mark H.
Iola).
The settling parties claimed that the August memo did not tend to show that Ness,
Motley was filing all the cases it could to avoid Geogine. They emphasized that the memo
specifically stated that the reason to get cases on file was to avoid a settlement agreement
like "the New England Agreement" that "would establish minimum medical criteria for
payment of future claims," but would leave "[p]resent claims ... not... [similarly] burdened." Proposed Findings of Fact supra note 44, at 192 (quoting August memo). The
New England model differed somewhat from Georgine see infra text accompanying notes
161-65, but it was the same in that it provided no immediate cash compensation to future
pleural claimants. It is reasonable to assume that no immediate recovery was what "burdened" future claims in the eyes of lawyers entitled to a percentage of such recoveries.
Thus, the fact that in other respects the New England deal differed from Georgineseems of
little import.
More important, the day before the August memo was written, Gene Locks, Motley's
parmer in the Georgine negotiations, entered into inventory settlements with CCR covering
the clients of the firm of Greitzer and Locks in eight states. According to the settling
parties, these settlements were stimulated by the fact that CCR was confident Georgine
would soon be filed. See infra text accompanying notes 157, 170, 177-81 (quoting settling
parties' submission to the court and wimess testimony). Mr. Motley was apparently not
actively engaged in the Georgine settlements at this time, having taken a hiatus from the
negotiations to try a large block of cases against CCR in Maryland. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D.
at 295. It is not, however, unreasonable to assume that Mr. Motley knew of the Locks
settlements and understood that they meant Georginewas on track, particularly given that
he had been involved in the Georginesettlement talks prior to his Maryland hiatus. Because
the August memo came one day after the Locks settlements, it seems fair to read it as an
effort by Ness, Motley to ensure that its co-counsel transformed as many clients as possible
into "present claimants" to avoid Georgine.
78 Other asbestos lawyers who supported the terms contained in the Georgine settlement (as demonstrated by their willingness to sign "futures provisions," see infra text accompanying notes 176-79) were also apparently permitted to include unfiled cases in
settlements made outside Georgin& For example, Mr. Hatten, a plaintiffs' lawyer who testified in support of the settlement, was allowed to settle cases under a deal that guaranteed
him higher payments than those contained in the negotiated averages in Georgine, see supra
note 58, until December 1993, without regard to whether those cases were filed. Fairness
Hearing, supranote 30, at 69, 74, 181-82 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of Robert R. Hatten).
Moreover, he apparently filed and settled cases with CCR afterJanuary 15, 1993. Id. at 74.
79 It is undisputed that CCR allowed class counsel to include some unfiled cases in the
inventory settlements. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 309 ("Class Counsel's inventory settlements
with CCR in 1992-1993 included a small percentage of unfiled cases, in accordance with
CCR's historical practice [of settling a small number of unfiled cases].") The court's emphasis on CCR's historical practice of settling cases that "were ready for filing, with the
medical work completed and some product identification established," id., only emphasizes the suspicious nature of the class definition. It highlights that many within the classall those with nearly ready but unfiled cases as ofJanuary 15, 1993-were similarly situated
to those outside the class who were given a different deal.
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There were moments when the settling parties dropped the
"present claimant" fig leaf. For example, the settling parties stated

and the court opinion repeated: "Present clients in the tort system are
not identically situated to future claimants." 80 Given the actual practices of class counsel and CCR, it appears that they consider people to
be "in the tort system" even before suit is filed.81 The phrase "clients
in the tort system" is thus redundant. In sum, "present claimants" is a

euphemism for "clients," and, for the settling parties, "future claimants" or class members means something like "those strangers out
there and clients who arrived at class counsel's offices after CCR re82
fused to pay any more people outside the class framework."

The settling parties would have denied that the shape of the class
was odd, if they had thought the shape of the class was an issue worthy
of serious attention. But they did not. The settling parties asserted
Moreover, there is no proof that the unified cases that class counsel settled were indeed "ready to be filed." Professor Hazard testified that treating "ready to be filed" cases
like filed cases did not alter his opinion that no conflict of interest arose, but did not state
the basis for his surmise that class counsel's unfiled cases were indeed "ready to be filed."
Fairness Hearing, supranote 30, at 47-49 (Feb. 25, 1994) (testimony of Geoffrey C. Hazard). The other CCR witnesses implied that the unfiled cases class counsel settled were
ready to be filed, but the basis for their apparent belief in this fact was not stated. See id. at
207-08 (Feb. 28, 1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney). Class counsel who could testify
on this matter based on personal knowledge did not testify under oath in a deposition or at
the fairness hearing. The record thus contains no evidence on the "readiness to be filed"
of the unfiled cases settled by class counsel outside Georgine
Finally, CCR's Chief Operating Officer reported that afterJanuary 15, 1993, CCR continued to settle Ness, Motley claims that were filed afterJanuary 15, 1993, outside the Georgine framework, treating those claims as akin to opt-outs from the class without having to
meet the formal requirements for opting out. Id. at 117-19 (Mar. 3, 1994) (testimony of
Michael F. Rooney). Contrast with this how finicky the settling parties were about other
class members meeting the formal requirements in order to be considered opt-outs. See,
e.g., Georgin 157 F.R.D. at 312 (explaining how court on settling parties' motion disallowed opt-outs that were signed by lawyers on behalf of their clients).
80 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 329. I will return later to the substance of this half-hearted
attempt to suggest some legitimate reason to distinguish present clients from class members with whom they are "not identical." See infra text accompanying notes 145-54. Here
the point is to notice the misuse of the word "client" and the fact that the new fig leaf "in
the tort system" adds nothing to that word.
81 As to the word, "present," there are two points I would like to make. First, "present" implies some fixed point in time. But the date the class action was filed and the date
thus "fixed" as "present" was in the hands of the settling parties. How many clients were
"present clients" was something that CCR and class counsel could determine.
Second, "present clients" implies a corollary phrase, "future clients," which is a phrase
the settling parties used to suggest that lawyers have some right to contract with third
parties in ways that affect people who might seek their advice in the future because those
people are some form of "client," albeit only a "future client." See text accompanying note
392 (arguing that attorneys agreeing as part of a settlement to restrict the representation
they provide "future clients" is a violation of the ethics rules). I avoid the word "present
client" because I believe the settling parties use it to imply this corollary proposition.
82 This latter group includes the class representatives, Anna Baumgartner, Nafssica
Kekrides, and LaVerne Winbun. I will return to the question of class counsel's treatment
of the class representatives later. See infra text accompanying notes 429-56.
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that this was a "futures class," as if the name conferred legitimacy on
83
the shape. It does not.

In a small number of cases, courts have approved the use of a
class action to resolve the tort claims of all people who are or might
become ill from a defendant's product.8 4 To the extent such cases
include the "futures" and thus approve the resolution of tort claims of
those who are not yet ill, they express a position that is hardly well
established.8 5 More important, the classes in those cases were not
shaped like the Georgine class. The class actions in those cases included all those presently ill and all those who would get sick in the
future, and none of those cases excluded all people who had filed a
83 For example, the settling parties responded to my testimony on the shape of the
class as follows:
She... testified that, in her opinion, the definition of the class, with a cutoff date for inclusion in the class, similarly created a conflict. Professor
Koniak's opinion, if credited, would mean that there could not be a futures
class, negotiated by any counsel experienced in asbestos litigation since they
would always be subject to the charge of divided loyalties to present and
future claimants.
Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 175 (citations omitted). On the contrary, I do
not and did not claim that the definition "created" a conflict. My position is that the
strangely defined class is strong evidence that there was a conflict. Thus, my opinion, "if
credited," would mean that class counsel who walks in with a class defined this way has a lot
of explaining to do and unless there is convincing evidence that the class definition is tied
to the issues common to class members alleged in the complaint, and not to class counsel's
financial interests in making different deals for his "current clients," the class should not
be certified in the form presented.
84 See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.RD. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed
without opinion, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993), and appeal dismissed, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
33691 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1993) (class of all those who had heart valve implanted); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (class of all persons
who were exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam), af'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). Whether it makes sense to describe those cases as examples
of "future class" actions is questionable, given that they include all presently ill people
along with all people who might get ill in the future.
85 See, e.g., Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979) ("[W]e do not think that future faculty members, whose possible claims are
only speculative and can only be formulated in a highly abstract and conclusory fashion,
should provide, and possibly be prejudiced by, membership in the class which [the plaintiff] seeks to represent."); Foster v. Bechtel Power Corp., 89 F.P.D. 624, 626-27 (E.D. Ark.
1981) (to allow the inclusion of futures would ignore due process considerations); Moore
v. Western Pa. Water Co., 73 F.R.D. 450, 453 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (describing futures as "an
amorphous, phantom group, incapable of identification" and refusing to include them
within the class); Freeman v. Moster Convoy, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 196, 200 (N.D. Ga. 1974)
(denying inclusion of futures because of concerns with protecting the interests of these
unnamed people); see also Elizabeth R. Kaczynski, Note, The Inclusion of Future Members in
Rule 23(b)(2) Class Action, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 397, 397 (1985) ("the inclusion of future
members in class actions is inconsistent with both the explicit requirements and the theoretical underpinnings of Rule 23, thus posing a serious threat to the due process rights of
future members"). Although Ms. Kaczynski focuses on the inclusion of futures in actions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (2), most of her arguments apply equally, if
not more forcefully, to actions under Rule 23(b) (3). As to Rule 23(b) (3) actions, she
states that futures cannot be included. Id. at 398 n.7.
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tort suit. The class definitions in those cases were tied to the common
issues of law and fact alleged in the respective complaints.8 6 Those
classes, in other words, looked like they were designed to meet the
common interests of class members-the way that a class is supposed
to be shaped 8 7-rather than the financial interests of the lawyers and
their present clients. Trying to camouflage the shape of the Georgine
class with an ill-fitting name does nothing to explain why the class
definition does not match the reasons put forth to justify the class
action form.
The district court offered a different explanation for the shape of
the Georgine class, diverging from the text written by the settling parties. The court found that the shape did not "create" a conflict of
interest because "[a] ny class for future claimants must necessarily be
defined with a cut-off date which is a logical method of identifying a
class in mass tort litigation."88 The point, however, is not that the
shape created a conflict, but that it is evidence of a conflict. The
shape strongly suggests that class counsel had some interest in mind
other than the interest of the class when they put forth this class for
certification and settlement. The court's "cut-off date" explanation
assumes that because it may be legitimate to have a class that includes
only those people whose claims have not yet arisen, any class like this
is legitimate. But this is no answer to the question of why the class
definition does not jibe with the reasons set forth in the opinion for
having a class. In discussing the shape of the class, the court simply
ignored that the definition served to dissociate class counsel's clients
from the class.
Because no mass tort class action before Georgine had been
shaped like Georgine, the court had no real authority for its suggestion
that the class shape in Georginewas legitimate. It relied circularly on
Aheam v. Fibreboard Corp.,8 9 a pending class action filed after-and
modeled on-Georgine. The Aheam class's suspicious shape, like that
86 For example, see infra note 192, giving the definition of the class in the Agent
Orange litigation, a class whose common interests in speedy and certain compensation for
injuries associated with exposure to Agent Orange precisely tracks the class definition.
87 As Judge Weinstein wrote in Dolgow v. Anderson:
Once the court has decided that a class action is superior to other available
procedural devices, the crucial prerequisite for the maintenance of a class
action under subdivision (b) (3) is the requirement that there be "questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class" and that such questions
must "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."
The predominance of these common questions, in turn, furnishes the basisfor defining the class or classes involved to the acceptable degree of precision.
43 F.RLD. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (emphasis added).
88 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 305.
89 Id. (citing Order Provisionally Certifying Class for Settlement Purposes, Ahearn v.
Fibreboard Corp., No. 93-526 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1993) [hereinafter Ahearn Certification
Order]).
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of the class in Georgine, excludes the clients of asbestos lawyers. It too
presents a class definition that is unrelated to the common questions
of law and fact invoked to justify the class action form.9 0
Aheam is not the only offspring of Georgine, which appears to be a
fast breeder. Soon after the court issued the Georgine opinion, another huge class action was filed with a Georgine-like class definition. 9 1
Georgine invites companies facing mass tort claims to minimize their
liability for future claims by paying a little extra to the first few claimants who sue.9 2 That is what makes Georgine such an important and

dangerous case.
C.

The More Generous Terms Provided to Clients

The settling parties admitted and the court acknowledged that
CCR and class counsel settled over 14,000 asbestos cases outside the
class framework while they were negotiating the Georgineclass action.93
Thus there is no question that the client settlements were made along4
side Georgine.9
The settling parties conceded that the terms negotiated for clients were different from the terms negotiated for the class, and the
court acknowledged this to be true. The settling parties conceded
that class members with only "pleural thickening or pleural plaques"95
would be ineligible for cash compensation unless and until they de90 The class in that case is defined to exclude all people with pending claims against
Fibreboard that were brought before August 27, 1993. See Ahearn Certification Order,
supra note 89.
91 Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-047368 (Harris County, Tex. Nov. 1994) (settlement defining class of persons who had not filed suit by a certain date and who owned
homes or would one day own homes that were fitted with allegedly defective plumbing).
By order dated February 16, 1995, the court denied the parties' joint motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement. Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 9-047363 (Harris County, Tex. Feb. 16, 1995). Notices of appeal have been filed. Beeman v. Shell Oil
Co., No. 93-047363 (Harris County, Tex. Mar. 8, 1995). Lawyers for the plaintiffs in Beeman
say that the class definition in Beeman serves the class's interest. Letter from Arthur H.
Bryant, Executive Director, Trial Lawyers for PublicJustice, to author (Mar. 27, 1995) (on
file with author). My position is that the shape is suspicious and that the court should
demand convincing proof that the shape meets the reasons set forth to justify the class
action form. While in general I am doubtful that this showing can be made, if it is, then
the shape would no longer be suspicious.
92 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruptionof the Class Action, WALL ST.J., Sept. 7, 1994, at
A15.
93 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295-96.
94 The public record contains only redacted versions of those agreements. Complete
versions were provided to a Special Master, Professor Stephen Burbank, whom the court
appointed to review them. See id. at 307. Objectors were provided with redacted versions
of the agreement. Id. at 260 n.9. See supra note 71 for details on the appointment of the
special master.
95
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 273.
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velop a more serious condition. 96 On the other hand, class counsel's
pleural clients received "immediate cash compensation." 97 Class
members with lung cancer would have to produce evidence of exposure to asbestos, evidence of lung cancer, and "objective evidence"
that asbestos was a substantial contributing cause of their cancer. On
the other hand, class counsel's lung cancer clients had to show evidence of asbestos exposure and lung cancer, but not causation. 9 8 The
class settlement provides that in any six-month period the average
amount offered to persons electing individualized payment procedures 99 in each compensable medical category must fall within the
negotiated average value range for that category. 0 0 But the payments
made to class counsel's 14,000 clients did not have to fall within those
ranges.' 01 Thus, the settlement terms were different.
The settling parties argued that the terms in the client settlements were not more generous than those in the class settlement, and
the court apparently accepted some of their arguments. I believe that
96 See id. at 272; see also id. at 273 (referring to the "exclusion" of "claims for pleural
changes alone").
97 The court accepted the testimony of ProfessorJohn P. Freeman, one of the ethics
experts testifying for the settling parties, that
thefact that non-impaired pleural claimants in the inventory settlements received immediate cash compensation, where similarly situated claimants under
Georginewould receive a different bundle of rights, with no immediate cash
payment, was not evidence that Class Counsel were burdened by an impermissible conflict of interest.
Id. at 298 (emphasis added). The court accepted the settling parties' argument that this
difference did not demonstrate that pleural clients received more generous terms, see discussion infra text accompanying notes 142-44, but here my only point is that there is a
difference, which the court accepted.
98 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing difference in treatment of
people with lung cancer).
99 Under the settlement, a qualifying claimant can elect a "simplified payment procedure," which will provide the claimant with payment of the minimum value for the claim in
a short period of time, or the "individualized payment procedure," which provides the
claimant with payment somewhere between the minimum and maximum value for the
claim based on various factors and which takes somewhat longer than the simplified procedure. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 276.
The settlement also provides for a third method of payment, the "extraordinary"
claims procedure. Each year a small percentage of claims, no more than three percent of
the qualifying claims in each disease category for that year, will be eligible for extraordinary treatment. There is no ceiling on the amount of money that might be paid any one
extraordinary claim, but the total amount of money available for such claims is capped for
each year. Id. Finally, a small number of people each year will have the option of exiting
to the tort system or binding arbitration. Id. at 281; see alsoAmendment to Stipulation of
Settlement of January 15, 1993, between the Class of Claimants and Defendants Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution at 7, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 930215 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1993) (providing the following percentages: for mesothelioma
and lung cancer 2%; for other cancer 1%; and for non-malignant conditions .05%). The
Georgine compensation schedule is reproduced infra note 189.
100 Stipulation of Settlement at 59, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Stipulation of Settlement].
101
See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
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the differences just described speak for themselves. However, given
my claim that the more generous client terms show that the class was
sold out, it is important to respond to the parties' arguments that the
terms were substantially equivalent. First, a caveat: it is not precisely
accurate to state that the settling parties disputed that the terms were
more generous. Neither they nor the court addressed the different
treatment of lung cancer victims. This is not surprising because re10 2
quiring less proof is more generous by definition.
It is difficult to prove that the effect of not being bound by negotiated averages in the class settlement was a boon to class counsel's
clients because the settling parties did not disclose the averages actually paid to class counsel's clients. The strenuous objections of the
settling parties to any comparison between the average settlement
amount paid to class counsel's clients and the negotiated averages for
the class might lead one to suspect that the clients did better than
class members will. However, there is more than mere suspicion to
rely on.'0 3 Professor Coffee produced a chart of the information that
was available on class counsel's client settlements: the total amount to
be paid to the clients of each of the two class counsel law firms and
the number of clients in each of the disease categories. That chart
shows what the total amount paid by CCR to each of the two law firms

102 I do not, however, mean to suggest that this obvious fact would have prevented the
settling parties from offering some argument about the different treatment of lung cancer
victims had they been pressed on this point; they generally were quite creative at disputing
the obvious. They might well have disputed that requiring less proof of class counsel's
clients is "more generous" or they might have admitted that it was "more generous" and
tried to explain how that treatment was deserved. Given that the difference so obviously
prefers class counsel's clients, I suspect they would have taken the latter route, arguing
something like: "Class counsel's reputation in the asbestos field made proof of causation
unnecessary." For a similar argument made by the settling parties, see infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
Then again, they might have argued that the explicit language of the Ness, Motley
agreements, stating that lung cancer and asbestos exposure suffice to qualify the client for
compensation, does not reflect what they really agreed to or what they really did. In other
words, they might have argued that despite the contractual language, COR actually would
not pay any of Ness, Motley's lung cancer clients without proof of causation similar to that
required of class members and that, despite the contractual language, Ness, Motley complied with this extra-contractual provision in every single case involving lung cancer. For a
similar argument made by the settling parties, see infra text accompanying notes 412-15.
How would one prove any different?
But this is all speculation. The fact is that neither the settling parties nor the court
addressed the import of the two different levels of proof required of lung cancer victims
under the two deals.
103 ProfessorJohn C. Coffee of Columbia Law School testified for the objectors to this
settlement. He accepted no payment for the time and effort he devoted to this case. See
Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 21 (Mar. 29, 1994) (testimony ofJohn C. Coffee).
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would have been, had their clients been required to comply with the
04
negotiated averages.'
According to this information, Ness, Motley settled its clients'
cases for $138,077,100.105 If each of those clients had received the
maximum average payment for a class member with that person's disease, Ness, Motley's clients would have been paid a total of
$89,660,000.106 Meanwhile, Greitzer and Locks settled its clients'
cases for $77,417,000.107 If each of those clients had received the maximum average payment, they would have been paid $44,907,500.108
Thus, Ness, Motley negotiated payments for its clients that were fiftyfour percent better than those it negotiated for the class, and Greitzer
104 The chart, Exhibit 0-170, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa.
1994), is reproduced below. Note that the chart assumes (see Column [B] below) that each
of class counsel's clients would have received the maximum value of the values that define
the negotiated average range. That assumption undoubtedly results in overstating how
well class counsel's clients would have done under Georgine and consequently results in
understating how much better the clients and lawyers did by keeping the clients out of

COMPARISON OF NESS, MOTLEY INVENTORY SETTLEMENTS
WITH GEORGINE NEGOTIATED AVERAGE VALUE RANGE
[A]
[B]
GEORGNE NEG.
NUMBER OF
AVG. VALUE RANGE
DISEASE
INV. CASES
CATEGORY
[HIGH-END]
[AX B]
97
$60,000
Mesothelioma
$ 5,820,000
Lung Cancer
315
$30,000
$ 9,450,000
Other Cancer
85
$12,500
$ 1,062,500
Non-Malignant
9,777
$ 7,500
$ 73,327,500
$ 89,660,000
Total [C]:
Total Actually Paid Ness, Motley Inventory Claimants...
[D]:
$138,077,100
DIFFERENCE ED-C]:
$ 48,417,100
COMPARISON OF GREITZER & LOCKS INVENTORY SETTLEMENTS
WITH GEORGINE NEGOTIATED AVERAGE VALUE RANGE
[A]
[B]
GEORGINE NEG.
NUMBER OF
AVG. VALUE RANGE
DISEASE
INV. CASES
[HIGH-END]
CATEGORY
[AX B]
Mesotheliom,a
174
$60,000
$ 10,440,000
Lung Cancer
$ 8,130,000
271
$30,000
Other Cancerr
52
$12,500
$ 650,000
Non-Maligna at
3,425
$ 7,500
$ 25,687,500
Total [C]:
$ 44,907,500
Total Actually Paid Grietzer & Locks Inventory Claimants...
[D]:
$ 77,417,000
DIFFERENCE [D-C]:
$ 32,509,500
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and Locks negotiated payments for its clients that were seventy-two
percent better. 10 9
Moreover, class counsel apparently charged their clients at least
thirty-three percent as a fee. 110 Had those clients been in the class,
they would have been charged no more than twenty-five percent and
perhaps as little as twenty percent."' Glass counsel's interest in collecting the fees from their clients that the clients had contracted to
pay is a questionable justification for paying clients more than class
members." 2 However, even if it were a legitimate reason to pay clients more, it would not explain a fifty to seventy percent larger payment to the clients." 3
By keeping its clients out of Georgine, Ness, Motley ensured that,
after attorney's fees, its clients collected" 4 at least sixteen percent
According to the settling parties, Greitzer and Locks agreed to the basic structure
of Georgine before Ness, Motley did. Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 76-77 (Mar. 1,
1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney). An economist would thus not find it difficult to
explain the fact that Greitzer and Locks received a larger premium: Ness, Motley's agreement was worth less to CCR because CCR already had at least one reputable plaintiffs' firm
on board.
110 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 309 (finding no reason to expect that class counsel would
have reduced their contingency fees in settling the present client cases); id.at 277 (finding
that asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers generally charge a contingency fee between 33% and 40%).
111 Under the settlement, the fee that may be charged by an attorney is limited to 25%
of the compensation award received by the claimant and 20% of any amount above the
maximum value for the relevant disease category, which is received by a claimant whose
claim is selected for "extraordinary" treatment. Id. at 285. For a description of the various
payment procedures available under the settlement, see supra note 99.
112
Class counsel's interest in seeing to it that other plaintiffs' lawyers could charge
more than the 25% fee cap in Georgine would allow is no better ajustification.
113 At most the difference in lawyers' fees would account for a 33% overpayment to
clients. That figure assumes that class counsel might have charged its clients 40% and
would have charged class members only 20%. It is determined in the following way: a
client would receive 60% of X to equal 80% of $1.00; solving for X, one gets $1.33.
114 This statement is not precisely accurate, given that the client settlements provided
that clients would receive their payment over time. The settling parties tried to use the fact
that the payments would be made over time to their advantage by arguing that this devalued the actual payments made to clients in comparison to those that would be made to the
class. See Fairness Hearing, supranote 30, at 271-72 (Mar. 29, 1994) (cross-examining Professor Coffee on how his chart did not take into account that some client settlements were
to be paid out over time). The settling parties' argument, however, plays fast and loose
with the facts. The redacted client settlement agreements omit the details on what percentage of the total recovery is to be paid in any installment, and some of the settlements
lack any information on when the installment payments will be made.
But the information that is available from the redacted documents shows that at least
7000 of class counsel's clients will have been paid in full by the end of 1995, which is
probably the earliest date on which any class member will see payment. See Settling Parties'
Exhibits 302A. 302B, 302C, 303 [hereinafter SP Exhibits]. An additional 2602 clients will
have been paid in full by the end of 1996, with 14 of the 16 installment payments due those
clients having been made by the end of 1995. See SP Exhibits 302C, supra, (Greitzer and
Locks' Pennsylvania settlement). The latest installment dates revealed by the client settlements involve 3891 West Virginia cases to be paid in seven installments: two in 1993, two in
1994, and one each in 1995, 1996, and 1997. See SP Exhibits 302A, 302B, supra While
109
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more than they would have collected had they been subject to Georgine's negotiated averages. 115 Similarly, Greitzer and Locks ensured
that, after attorney's fees, its clients made at least twenty-nine percent
more. 1 6 More important, by keeping its clients out of the class, Ness,
Motley may have increased the fees it collected from 103% to
208%. 117 And Greitzer and Locks may have increased its fees by 128%
to 245%.118
The settling parties disputed that Professor Coffee's chart demonstrated that class counsel's clients did much better outside Georgine.119
First, they argued that the real issue was whether the client settlements
were more favorable to their clients than past inventory settlements
these last two settlements show that some number of clients will not receive all their money
until 1996 or 1997, given the number of installments in earlier years it is reasonable to
assume that the percentage of the recovery to be paid in those years is relatively small.
More important, the existence of these West Virginia late payments is outweighed by the
fact that at least 1500 of class counsel's clients will have been paid in full by the end of 1994
before any class member is likely to have received a dime.
115
The 16% figure assumes that Ness, Motley charged a fee of 40% to its clients and
that it would have charged only 20% if those clients had been in the class. With those
assumptions, Ness, Motley's clients made $11,166,260 more than they would have made
had they been paid the high-end of the negotiated averages set by Georgina Of course,
class counsel might have charged 38% to their inventory clients and 25% to those in the
class, which would mean that the clients made $25,311,657 more than they would have
under Georgine ; negotiated averages. Under this latter, more realistic, scenario, class counsel's clients did 38% better outside the class. It should be noted that most of Ness, Motley's
client settlements were made in association with affiliated counsel, so that Ness, Motley
itself did not retain all the money it collected in fees, whatever that amount was. See SP
Exhibits 302A, 302B, supra note 114. That fact does not change the basic point being
made in the text.
116
The 29% figure assumes that Greitzer and Locks charged a fee of 40% to its clients
and that it would have charged only 20% if those clients had been in the class. With those
assumptions, Greitzer and Locks's clients made $10,524,200 more than they would have
made had they been paid the high-end of the negotiated averages set by Georgina Again,
however, it is even more likely that Greitzer would have charged 33% to its clients and 25%
had they been in the class, which would mean that the clients made $18,188,765 more than
they would have made under Georgine's negotiated averages-54% better.
117 If Ness, Motley charged 33% to its clients and would have charged 25% under
Georgine, Ness, Motley made $23,165,443 more in fees by avoiding Georgim, a 103% bonus.
If Ness, Motley charged 40% to its clients and would have charged 20% under Georgine,
then the bonus is $37,310,840 or 208%. If Ness, Motley had discounted its fees for its
clients to the fee they would have charged under Georgin say 25%, then Ness, Motley
would have made only 54% more in fees by avoiding the class. But that still amounts to
$12,119,275, a substantial sum.
118 If Greitzer and Locks charged 33% to its clients and would have charged 25%
under Georgine, Greitzer and Locks made $14,320,735 more in fees by avoiding Georgine, a
128% bonus. If Greitzer and Locks charged 40% to its clients and would have charged
20% under Georgine, then the bonus is $21,985,300 or 245%. If Greitzer and Locks had
discounted its fees for its clients to the fee they would have charged under Georgine, say
25%, then Greitzer and Locks would have made only 72% more in fees by avoiding the
class. But that still amounts to $8,127,375. Moreover, the record supports the conclusion
that neither Ness, Motley nor Greitzer and Locks reduced the fees it charged its clients. See
supra note 110.
119 Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 44, at 190-92.
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between CCR and class counsel. The court appointed Professor Burbank120 to compare the details of the client settlements and to determine whether they were like the settlements made between class
counsel and CCR from 1988 to 1992.121 Professor Burbank reported
that the client settlements roughly matched the historical settlement
averages of class counsel. 122 The settling parties and the court relied
on this study to show that CCR did not pay a premium to class counsel
123
in the client settlements.
However, the study fails to explain how or why the class appears
to have done so much worse. As discussed below, the settling parties'
and the court's attempts to explain this are extremely weak.' 24 On the
other hand, if the client settlements matched past settlements, it does
seem to support the settling parties' claim that the settlements were
not "payoffs" to class counsel. Except, there is a strong reason to believe that the settlement value of cases in 1993, the year of the client
settlements, was dramatically lower than the settlement value of similar cases in prior years. If so, CCR's payment of historical value for
class counsel's cases demonstrates that CCR paid a premium.
Why would the settlement value be dramatically lower in 1993
than it was from 1988 to 1990, three of the five years included in Professor Burbank's analysis as a base for comparison? According to
CCR's own witnesses, the world had changed: CCR's settlement philosophy was quite different between 1988 and 1990.125 After 1991,
CCR refused to settle large blocks of cases and would generally make
120 This appointment was actually made by Judge Weiner, who first had jurisdiction
over this matter. See supra note 71. The objectors alleged thatJudge Weiner had so involved himself in pushing for some sort of global solution to the asbestos litigation that he

should recuse himself from the case. Judge Weiner refused. Carlough et al. v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215, slip op. at 22, 10-22 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 15, 1993) (mem.) (order
denying motion to recuse). Nonetheless, he turned the job of presiding over the fairness
hearing to Judge Reed. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 245, 258. Judge Reed wrote the opinion
approving the Georgine settlement that I criticize in this Article.
121
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 307.
122 For a complete description of Professor Burbank's methodology and results, see id.
at 308. In short, Professor Burbank analyzed the inventory settlements for four states, as a
representative sample: the home states of class counsel's law firms, South Carolina and
Pennsylvania, and two states designated by counsel for the objectors-Illinois and New
Jersey. For all four states Professor Burbank received historical data on the settlements
between class counsel and the CCR defendants for the years 1988-1992. He then calculated the dollar and percentage differences between the historical averages and the inventory settlements made alongside Georgine. Professor Burbank found that the inventory
settlements in the home states were generally lower than the historical averages for each
firm in its home state, ranging from 3-14% lower. In the objector-designated jurisdictions,
the results were a little more mixed. For most disease categories in Illinois and NewJersey,
the inventory settlements were lower than historical averages, but the mesothelioma inventory settlements tended to be higher than historical averages-from 7-30% higher.
123

Id. at 309-10.

124

See infra text accompanying notes 137-56.
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294. See also infra text accompanying notes 159-66.

125
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only settlements that were trial driven. 12 6 Federal asbestos cases were
no longer going to trial because the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict
Litigation had transferred all federal personal injury asbestos litigation to the district court in Philadelphia (the MDL).1 27 Thus, the settlement value in 1993 of federal cases was not what it was in 1988,
1989, and 1990. Moreover, CCR's witnesses testified that CCR made
almost no inventory settlements in 1991 and 1992-aside, that is, from
28
the client settlements negotiated in tandem with Georgine.'
To this, the settling parties and the court responded that most of
the cases in the client settlements negotiated by class counsel at the
same time as Georgine were state cases and were thus unaffected by the
MDL transfer. 129 But block settlements of "stuck" federal cases and
"unimpeded" state cases should still reflect a lower average amount
than settlements involving unimpeded cases (that is, settlements that
took place prior to the MDL).130 The settling parties denied this too,
relying on testimony by CCR witnesses that CCR would never have
offered a lower average amount for a mixed package of state and federal cases merely because the federal cases were worth less.' 3 ' The
court credited this testimony without so much as remarking on CCR's
dubious assertion that it would have ignored the effects of the
MDL. 1 32 The court could have taken judicial notice of facts that sup-

ported the objectors' claim that the settlement value of cases in 1993
was lower than that in the 1988 to 1990 period.1 33 Instead, it credited
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294.
Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 135-38 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of Robert R.
Hatten) (testifying on concerns of plaintiffs' lawyers that federal cases were not being remanded for trial); id. at 48 (Mar. 30, 1994) (testimony of Mark H. Iola) (describing "black
hole" of MDL where federal cases disappeared and could not get to trial); id. at 68-69
(Mar. 29, 1994) (testimony ofJohn C. Coffee) (describingJudge Weiner's April 15, 1993,
order stating that no cases would be remanded for trial "except in extreme instances where
the plaintiff was near death and all [settlement avenues] had been exhausted").
128
Id. at 147-48, 191-92 (Feb. 23, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick) (stating
that from 1991 on, CCR would settle only trial-driven cases and, at first, the inventories of
lawyers who recommended pleural registries, and later, after CCR was confident that a
Gearginedeal would be struck, the inventories of lawyers who signed "futures provisions"
that accepted the basic criteria in Georgine).
129
See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 309.
130 Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 70-72 (Mar. 29, 1994) (testimony of John C.
Coffee) (quoting from a letter written by Mr. Motley on June 25, 1992 that describes how,
after the MDL was instituted, at least one "major defendant" was offering X for state cases
and X divided by two for federal cases).
'3' Id. at 226 (Feb. 28, 1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney); it. at 24 (Feb. 23,
1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick).
132 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 308-09.
133 The court knew that plaintiffs' lawyers were having great difficulty getting cases
remanded for trial because it was the very court that was refusing to remand the cases.
Moreover, every judge knows that this lowers the settlement value of a case. Finally, the
record in Gergineis clear on CCR's settlement posture post-1991, i.e., no block settlements
without "protection for the future." And every judge must know that the only way CCR
126

127
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CCR's self-serving testimony that it would not have considered the
MDL in settling cases and refused to admit evidence that tended to
show that the value of federal cases was one-half or less after the
MDL.l'4

Acceptance of the Burbank analysis does not, however, solve all
the problems raised by Professor Coffee's chart. The chart still seems
to show that clients were paid more money than they would have been
paid had they been in the class. If the client settlements did not reflect a premium, why was the class not paid an equivalent amount?
Alternatively, if the class was paid a "fair amount" and the clients received more, it strongly supports the objectors' arguments that the
MDL reduced the value of claims in 1993, that CCR paid class counsel
a premium, and that class members would have received more had
their counsel not been seeking to maximize other interests while representing the class.
Untroubled by these questions, the court relied heavily on the
Burbank study to demonstrate that the class was not "sold out." It
concluded that the client settlements were based on historical averages and that "[t]his would be so whether or not Georgine were approved." 35 The court's assertion that the client settlements would
have been made regardless of Georgineis not supported by the record.
could afford to take such a posture was that fewer cases were trial-driven because of the
MDL. Thus, the court had ample reason to question the "proof"offered to show no premium was paid because that proof was based on settlements paid in years when the world
was different
134
The court's dismissal of the common sense and economically sound conclusion
that the MDL reduced the settlement value of cases is worth quoting at length:
[T]his Court finds that the CCR defendants never had a policy to seek a
discount for the settlement of federal cases based upon the MDL stay order,
and never offered less than historical averages for the settlement of pending federal cases as a result of the MDL. Rooney 2/28/94 Tr. at 226; Fitzpatrick 2/23/94 Tr. at 24. A portion of the evidence upon which Professor
Coffee relied [to conclude that the MDL depressed settlement value] was
excluded as inadmissible hearsay (Coffee 3/29/94 Tr. at 79, 80-81). The
rest of the evidence upon which Professor Coffee relied either did not implicate the settlement policy of CCR or was not credible to the Court. See
Exhibit 0-15 and Rooney 3/1/94 Tr. at 107-08 (in letter, Mr. Motley referred to the settlement policy of an asbestos defendant [to pay less because
of the MDL] that was not one of the CCR defendants); Iola 3/30/94 (plaintiff attorney's testimony that cases are "stuck" in the MDL not credible because [he] has historically settled only thirty cases with CCR). See also
Hatten 3/18/94 Tr. at 55 (values in federal court cases were not depressed
in 1992 because of the MDL).
Corgine, 157 F.R.D. at 308-09. Mr. Rooney and Mr. Fitzpatrick were witnesses for CCR.
Mr. Iola was an Objector's witness; his testimony was not found credible. Mr. Hatten was a
witness for the settling parties; the court accepted his testimony. Moreover, the court's
assessment of Mr. Hatten's credibility was not affected by the fact that he admitted that
CCR continued until December 1994 to settle Mr. Hatten's cases, outside Georgine, at his
"historic" rate, whether or not those clients cases had been filed byJanuary 15, 1993. See
supra note 78.
135
See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 310.
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It ignores the uncontradicted testimony of CCWs principals that, had
they not been confident Georginewould be filed, they would not have
36
made the client settlements on CCR's behalf.'
Although the settling parties relied heavily on the Burbank study,
they did attempt to address the Coffee chart directly. First, they argued that class counsel's clients might have received the same amount
under Georgine that they received under the side-settlements. The settling parties listed a jumble of factors that supposedly explained how
CCR could legitimately pay class counsel's clients a total amount fifty
to seventy percent greater than the best CCR would provide class
members under the negotiated averages.' 3 7 Basically, the settling parties' argument rested on one fact: they had negotiated a class settlement that made a claimant's recovery dependent, in part, on the
identity of the lawyer the claimant retains to process her claim
through the dispute resolution mechanism established by the class settlement. If the claimant hires a lawyer who has historically received

136
137

See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 170 (quoting testimony).
Illustrative of the jumble:
[Professor Coffee's chart] does not reflect Class Counsel's historical settlement averages; it does not reflect settlement amounts that would actually be
offered to any Georgineclass member;, and does not provide sufficient information to support the conclusion reached by Professor Coffee that had the
inventory claimants' cases been resolved under Georgine, they would not
have received comparable compensation. Professor Coffee did not consider the value of extraordinary claims in his analysis. He did not consider
it possible for certain Class Counsel's settlements to exceed the negotiated
average range and still be considerably less than the "maximum value" in
the Compensation Schedule (Exhibit B) to the Stipulation. Professor Coffee testified that he understood that, for any particular period, there could
be low settlement values that would bring down the overall average, but he
did not consider that there could be a sufficient mix of cases, with low
enough settlement value, to balance Class Counsel's cases.

In reaching his conclusion, Professor Coffee did not review or consider
lower settlement averages in otherjurisdictions. He did not have any actual
data showing that Class Counsel's clients would not have received comparable compensation under Georne. He relied instead on what he called "statistical knowledge." Applying his statistical test, Professor Coffee testified
that the odds were against all non-malignant cases coming up in the upper
quadrant, but he did not consider the impact on his analysis if some, but
not al4 of these cases, and the cases in the other disease categories, were
settled above the "negotiated average value range," with the remaining settled cases at or below the average. Professor Coffee's analysis assumed that
the Ness, Motley and Greitzer and Locks inventory settlements could not
have exceeded the high point of the average range if settled under Georgine
over some period of time, but there is no evidence in the record to support
this assumption or to support Professor Coffee's theory of collusion.
Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 191-92 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The above two paragraphs are the only part of the settling parties' Proposed Findings
of Fact that deal directly with Professor Coffee's chart.
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high settlement values from CCR-like class counsel 3 8-she will be
offered more money. 3 9
If this is true, it means that class counsel negotiated a settlement
ensuring that their future clients would do fifty to seventy percent bet-

ter than everyone else.140 This is not a ringing endorsement of class
counsel's faithfulness to the class's interests. What possible interest
could class members have in a settlement that ensured that a class
member who stumbled into the wrong lawyer's office would receive
considerably less than if she had had the good sense to hire class
4
counsel?' '
The court was apparently unimpressed with the jumble of factors
argument, because it made another of its relatively rare digressions

from the settling parties' text. The court found that the Coffee chart
"[lacks] sufficient information to support a finding" that the clients
did better than the class.' 42 The court also suggested that the clients
138
See Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 88 (Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick) (referring to Exhibit 0-28 and explaining that it showed that in every disease
category Greitzer and Locks had a higher historical settlement average than the average
law firm); id. at 241-43 (Mar. 29, 1994) (questioning of Professor Coffee by Mr. Motley
implying that Coffee's chart was flawed because it failed to consider that Ness, Motley's
firm might receive higher than average settlements from CCR based on the firm's past
record).
139 See infra notes 308-16 and accompanying text (explaining how identity of counsel
affects recoveries under Georgine).
140 They would have accomplished this, according to their story, in large part by ensuring that under Georgine the lawyer's historical settlement averages would play a substantial
factor in determining a class member's recovery. See supra note 137. In an effort to
counter Coffee's evidence, the settling parties thus stressed the important role that the
identity of one's counsel would play under Georgina See infra text accompanying notes 30309 (discussing provision in the settlement that provides that a class member gets more
money depending on who his lawyer is). Elsewhere, the court had to minimize the importance of this factor. See infra text accompanying note 315.
141 The argument that this mirrors the tort system will not wash. See Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 44, at 102 (making this argument). In the tort system, although a
law firm's past performance undoubtedly influences the settlement figures that firm can
command, if a law firm begins to do shoddy work, then the settlements that the firm can
demand of defendants will ultimately decrease in value. As a result, that firm presumably
will get fewer high-quality cases over time. Thus, for a law firm's historical settlement record to be taken into account by defendants generally can be said to benefit client-consumers because it encourages law firms to stay sharp.
On the other hand, under Georgine a law firm's historical settlement averages are frozen into consideration as a factor. Thus, there is little incentive for a firm to improve its
services or even to maintain past levels of service. Firms can rest on their laurels. For this
reason, the provision in Georgine that builds in historical averages as a factor of recovery
may be subject to antitrust challenge as an illegal attempt to divide a market and freeze out
new entrants. See infra note 306 and accompanying text. The "identity" provision of the
settlement and related provisions that also serve the interests of lawyers, not class members,
are discussed later. See infra text accompanying notes 303-26.
142
The court wrote:
Having reviewed Exhibit 0-170, the Court finds that it does not provide
sufficient information to support a finding that the claimants in the inventory settlement would not have fared as well under the Stipulation.
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did not necessarily get a better deal even if they received more
money. 143 This argument has no evidentiary basis and is inherently
implausible. The class members and the clients are similarly situated. 4 4 If more money merely makes the client deals look better, why
do similarly situated clients get such different looking deals? This
question is particularly important because ultimately neither the settling parties nor the court can demonstrate that the "more money"
deal is equal to the "less money plus fringe benefit" deal, and the settling parties are supposed to bear the burden of proving "fairness"
and "adequacy of counsel."
One might presume that settling parties and the court, unable to
demonstrate the deals were equal, at least spent some energy demonstrating that clients were not similarly situated to class members. They
did not. They spent some time asserting that there were differences,
but not with a good deal of commitment. The settling parties and the
Gorgine, 157 F.R.D. at 310.
Professor Coffee's chart is not based on the best evidence, see supranote 104, but that
is the court's own doing. More important, the evidence it is based on is unduly favorable
to the settling parties. The chart would have been even stronger as a piece of evidence had
Professor Coffee been able to compare what the average mesothelioma client received to
Geargine'snegotiated averages for mesothelioma class members and then done the same
for each medical category recognized by Georgin. But the court refused to order the settling parties to disclose that information. By limiting the information available to the objectors, the settling parties and the court in effect forced Professor Coffee to understate
how much more money was paid to class counsel's clients by keeping them out of Georgine.
This is true because it is undisputed that some number of class counsel's clients would
have received no cash under Georgine, either because they were pleural clients or lung
cancer clients who could not satisfy Georgine'sstandards of proof. But Professor Coffee had
no way of knowing how many of class counsel's clients would be in the no-cash category
because the client settlements did not identify pleural clients or give details about the lung
cancer cases. Professor Coffee's chart, therefore, assumes that every one of the clients
would receive the high-end of the negotiated average under Georgine. This is counterfactual and results in a significant understatement of how much more the clients actually
made by being kept out of the class. It is hardly persuasive then for the court to reject
Professor Coffee's chart on the ground that it is based on insufficient information. Sufficient information only would have made the overpayment to clients seem worse.
143 The Court wrote:
This Court has also found that, during the course of the settlement negotiations in this class action, there were reasons for decreasing the values in the
compensation schedules in the Stipulation from CCR's historical averages.
These reasons included the fact that the Stipulation involves a waiver of
defenses to qualifying claimants by the CCR defendants; that payments
under the Stipulation should, in most cases, be made faster than under the
tort system at considerably lower transaction costs, including attorneys'
fees; and finally, that qualifying claimants with non-malignant conditions
will be able to receive additional compensation if and when they contract
cancer. Professor Coffee's inquiry into how well the inventory claimants
would have fared under the Stipulation ignored these reasons, and thus the
Court finds his opinion on this issue unpersuasive.
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 310-11.
144 See infra text accompanying notes 145-55 (discussing attempts of court and settling
parties to distinguish clients from class members).
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court said this: The two groups were "not identically situated." 14 5
This weak assertion is hardly adequate to explain why the two groups
got such different looking deals. The question the court and the setfling parties had to answer is: how are the clients different from the
class members in a way that might justify the different treatment they
received?
According to the court and the settling parties, the two groups
are "not identical" because the clients, or "present claimants" as the
settling parties prefer to call them, have "transaction costs" that differentiate them from the class.14 6 First, this explanation is unsupported
by any evidence in the record. It is an assertion and nothing more. 147
Second, even if we assume that clients had additional transaction costs
associated with filing suit (or getting ready to file suit), these are not
the only, nor indeed the most costly, transaction costs that someone
exposed to asbestos might have. Some pleural class members might
have incurred costs prior to January 15, 1993, or might later incur
costs associated with their exposure, such as the cost of medical
monitoring.
Finally, the transaction costs may very well have been trivial for
many, if not most, of class counsel's clients. To be eligible for inclusion in an inventory settlement, a client need not have filed a deposition, hired medical experts, or incurred any costs specifically
associated with the lawsuit. 14
Moreover, lawyers typically pay any
such litigation transaction costs, not clients. 14 9 The only "transaction
145 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 298. Of course, one might ask: Who is "identically situated"? Surely not the various members of the Georgine class, some of whom are dying, see
supra note 9, and some of whom never will be very ill at all (those future pleural claimants
who never will get a more serious disease) but all of whom were handled under one deal.
146
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 298 (relying on testimony of Professor Hazard).
147 The court cites Professor Hazard's testimony on behalf of the settling parties for
the proposition that the clients had already incurred some transaction costs. Id. Professor
Hazard was, however, merely an expert witness on the ethics of class counsel and the absence of collusion between the settling parties. He had no personal knowledge of whether
the clients in the inventory settlement had incurred transaction costs, and his testimony
could only be speculation on what might account for the different treatment of the two
groups.
148 To collect under an inventory settlement, clients only needed a doctor's report
testifying to their condition and some proof of exposure to the defendants' products. See
SP Exhibits 302A, 302B, supra note 114. No deposition testimony and no discovery was
necessary.
149 Model Rule 1.8(e) (1) allows a lawyer to advance court costs and the expenses of
litigation, even when repayment is contingent on the outcome of the litigation. See MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (1) (1994). Under the Model Code DR 5103(B), the lawyer could only advance costs when the client remained ultimately liable for
the expenses. SeeMODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrTY DR 5-103(B) (1980). Even
under the Code's regime, plaintiffs' lawyers typically advance such costs and expenses without demanding repayment of clients whose claims were unsuccessful. See County of Suffolk
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407, 1414-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (criticizing DR 5103(B) as outmoded), aftd, 907 F.2d 1295, 1414-16 (2d Cir. 1990).
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cost" the clients had that most class members did not was the expense
of bus fare, cab fare, or gasoline necessary to get to a lawyer's office to
sign a retainer. In sum, the fifty to seventy percent difference between
payments to clients and to class members is too great to be explained
by transaction costs.
Perhaps embarrassed by the emptiness of the "transaction cost"
argument, the settling parties relied on, and the court adopted, a second argument that might be called the "expectation" distinction. 50
The settling parties argued that class counsel's clients "had a realistic
expectation that their cases were going to be resolved in the tort sys152
tem,"15 1 while the class had "different expectations."
Like the transaction cost distinction, the expectation distinction
is not supported by any evidence. 155 Indeed, the expectation distinction is so ephemeral that it is hard to imagine what evidence might
support it. Regardless, the court concluded: "Present clients in the
tort system are not identically situated to future claimants. They already have engaged a lawyer, they already have made or committed to
expenditures, have a place in the trial queue and have expectations of
54
a certain course of proceedings.'
This is nonsense. Contacting a lawyer does not get one a "place
in the trial queue" or mean that one has "made" or even "committed
to expenditures," unless commitments that one is not called on to repay are to count. Even if a "place in the trial queue" had been taken
or "commitments to expenditures" had been made, why should those
things lead to more money? Moreover, if class members expect different proceedings and no cash, it is only because class counsel negotiated Georgine's provisions for them and made those provisions
different from the provisions negotiated for clients. How can class
members' different "expectations" then be offered to prove that the
negotiation of the dissimilar terms was justified?
There is, however, one obvious way in which clients are not similarly situated to class members: Class counsel's clients and the clients
of other asbestos lawyers already had lawyers who expected compensation directly proportional to the amount of money their clients received. By contrast, the class has lawyers who get paid through a court
award, whether or not the pleural class members get money or the
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 299.
Id. at 298 (quoting Professor Freeman's testimony).
152 Id. (citing Professor Freeman's testimony).
153 For this proposition the Court cited the testimony of another one of the settling
parties' expert wimesses, ProfessorJohn P. Freeman. Id. There is no evidence in the record that Professor Freeman had any personal knowledge of the "expectations" of clients or
class members. He was merely offering his ideas on how one might account for the different treatment of clients.
154 Id. at 329.
150

151
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lung cancer class members have higher hurdles of proof. Thus class
counsel's "expectations" and "transaction costs" provide a much more
plausible explanation for the cash paid to the pleural clients and for
all the other differences between the two deals than the feeble arguments offered by the settling parties and accepted by the court. By
disassociating their clients from the class, class counsel could achieve a
result they could not have achieved through the settlement.
What court would approve a settlement that provided that class
members who had not already engaged lawyers got "insurance" or
"had to prove more to qualify for recovery," while class members who
had engaged lawyers got cash or had to prove less? But that is precisely the type of settlement that the district court approved by blessing Georgine, which excluded clients to make them eligible for
separate deals. 155 In sum, the clients did better than the class members, and even if some did not, their lawyers profited by keeping them
156
out of the class.
Unlike class counsel, CCR appears to have done worse by excluding the clients from the class, agreeing to pay the pleural clients, easing standards of proof for the lung cancer clients, and paying much
more money overall in the client settlements than they would have
reasonably expected to pay under Georgine. CCR did worse-unless it
could not get Georgine any other way.
D. Were the Client Settlements Made in Exchange for Georgine?
The settling parties deny that the client settlements were made in
exchange for Georgine. Although they acknowledge that there was a
connection between the client settlements and Georgine, they deny
that the connection was an exchange. A proffer submitted on behalf
of CCR some months before the fairness hearing explained the settling parties' position:
[T]he prospect that the [Georgine] settlement will provide the CCR

defendants with certain assurances for the future has stimulated
these recent [client] settlement efforts. Nevertheless, the terms of
the [client] settlements recently reached by the CCR defendants
with [class] counsel [and other asbestos lawyers] ...and the terms
of the [Georgine] settlement are otherwise wholly independent of
155 Only the settlement in Georgineisworse because no showing of substantial "transaction costs" must be shown before a lawyer's present clients are eligible for the better deal.
156
If the "insurance" provided pleural class members would have been better for some
clients than cash, then it is interesting to note that apparently none of them demanded it.
Perhaps this is because class counsel never asked their clients whether they would prefer
the class deal. In any event, whether the class deal would have been better for some pleural clients, the lawyers made more money by keeping all pleural clients out of the class and
thus eligible for immediate cash compensation.
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each other, and neither has served as consideration for the
15 7
other.

This is false. First, the evidence showed that class counsel's agreement
to the basic structure of Georgine"stimulated" the client settlements by
giving CCR enough of the price it was asking in exchange for those
client settlements for CCR to make the client deals. "Stimulation," in
other words, is nothing but a euphemism for "consideration." Second, the "terms" of the two deals are not "wholly independent."

As the settling parties explained, in 1989 and 1990 it was CCR's
"settlement philosophy.., to settle large numbers of pending claims"
through "block or 'inventory' settlements."' 5 8 CCR found, however,
that this policy was "not diminishing the number of pending
claims."' 5 9 Consequently, in 1991 it "determined [as a general matter] . . .to make inventory settlements only if it could obtain some
kind of protection for the future."' 60 In other words, CCR set the
price of an inventory settlement as "protection for the future."
At first, the future protection CCR demanded in exchange for an
inventory deal was support for the establishment of pleural registries. 161 A pleural registry is a docket set up by a court to defer the
claims of people who have pleural changes due to asbestos exposure
but do not meet the registry's criteria for impairment. The pleural
claimant's case is deferred until the person's condition worsens

enough, if ever, to meet the registry's impairment criteria; in exchange, the statute of limitation is tolled as to illnesses that meet the
162
registry's criteria.

157
CCR Proffer at 17, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
[hereinafter CCR Proffer] (citations omitted).
158
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294.

159 Id.
160 Id.; see also Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 150.
161 "During the period of the MDL global settlement negotiations in 1991, CCR's position was that it was not prepared to agree to 'inventory settlements,' unless the plaintiffs'
bar was willing to work with CGR and the courts for the establishment of pleural registries."
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294 (citing Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 146, 161, 191-92 (Feb.
23, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick)).
162 Id. at 294 n.41. Georgine's provisions for pleural class members could be characterized as setting up a mandatory national pleural registry. The settling parties dispute this,
arguing that pleural registries do not provide claimants with any assurance that the defendants will be around and able to pay when and if a more serious illness develops, whereas
Georgine does provide some such assurance. Georgine does not, however, require the defendants to set aside money now to assure that deferred claimants who get sicker will be
paid. The "assurance" that Georgine offers is not, therefore, terribly concrete: it is an assurance based on the notion that Georginewill guarantee the financial viability of the defendants, preventing bankruptcy. I am therefore skeptical about how much different Georgineis
from a national pleural registry, at least from the viewpoint of a pleural class member.
The settling parties emphasize the difference largely to explain that class counsel's
advice to its affiliated counsel to file cases to avoid the possibility of pleural registries had
nothing to do with Georgine. See supranote 77. I am equally skeptical of this explanation.
Some people might also dispute my characterization of Georgine as a mandatory pleural
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A group of lawyers representing asbestos victims in New England
accepted CCR's price, agreeing to urge their courts to adopt
mandatory pleural registries. In exchange, CCR agreed to inventory
settlements for their cases. 16 3 In general, however, plaintiffs' lawyers
were not jumping to accept this exchange. 6 4 And, for their part, the
defendants were not entirely satisfied with the deal because "[u]nless
there was a national pleural registry, one could simply go to an adjoining state, if one wanted to and file the claim and avoid the pleural
166
registry."16 5 Consequently, CCR adopted a new settlement posture.
registry as opposed to a voluntary one because Georgine is an opt-out class. But given that
many in the Georgine class may not have had actual notice of their right to opt out, this
criticism is not well-founded. On Georgine being the equivalent of a non-opt-out class for
many class members, see infra notes 193-97.
For an article advocating the use of pleural registries, see Peter H. Schuck, The Worst
Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation 15 HAuv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 541
(1992). My response to the supposed equity of mandatory pleural registries is: if it is fair
to make less injured people defer their claims forever so that the claims of sicker people
get to court first and faster, why shouldn't most whiplash claimants wait behind the pleural
people and people who only have broken bones wait behind all people who are dying?
Why, in other words, limit this principle of "justice" to those suffering from asbestos
exposure?
Courts do not have a deferral docket for people with hurt feelings, as one might characterize those bringing claims for emotional distress. If the court set up such a docket, we
would all be able to see that it was a way of changing the substantive law on what counted
as a legal wrong without taking responsibility for doing so, without explaining why "hurt
feelings" was no longer recognized by the courts as a wrong. Pleural registries are similarly
a method for courts to treat people whom the law continues to acknowledge as injured as if
they were not injured without having to explain why. Could it be that if one harms enough
people, those one harms the least don't count anymore? Is this the principle of "justice"
that underlies pleural registries?
163

Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295. ("In August of 1992 ... a regional settlement of the

asbestos cases pending in New England was reached and, as part of that settlement, the
plaintiffs' counsel agreed to support the entry of mandatory pleural registries in the applicable jurisdictions.") (citing Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 128 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick)). For those with any doubt that this means the inventories
settlements were made in exchange for the plaintiffs' counsel agreeing to support pleural
registries, consider the following testimony from Mr. Fitzpatrick elicited by Mr. Baron on
cross-examination:
Q: [D]id you get - the New England deal, was that in exchange for the
agreement to do a pleural registry?
A: The New England settlement agreement included a commitment by
the plaintiffs attorneys to move for a pleural registry in their jurisdiction.
Q: Was that the quid pro quo?
A: It was among the items of quid pro quo, yes.
Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 167-68 (Feb. 23, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick).
164 Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 65-66 (Feb. 23, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick); see also Georgine 157 F.R1D. at 294-95 (citing opposition to pleural registries).
165 Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 124 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick); see also Georgine, 157 F.RD. at 295 (court adopting Fitzpatrick testimony).
166 Or, as the settling parties put it:
CCR... reached the conclusion that its concerns about the filing of pleural
claims, by persons with little or no impairment, could not be successfully
addressed by pursuing pleural registries. First, there was opposition in
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At this point, the settling parties' story gets a little fuzzy. In their
Proposed Findings of Fact, after admitting that CCR had decided it
would not make inventory settlements without "protection for the fut=re" 16 7 and that pleural registries were inadequate, 1' the settling
parties did not forthrightly explain what CCR now sought as the price
for an inventory settlement. Instead, the settling parties' documents
and the court opinion jump to the point in time when the settling
parties had reached agreement on the basic structure of a class
settlement.

CCR negotiators came to believe that the class action settlement negotiations were likely to result in an agreement.
[They had] communicated to [class counsel] that once the CCR
defendants "believed that there was some rational way of dealing
with the future [claims], that [they] were prepared to address the
settlement of pending cases." This Court finds that, indeed, once it
was probable to the CCR negotiators that the negotiations would be
successfully concluded for a class action settlement, CCR began to
negotiate inventory settlements without a pleural registry.' 69
The above language was carefully drafted to avoid a forthright statement of what is plain from the context, content, and sequence of
events-the new price for inventory settlements was agreement to support Georgine. Mr. Fitzpatrick admitted this in testimony that neither
the settling parties nor the court quoted:
Without a degree of confidence that the Geoigine discussions would
be successful, we would not have done the present inventory settlements with Ness, Motley, with Greitzer and Locks, or the other numany quarters from the [plaintiffi'] attorneys to such pleural registries.
The opposition was based in part on the desire to receive immediate cash
compensation and in part on the lack of finding for the registries to ensure
that companies would still be viable if and when a pleural claimant...
moved off the registry. In addition, this Court finds that CCR reasonably
concluded that pleural registries were unsatisfactory unless a national pleural registry could be established, because it would be difficult for plaintiffs
in one state to defer their claims if plaintiffs in other states would not be
subject to deferral.
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295 (citations omitted). Notice that the last sentence suggests that
the CCR's concern was somehow for the well-being of plaintiffi who would find it "difficult." The testimony relied on, which I have quoted in the text, makes it clear that CGR's
concern was for its own sake. See supra text accompanying note 165. There is nothing
wrong with that, but the settling parties were not forthright even about this. Thus, they
drafted the misleading language quoted in this footnote, see Proposed Findings of Fact,
supra note 44, at 151, and the court with minor changes repeated their language.
167 Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 150.
168 Id. at 151.
169 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295 (citations omitted) (quoting Mr. Rooney and citing
testimony of Mr. Fitzpatrick).
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merous unaffiliated [plaintiffs'] firms [that] we did inventory deals
170
with, that is correct.

Mr. Fitzpatrick's admission emphasized that other law firms were
given inventory settlements as if that proved that support for Georgine
was not the new quid pro quo for class counsel's inventory settlements. Of course, CCR could use all the support for Georgineit could

get.
To prove that the class action was not consideration for the client
settlements, the settling parties argued that the terms of the two deals
were independent. However, the terms themselves show otherwise.
The client settlements that Georgine"stimulated" and that class counsel
and other asbestos lawyers 171 signed included what the settling parties
called "futures provisions." 172 These provided that the signing lawyer
would not handle or file future asbestos cases against the CCR defendants unless those cases met certain medical criteria. 73 Before the fairness hearing began, the settling parties modified these provisions in
an attempt to avoid charges that the provisions violated Model Rule
5.6's prohibition of agreements to restrict one's practice. 74
Although I believe both versions violated Model Rule 5.6(b), that
is not my point here. 75 Rather my point is that every lawyer who
wanted a Georgine-stimulated client settlement had to accept a futures
provision. As Mr. Fitzpatrick testified: "There became a point in time
in 1992 when we became reasonably confident that the Georgine negotiations would become successful. We then changed our position
from not doing inventory settlements without pleural registries, to doing inventory settlements in exchange for commitments on the fu170 Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 193-94 (Feb. 23, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick).
171 Id. at 192 (other lawyers signed settlements with futures provisions).
172 Ceorgin 157 F.R.D. at 299.
173 Id.; see also infra note 382.
174 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROrSSIONA. CoNDucr Rule 5.6(b) (1994) ("A lawyer shall
not participate in offering or making. . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.");
see also infra quotation accompanying note 401.
175 For an explanation of my opinion on the violation of Model Rule 5.6(b), see infra
text accompanying notes 382-97. The court concluded that neither version violated Model
Rule 5.6(b), see Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 303, and that, even if either did, it was irrelevant to
the issues before the court because the "futures provisions did not have any adverse or
improper impact on the Georgineclass... and they did not create an impermissible conflict
of interest." Id. at 330. It is interesting to note that the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility assumed the opposite: "[W]e assume that a settlement offer of
this sort is in the interest of some, and perhaps even most, of the lawyer's present clients.
Indeed, it may be that part of the reason these present clients are able to obtain particularly favorable terms is the fact that the defendant is willing to offer more consideration
than it might otherwise offer in order to secure the covenant from the attorney not to
represent other present [or] future claimants." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 371 (1993) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 371].
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76

In other words, to get a Georgine-stimulated client settlement,
the plaintiffs' lawyer had to make some kind of commitment as to the
future, memorialized in the futures provision.
The court understood these provisions to mean "commitment to
the concept of the deferral of claims that did not meet the medical
criteria in the [ Georgine] Stipulation." 77 In essence, the futures provisions were commitments to the core of the Georgine settlement: no
immediate cash compensation for future pleural claimants who do
not meet Georgine's criteria. Through the "futures provisions," CCR
exchanged inventory settlements for support for Georgine by class
counsel and other asbestos lawyers. In other words, no commitment
178
to Georgine meant no client settlements.
The settling parties and the court stated that the inventory settlements were "not conditioned upon an agreement being finally
reached in Georgine."179 Although this may be technically true, the
settling parties' witnesses testified that CCR would not agree to these
inventory settlements until it was confident that an agreement on the
terms of Georgine would be reached.'8 0 CCR did not sign Ness, Motley's
settlements until January 14, 1993, one day before Georgine was
filed.181
The court found that the futures provisions did not violate Model
Rule 5.6(b).18 2 While I disagree with this conclusion, I do agree with
the court's alternative finding that a violation of the rule is not in itself
reason enough to reject a class settlement. 8 3 On the other hand, the
client settlements in this case are sufficient reason because they
demonstrate that CCR compensated class counsel through the client
settlements for their support of Georgineand because the futures proviture."

176
Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 192 (Feb. 23, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick).
177 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 300 (citing testimony of Mr. Rooney).
178
For example, Mark H. Iola, a plaintiffs' lawyer testifying on behalf of the objectors,
stated that CGR told him that if he was "unwilling to do the futures deal, that they're going
to put me at the back of the [settlement] line and that they'll get to me at some point...
I've never received a single real dollar offer." Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 25 (Mar.
30, 1994) (testimony of Mark H. Iola). Thus, the terms of the client settlements were not
"independent" of Georgine. Moreover, the Georginesettlement itself refers to the settlement
of present client cases. See Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 100, Preamble, at 3
("There are approximately 77,000 asbestos ...claims currently pending against the COR
defendants in the state and federal courts. The goal and intent of the CCR Defendants is
to resolve all these presently pending claims over the next five years.").
179 Geogine, 157 F.R.D. at 296.
180 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 170 (quotation from testimony).
181 See SP Exhibits 302A, 302B, supra note 114.
182
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 303.
183
Id. at 330 ("This Court need not decide, however, whether or not a state bar disciplinary board would conclude that these provisions technically violated Rule 5.6, since that
issue is not before this Court in determining the adequacy of counsel.").
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sions affect the class.1 84 The class has a right to faithful representation, and that right is abused when its lawyers make separate deals for
class counsel's individual clients in exchange for class counsel's work
for the class. The class is affected when premiums are paid to nonclass members to secure class counsel's support for the settlementmoney that otherwise might have gone to the class. The settlement is
tainted when defendants seek to circumvent court process designed to
ensure that a class settlement is fair by offering plaintiffs' lawyers a
benefit (that is, inventory settlements) in return for the lawyers' agreement to abide by a core provision of the class settlement regardless of
whether the court finds the settlement fair.
The more complicated reasons the court and the settling parties
offered to explain why clients were dissociated from the class and
given separate deals are sophistry. The simpler explanation I offered
at the beginning of this Article is much more plausible. The court
and the settling parties had no real justification or authority for the
shape of this class. Their assertion that clients are "not identical" to
class members simply cannot explain the separate treatment of clients
or the different and much more generous-looking terms offered class
counsel's clients. In substance, they admit that the client settlements
were conditioned on class counsel's support for Georgine. Their testimony shows that they tried to nail down this support with futures provisions, even at the risk that someone would accurately describe these
provisions as violations of an explicit ethics rule. Buried in the pages
of the settling parties' submissions and the court's opinion, and supported by the record, is the same story with which I began: CCR
bought off class counsel and other plaintiffs' lawyers.
As I have explained, I believe the evidence demonstrates that this
is what happened. That CCR, by signing the inventory settlements
before Georgine was filed, took some risk that class counsel would not
go through with their part of the bargain does not prove there was no
bargain. It only proves that CCR took a calculated risk. Someone had
to. If class counsel had filed Georginebefore CCR signed the inventory
settlements, class counsel would have assumed the risk because CCR
might not have then delivered the more generous terms for the clients. Instead, CCR assumed the risk,18 5 but sought to minimize it with
futures provisions designed to hold class counsel to the Georgine crite184 The court reached the opposite conclusion: "What is significant for this proceeding is that the futures provisions did not have any adverse or improper impact on the

Georgine class." Id.
185 See Fairness Hearing, supranote 30, at 102-03 (Mar. 1, 1994) (testimony of Michael

F. Rooney) ("Whether or not the stipulation of settlement was ever filed, had no bearing
on whether these [inventory] settlement agreements were in full effect. . . . The CCR
basically took the risk at some point in time based on their anticipation that.., we would
be successful in our negotiations [to get Georgine filed].").
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ria regardless of whether class counsel filed the settlement action and
regardless of whether the court approved it. Moreover, Ness, Motley's
client settlements were not finalized until the day before Georgine was
filed, suggesting that CCR was not interested in taking on unnecessary
risk.
The class definition was an integral part of the scheme. Class
counsel could not plan to opt out over 14,000 people, almost all of its
clients, yet remain credible on the fairness of Georgine. With CCR apparently unwilling to settle Ness, Motley's cases until Georgine was
typed and ready to be filed at the courthouse and with CCR's interest
in avoiding too much opposition from other plaintiffs' lawyers whose
cases they had not settled before Georgine, the class definition had to
exclude present clients. The account I have presented is the most
plausible explanation of the evidence contained in the record of Georgine. Indeed, I believe that the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that CCR paid class counsel on the side in exchange for the
Georgine class action, and, for myself, I have no reasonable doubt.
No one likes to say such harsh words. I say them because I believe
them to be true and because I believe that it is wrong to hem and haw
in the interest of politeness or professional courtesy or one's own career when doing so helps injustice flourish. If, as I firmly believe, the
client settlements were made in exchange for class counsel's agreement to support the terms in the Georgine settlement and included
sweet terms for clients as part of the bargain for supporting Georgine,
86
the settlement is collusive and should not stand.'
To those who would argue that Georgine is "efficient" because it
reduces the backlog of asbestos cases, I would point out that there is
no conflict between efficiency and equity if one can redistribute
money without cost.1 8 7 Had the court insisted that any "futures deal"
include "present claimants" on equal terms with "future claimants," 8
given the realities of the MDL, a more equitable and no less efficient
deal might well have been reached. The lawyers bet that the courts
would be eager enough to get rid of the asbestos mess that they would
not balk over the disproportionate payments to present claimants and
their lawyers. So far, the lawyers' gamble has paid off.
If you believe that the evidence I have described is subject to a
more innocent and equally plausible explanation or that the settling
parties' behavior, while troubling, is beside the point so long as class
186

See infra text accompanying notes 328-70.
See A. MITCHELL PoUNsmr, AN INTRODUCrON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 (1989).
188 See generally infra text accompanying notes 215, 222-25 (discussing importance of
even-handed treatment in assessing whether due process has been afforded future
claimants).
187
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members receive a reasonably fair recovery, 8 9 there are nonetheless
strong reasons to reject the court's approval of the settlement. 190 We
now turn to those reasons.
III
BUILDING A DUE PROCESS ON FAiTH

A.

Ivy and Adequacy Plus

Mass tort class actions are new and controversial. 19 1 But Georgine
is not your run-of-the-mill mass tort class action. It is atypical because
it involves a class composed largely of persons who could not be identified by the parties, who had not yet manifested injury at the time the
action was brought, and who might not have known then or now that
they had been exposed to the hazardous product. I will call such people "unknowing," in contrast with people I will call "unknown." Unknown people would readily recognize they were members of the class
if information about the suit reached them through some means, but
189 Under Georgine's compensation schedule, these are the minimum value, negotiated
average value range, maximum value, and negotiated average value for the small percentage of extraordinary cases each year. See supranote 99 (discussing the methods of recovery
available under Georgine).

Disease
Mesothelioma
Lung Cancer
Other Cancer
Non-Malignant

Minimum
Value

Negotiated
Average Value

Maximum

20,000
10,000
5,000
2,500

37,000-60,000
19,000-30,000
9,500-12,500
5,800-7,500

200,000
86,000
32,000
30,000

Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 337 (Exhibit B). For mesothelioma, the negotiated average value
for extraordinary claims is $300,000 and 3% of the claims each year are eligible; for lung
cancer, $125,000 and 3% eligible; for other cancer, $50,000 and 3% eligible; and for nonmalignant, $50,000 and 1% eligible. Id.
For a discussion of how wide a range of settlements might be considered fair in any
one case, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Settlement Black Box (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). That reality only emphasizes how important procedural checks are in
any class action in which the plaintiffs' consent is not actually obtained. The next part of
this Article is devoted to the importance of such procedural checks.
190 In other words, the Third Circuit need not repeat or accept the story I have told in
order to overturn the district court decision.
191 See, e.g., FED. R. Crw. P. 23 advisory committee's note (frowning on use of class
actions to resolve mass tort cases); HERBERT B. NEwBERG & ALBA CONTE,NEWBERG ON CLASS

AcrlONS § 17.4 (3d ed. 1992) ("Class actions in the mass tort field are in dynamic evolution.") ;Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect ofEquity on Mass Tort Law, 1991
U. IL L. REV. 269, 289 ("In recent years an increasing number of district courts have been
forced to move beyond the Advisory Committee's notes .. .to certify classes in mass
torts."). See generally Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-LegalAnalysis, 59 BRooi. L REV. 961 (1993) (discussing the strain
mass torts have placed on legal system and describing efforts to use class actions to address
mass torts); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A ProposedFederalProcedure Ac4 64 Tax. L. Rxv. 1039, 1043, 1049 (1986) (noting the push to use class actions to
resolve mass tort cases and the resistance of many judges).
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the parties cannot mail notice to them because the parties do not
know who they are.
Before Georgine, the only other settlement involving a class composed largely of unknowing plaintiffs was the Agent Orange class settlement. 19 2 Most, if not all, unknown people can, in theory, be
provided notice of a class action and the opportunity to opt out
through, for example, television, radio, and newspaper announcements. But how does one provide notice and the opportunity to opt
out to the unknowing? It cannot be done, if notice means apprising
those people that an action is pending that affects them. By definition, unknowing persons have not manifested an injury and may be
unsure whether they have been exposed to the product. 193 Therefore, those class members cannot know in any meaningful sense that
they are members of the class.
In PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts,194 the Supreme Court held that
in class actions brought for money damages (such as the Agent Orange and Georgine cases), due process requires that absent class members receive notice and the opportunity to opt out, at least when the
class action form is used as a matter of efficiency-that is, when the

192
The class in In re Agent Orange was defined to include all persons who were in the
United States, New Zealand, or Australian Armed Forces at any time from 1961 to 1972
and who, while in or near Vietnam, were exposed to Agent Orange or other phenoxy
herbicides, even if no illnesses were yet manifest from the exposure. In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 1987), cet. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
193 For example, two of the three widows who served as class representatives testified
that they were unaware that their husbands had been exposed to asbestos until shortly
before they died of mesothelioma. Deposition of Nafssica Kekrides at 13-14, Georgine v.
Aichem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 12, 1994) [hereinafter Deposition of Nafssica Kekrides] (asserting that before her husband was diagnosed with mesothelioma in
July 1992, less than a year before his death, she did not know what asbestos was or that he
had been exposed to it); Deposition of LaVerne Winbun at 13-14, Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Deposition of LaVerne
Winbun] (asserting that up to the time of her husband's death from mesothelioma she
had no idea that he had been exposed to asbestos). But see Deposition of Anna Baumgartner at 1-15, Georgine v. Anchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 6, 1994) (asserting that her husband told her of his exposure to asbestos prior to his developing
mesothelioma).
194
472 U.S. 797 (1985). While Shutts involved a class action in state court that included class members outside the state, courts have read its discussion of individual notice
as applying to federal class actions as well. See, e.g., Carlough [now Georgine] v. Amchem
Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 200-01 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Shutts to the Georgine federal class
action in deciding whether prior to notice and the opt-out period class members the federal court could enjoin suits filed by Georgine class members in state court without offending due process); see also infra text accompanying notes 197-202 (discussing the Second
Circuit's application of Shutts in a federal class action).
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class action form is permissive, not mandatory.' 9 5 They must also be

196
provided with adequate representation.
In Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,1 97 the Second Circuit
considered a collateral attack on the Agent Orange settlement. The
Ivy court read Shutts as permitting class actions composed largely of
the unknowing, people who, by definition, could not receive notice or

exercise their right to opt out. 19 8 The court relied on a footnote from

Shutts "Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek
to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for
money judgments. We intimate no view concerning other types of
class actions, such as those seeking equitable relief."199
Shutts thus left open the question of whether notice and opt-out
rights were required in all class actions. The Second Circuit read the
Shutts footnote to mean that a class composed largely of unknown or
even unknowing plaintiffs purportedly seeking money damages might
be properly certified under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b) (3) for permissive class actions, and that the due process rights
of those people might be met through means other than notice or the
opportunity to opt out.200 Ivy held that in a class action that includes
countless unidentified victims who are unaware that they have been
195
Id. at 812. There are three subdivisions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: The
first two subdivisions, (b) (1) and (b) (2), detail the requirements for certification of socalled mandatory class actions, or those in which members of the class do not have a right
to opt out. Section (b) (1) allows a mandatory class action to be maintained if either (1)
the prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent rulings establishing
"incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class," or (2) separate adjudication would, "as a practical matter," dispose of the interests of nonparticipating potential class members or impair their ability to protect these interests. FD. R. CIv. P.
23(b) (1). Subsection (b) (2) provides for class actions that seek injunctive or declaratory
relief. This type of mandatory class action is maintainable if "the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief.., to the class as a whole." FaD. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2).
Finally, Rule 23(b) (3) provides for what might be called permissive class actions, class actions designed to promote efficiency and fairness in cases where common questions of law
or fact "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." FED. R. Cirv.
P. 23(b) (3).
196 472 U.S. at 812 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)).
197 Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996
F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1125 (1994).
198 Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1435 ("Shutts does not apply directly to classes of unknown plaintiffs."). In an earlier Agent Orange appeal, the Second Circuit had ruled similarly. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 169 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988).
199 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3 (emphasis added by Iy court); see also Iy, 996 F.2d at
1435 (quoting Shutts). Holding that opt-out rights were required in all class actions would
have doomed class actions brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (1). The
question of whether due process requires notice in class actions brought under Rule
23(b) (1) or (b) (2) was also left open.
200 Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1435 (stating that "Shutts does not apply directly to classes of unknown plaintiffs" and declining to extend it to such classes).
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injured, due process does not lie in notice or the opportunity to opt
out; in fact, "providing individual notice and opt-out rights to persons
who are unaware of an injury would probably do little good."20 1 The
Ivy court instead found that due process is satisfied by "requiring fair
and just recovery procedures" and "ensuring... vigorous and faithful
20 2
vicarious representation."
Ivy's holding that the Constitution permits a court to bind unknowing persons to a class action settlement of their tort claims is
troubling.2 03 First, there is the question of basic fairness. Most people
consider personal injury claims to be just that-personaL How do we
convince people who discover five years from now that they are sick
from exposure to some product that it was fair to have disposed of
their claim years earlier without their knowledge?
Second, Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power to
"cases" or "controversies." 20 4 Unknowing victims do not have a present controversy with anyone, and for the courts to entertain their
"claims" may violate Article III. Aside from the separation of powers
problems implicit in the case or controversy question, the Agent Orange settlement and Georgine present further separation of powers
problems because they require judges to craft, or at least approve, farreaching settlements that resemble legislation. Yet no justification for
this stretch of the judicial function is offered other than the courts'
burgeoning dockets and Congress's failure to act. 20 5 These are all
Id.
Id.
203
See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26-27, Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 1125 (1994) (No. 9-860) (arguing that binding the unknowing is fundamentally unfair).
204
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
205
Those who argue that Ivy and Geargineare analogous to the civil rights injunction
cases in which unknowing "futures" are routinely bound without notice or an opportunity
to opt out, see, e.g., Richard L.Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Va Rule
23, 80 CORNELL L. Rav. 858 (1995), are overlooking several critical distinctions between
injunction cases and damages cases. By definition, injunctions are projections of the
court's vision of justice into the future. The fact that such a move is an extraordinary
exercise of court power accounts for the existence of various principles that restrain the
court's power, ensure that the court remains accountable for the power it has exercised,
and allow those affected by the injunction in the future to appeal to the court to change its
decree. None of these principles are replicated in class action suits for damages.
First, injunctions will not be issued unless there is no remedy at law, e.g., damages,
that will correct the harm being inflicted or threatened. See generallyDoug Rendleman, The
InadequateRemedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33 U. FLA.L. REv. 346 (1981). Second, a court retains jurisdiction over the subject matter in controversy in any case in which
an injunction is issued. See, e.g., System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364
U.S. 642, 647 (1961) ("An injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing
court and always a continued willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the
party who obtained that equitable relief."). Third, an injunction may be modified or lifted
on request of those affected by the injunction provided that they make an appropriate
201

202
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strong reasons for rejecting both Ivy and Georgine. Ivy, however,
bothers with constitutional concerns in a way Georgine does not, making Georgine the worst of the two "unknowing" decisions.
The Second Circuit did not assert that adequate representation
alone was sufficient to satisfy due process for unknowing class members. How could it? Shutts makes clear that in class actions for money
damages involving primarily knowing class members, the class members are entitled to adequate representation plus notice and the optout right. Moreover, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 2 0 6 relied on in Shutt, 20 7 the Court held that unknown class members should receive some notice, even if only by publication. 20 8 In
Mullane, the Court concluded that publication notice to the unknown,
however unlikely to be effectual, satisfied due process, at least when
the unknown were a small part of the class and when all class members had "identical" interests; moreover, a guardian was appointed
whose sole function was to ensure that the interests of the unknown
were adequately protected. 20 9 The identity of interests, the large
group of known class members, and the presence of a guardian ensured that there would be enough reliable monitors of the litigation
to guarantee the faithful representation of the interests of the unknown. 210 Shutts and Mullane strongly suggest that if a money damages class action involving primarily unknowing plaintiffs could ever
pass constitutional muster, there would have to be something more
than merely adequate representation to ensure the due process rights
of class members. The Second Circuit got the message.
In Ivy, the Second Circuit implicitly established a "more than adequate" standard for the representation due unknowing plaintiffs, or
showing. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-50 (1991) (holding that in
school desegregation cases, injunctions are designed as temporary measures and should be

lifted upon a sufficient showing that the school board has complied with the injunction in
good faith and that the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent
practicable).
As for institutional consent decrees, they may be modified or lifted under an even
more modest showing. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk CountyJail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992)
(holding that a party seeking modification of an institutional reform consent decree must
establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that
the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances). The lenient
standard articulated in Rufo and Dowell for modifying consent decrees and injunctions has
already been extended to injunction cases that do not involve government entities. See,
e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 13 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 58 (1994); In re Hendrix, 986 F.2d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1993). None of
these protections are present in a class action for money damages brought under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3).
206 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
207 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807-11 (1985).
208 Mullane 339 U.S. at 319.
209 Id. at 317.
210 Id.
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what one could call "an adequate representation plus" standard for
class actions involving unknowing plaintiffs. The court first analyzed
whether the unknowing claimants-whom the Ivy court referred to as
"unidentified" or "future" claimants-had received representation
that would be adequate in an ordinary class action, using the test set
2 11
out by the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin:
[A]n essential concomitant of adequate representation is that the
party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation. Additionally, it is necessary to eliminate so far as possible the likelihood that the litigants are involved
in a collusive suit or that plaintiff has interests antagonistic to those
2 12
of the remainder of the class.
Eisen did not involve a class made up largely of "future" or otherwise
unknowing claimants. Indeed, the Supreme Court later found that
some two and a quarter million members of the Eisen class were identifiable by name and address with reasonable effort and held that they
were thus entitled to individualized notice. The Court specifically rejected the argument that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
adequate representation could be substituted for notice in a class with
213
identifiable members.
Heeding the Supreme Court's rulings in Shutts, Mullane, and Eisen, the Ivy court did not end its due process inquiry with the conclusion that class counsel had been adequate. Indeed, the court
expressed concern that its analysis might be read to "denigrate the
importance of qualified and faithful class representation" in an action
involving "future" (unknowing) claimants, where "quality and fidelity
of counsel are of paramount importance."2 1 4 It thus continued:
[We ordinarily would anticipate the appointment of a guardian to
represent the interests of absent claimants, particularly those with
questionable injuries. In the instant case, however, we are not writing on a clean slate. The unique circumstances surrounding Agent
OrangeI-in particular, the even-handed treatment of both identified and unidentified legitimate claimants in the Agent OrangeIsetdement and the dim prospects of success both then and now215
rendered additional protections unnecessary.
211

391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).

Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996
F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Eisen, 391 F.2d at 562), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125
(1994). I do not think class counsel in Georgine meet this test because the evidence shows
at least as strong a likelihood that they colluded with the defendants. This is not, however,
my point here.
212

213
214

See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 175-77 ("2,250,000 class members are easily ascertainable.").
Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1437.

215

Id. at 1437 (emphasis added).
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The Ivy "adequate representation plus" standard for class actions
involving unknowing plaintiffs is reflected in the court's emphasis on
the "paramount importance" of vigor and faithfulness in class actions
involving unknowing plaintiffs, in its statement that "ordinarily" a
guardian would be required, 21 6 and in its explanation of the "unique"
2 17
circumstances that made more protection unnecessary in that case.
The two unique circumstances mentioned by the court strongly support this reading. First, "even-handed treatment of both identified
and unidentified legitimate claimants" provided objective evidence
that class counsel did not prefer "knowing" plaintiffs to the more vulnerable and less protected "unknowing." Second, "the dim prospects
of success" was not offered to demonstrate how vigorous or faithful
counsel had been, but rather to explain that less process was duethat is, less faithfulness and vigor-in the case before the court than
in most cases involving "future" claimants. In general, less process is

216 The requirement of a guardian, when notice is impossible, is also supported by
Mu/ane, where the interests of the unknown, who could not receive actual notice, were

represented by a guardian "with the sole duty of representing those interests." See Douglas
Laycock, DueProcess of Law in Trilateralisp&utes,78 IoWA L. Rav. 1011, 1019 (1998) (discuss-

ing Mu/ane). Professor Laycock's article provides a thorough analysis of the requirements
of due process in complex class action proceedings. He concludes that individual notice is
the general rule, the essence of due process, and that adequate representation is available
as a second-best solution when individual notice is impractical. Id. at 1026.
217 It is my position that the Ivy court articulated a standard of "adequacy plus" to
justify its holding that the unknowing could be bound consistent with due process. It is
not, however, my position that the Ivy court actually applied the standard it articulated.
Many of the plaintiffs' lawyers who negotiated the Agent Orange settlement had a conflict
of interest that could have influenced the settlement terms accepted on behalf of the class.
See Scwucx, supra note 25, at 192-206 (discussing fee agreement among plaintiffs' lawyers
and how it might affect their approach to the settlement). The Second Circuit had earlier
been troubled enough by this conflict to undo the agreement among plaintiffs' lawyers as
to how they would divide the fees awarded by the court, but not concerned enough to
undo the settlement. In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 224-26 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). This conflict was not discussed by the Ivy court in
applying its "adequacy plus" standard.
In law, however, a court may articulate a new principle in a case that demonstrates
little commitment to the principle without dooming the principle to an apologist role in
later cases. Perhaps the most famous example of this phenomenon is the strict scrutiny
test developed in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). First used as an apology, the test later became a formidable constitutional barrier. A less well-known example is
Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), in which a
standard for holding lawyers liable to third parties for negligence was first articulated and
applied without rigor. The standard has been taken more seriously thereafter. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(citing Lucas and holding that a third party could sue a law firm which rendered a legal
opinion on which the third party relied and which failed to reveal critical facts that argued
against the firm's legal conclusion, notwithstanding that the legal conclusion might well
have been correct).
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due when there are "dim prospects of success" because less process is
2 18
due when the interests at stake are not substantial.
Compare Georgine. Unlike the Ivy court, which was considering a
collateral attack on a settlement that the district court approved eight
years earlier and that the appellate court upheld six years earlier, the
Georgine court was writing on a clean slate. Yet it put in place no "additional protections" to ensure that the representation of the "futures
class," as the settling parties called it, was "faithful" enough to guarantee the due process rights of the hundreds of thousands of people in
the class for whom notice and opt-out rights would do "little good."
The court ignored Ivy's admonition that a guardian should ordinarily
be appointed to guarantee that the interests of the absent (unknowing) victims are faithfully represented, failing to appoint a guardian
even for those class members with "questionable injuries"-the future
pleural claimants-whose interests are most likely to be disfavored out
of concern for the more seriously ill.219 This, however, understates
the lack of due process protection in Georgine. The court not only
failed to appoint a guardian, it allowed the defendants to select class
2 20
counsel for the unknowing claimants.
More important, neither of the two unique circumstances that
the Second Circuit relied on in Ivy is present in Georgine. In Georgine,
the interests of unknowing class members are substantial. Some unknowing class members will suffer painful and prolonged suffering because of their exposure to the defendants' products. Although the
future pleural claimants have less at stake now, they might later de218 The Ivy court relied on Matthews v. Eldridge in holding that due process could be
satisfied when notice and opt-out rights were meaningless. Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1485 (citing
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). The Matthews court set out three factors
to be weighed in deciding what process is due. The first is "the private interest that will be
affected" or "the potential deprivation" at stake. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334, 341. If a claim
is very weak, the private interest at stake is not substantial. The "dim prospects of success"
for claims brought by Agent Orange victims was the other unique circumstance thatjustified the Second Circuit's holding that the due process rights of "future" claimants were
satisfied without "additional protections." Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1437. This is in accord with
Matthews in that less process is due when the interest at stake is not substantial.
219 Note the Ahearn court's appointment of a guardian. See Report of Guardian Ad
Litem, Eric D. Green, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:9t-526 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1995).
By referring to the Ahearn court's appointment of a guardian, I do not mean thereby to
imply that the existence of a guardian cures the unequal treatment of present and future
claimants that the shape of the Ahearn class suggests. I am not sure that a guardian appointed to review a settlement already negotiated, as was the case in Ahearn, can ever substitute for even-handed treatment as a guarantee of due process. What is the role of such a
guardian? How does she perform her task when confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition? It seems to me that when a class is shaped like Georgine or Ahearn, a guardian appointed after a settlement has been reached is an insufficient guarantee that the class was
not "sold out"
220 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294 ("CCR commenced negotiations with Class Counsel
based on their reputation and experience in the asbestos litigation.").
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velop a more serious illness. Moreover, many unknowing claimants
would have little difficulty establishing that the defendants were liable
for their substantial injuries. 22 1 Thus, unlike the "future" claims in
Ivy, the "future claims" settled in Georgine involved substantial private
interests.
Even more damning, the Georgine court did not demand evenhanded treatment of identified and unidentified claimants as an indication of class counsel's fidelity to the unidentified. The court was
satisfied with class counsel who had negotiated one set of terms for
"identified" claimants, whom the settling parties call "present claimants," and another set of terms for "unidentified" claimants, called
"future claimants." The court did not adopt the settling parties' position that the deals made for these two groups were equal. Instead, it
said that there was insufficient evidence to tell whether the terms were
even-handed or not, and that it did not matter either way.22 2 This is a

far cry from the approach taken by the Second Circuit If the Georgine
court had
understood the problem as one of due process, not merely
"ethics,"2 23 it might have understood, as the Second Circuit did, that
whether unknowing claimants were treated the same as identified
claimants mattered a great deal.
221 There is more than a little irony in the Agent Orange case leading to Georgin&e The
procedural irregularities in the Agent Orange case were justified in no small measure by
emphasizing the weakness of the plaintiffs' claims, suggesting that courts would tolerate
such irregularities in the future only in cases involving similarly weak, near frivolous, mass
tort claims. See, e.g., Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1437 (stating that "the dim prospects of success" was
one of two factors that made additional protections of the due process rights of the unknowing "unnecessary"). In Georgine the uniqueness of the case was again invoked, if
somewhat indirectly, as a means to justify the court's acceptance of the settlement. For
example, the Georgine opinion opens with a background section on the history of asbestos
litigation, Georgine, 157 F.RID. at 257-61, and concludes with some thoughts on the unique
problems in asbestos litigation. Id. at 334-36. But the uniqueness of asbestos claims is not
their weakness but their strength: they are knock-down winners for the plaintiffs. For
example, in CCR's history, it has settled about 128,000 asbestos claims and tried only 196
claims to verdict. See Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 131-32 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony
of Lawrence Fitzpatrick). Of the 196 cases tried to verdict, CCR prevailed only 107 times.
Id. at 132. Courts, it seems, are equally besieged by meritorious and frivolous cases and are
willing to justify dispensing with procedural regularity to rid themselves of either burden.
222 Consider the court's conclusion of law:
The fact that the inventory settlements included terms that differed from
the terms of the Georgine settlement also does not reveal an impermissible
conflict of interest.... The relevant question is not whether the terms of
the Georginesettlement are identical to the terms of settlements in the past
but whether, given all the circumstances, the terms of Georgineare fair and
reasonable.
Georgine 157 F.RD. at 329 (emphasis added). The court's use of the word "past" to describe the client settlements that were negotiated simultaneouslywith Georgine is misleading.
223 The court's conclusion of law on the importance of the differing terms appears
under the heading "Conflict of Interest." Id. at 327-30. The court's omnibus conclusions
state that due process was satisfied by notice and mention adequacy of representation as if
it were only a question under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 334.
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Instead of objective evidence that class counsel had treated the
class and their clients in an even-handed fashion, the Georgine court
had before it objective evidence of dissimilar treatment. Yet it did not
require class counsel to explain the segregation of the two groups.
And although in a class action, the burden of proving adequacy ordinarily rests with the settling parties, 2 24 the Georgine court demanded
that the objectors prove that the terms were not equal. 22 5 In a class
action involving unknowing plaintiffs, the burden should not only remain on the settling parties, but should be harder to meet.
B.

Georgine's Shaky Legal Foundations

The Georgine court did not attempt to reconcile its holding that
the different treatment accorded identified and unidentified claimants does not matter with the holding in Ivy. It cited just one case in
support of its position: M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace,
Inc..22 6 Berenson involved a class action settlement that divided the
class into three groups for purposes of determining what relief would
be awarded class members. 2 27 None of the groups in Berenson were
composed of unknowing claimants. 228 Thus, Berenson did not implicate the same due process concerns as Ivy or Georgine.
Moreover, the notice to the class in Berenson fully disclosed that
229
different segments of the class were to be treated differently.
Although separate lawyers had not been appointed to represent the
different class segments, the court found that the class had received
adequate representation because it judged that the notice to class
members was evidence that "the class [members] judged retrospectively for [themselves] that [their] interests [had] been adequately
represented," 230 and because it found that class members could have
opted out "if ... in their view... the proposed settlement unfairly
224

Pilots AgainstIllegal Dues (Paid) v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 938 F.2d 1123, 1134

(10th

Cir. 1991) (burden of showing adequacy of representation on plaintiffs); United Independent Flight Officers v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1274, 1284 (7th Cir. 1985)
(burden of showing adequacy rests with plaintiffs); Rex v. Owens ex reL State of Oka., 585
F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1978) (party seeking to certify a class required to show that all
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are met).
225
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
226 671 F. Supp. 819 (D. Mass. 1987).
227 Id. at 824.
228 The Berenson court noted that the entire plaintiff class consisted of readily identifiable parties, namely all present and former retail tenants of Fanueil Hall Marketplace and
Fanueil Gallery. Id. at 821. In addition, the court stated that notice of the fairness hearing
was sent to all of the plaintiffs and that they all had an opportunity to opt out after being
notified of the settlement, because no prior notice of class certification had been sent. Id.
at 822.
229
Id. at 824.
230 Id. at 824 (citing In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 502 F.2d 834, 843 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974)).
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favored present tenants."23 1 In sum, the Berenson court relied heavily
on notice to ensure that the rights of absent class members were protected in a situation in which a settlement provided differing terms for
groups not independently represented.
But Ivy teaches that notice cannot be depended on to protect the
due process rights of "future" claimants. If the Georgine court had at
least ordered that the notice disclose that present clients were getting
a different deal, it might have provided some protection for a small
segment of the class-those presently ill people, who were nobody's
clients (the unknown). But it did not even do that 23 2 Thus, Berenson
2 33
simply does not support approval of Georgine.
The Georgine court cited the 1987 district court opinion in Holden
v. Burlington Northern, Inc.23 4 to support its conclusion that simultaneous negotiations of different group settlements against a common defendant was not evidence of inadequacy of counsel. Holden was an
employment discrimination class action brought under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b) (2), in which the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had engaged in sexually discriminatory employment practices. 2 3 5 While negotiating the Holden settlement, class counsel also
negotiated settlements of six other cases they were litigating against
23 6
the same defendant.
I believe that Holden was wrongly decided and that class counsel
should not be allowed to negotiate with the defendant on behalf of
third parties, while negotiating for the class.23 7 But even if Holden was
231
Id. at 825.
232 See Carlough [now Georgine] v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (describing notice). The notice made no mention of simultaneous representation
or inventory settlements. Id. The notice did disclose that within the class, recoveries would
differ depending on what disease a class member contracted. Notice of Rule 23(b) (3)
Class Certification for Settlement Purposes Only, of Proposed Settlement, and of Hearing
on Proposed Settlement, Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(No. 93-CV-0215) app. at A-4 to A-5. So the small subgroup of the class that was identifiable and identified received notice of intra-class differences, but not of the different treatment accorded present claimants.
233 The Georgine court's citation to Berenson does, however, betray something important
about its understanding of the case. The citation shows that the Georginecourt understood
that the question of whether to approve the settlement could be analyzed as if the clients
had been included in the class and been given better terms than everyone else. Of course,
Berenson does not support the approval of a class settlement in which the clients of lawyers
got better terms than all the absent class members. That such a class settlement could be
approved as fair or consistent with due process, particularly absent notice of the differing
terms, seems ludicrous.
234 665 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Minn. 1987).
235 Id. at 1401.
236 Id. at 1425. The six cases involved four "race, sex or national origin discrimination
actions either brought by or about to be brought by" class counsel and two matters springing from a multi-district employment discrimination action against the railroad company
and its unions, in which class counsel served as co-lead counsel. Id.
237 See infra text accompanying note 367.
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worthy precedent, it would still fall short of supporting the Georgine
settlement. Unlike Georgine,the Holden class was not composed largely
of unknowing people. It was not composed largely of "future claimants"; people who had not yet experienced any ill effects from the
"injury" the defendants caused. 238 The Holden court, therefore, could
and did rely on notice to provide some protection for the due process
rights of almost all class members.
The Georgine court did not mention that the Holden court had
ordered that class counsel's representation of competing classes be
"disclosed to the class members in the mailed notice sent to them regarding the proposed [settlement]."239 Moreover, the Holden court

took seriously the objectors' allegations that the class was sold out,
stating that it was a matter "going ...

to the heart of the fairness,

reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement."24° To address these allegations, the Holden court ordered depositions of both
the lead class counsel and the negotiating counsel for the defendant.24 ' The Georgine court, on the other hand, refused to order depositions of the counsel who conducted the Georgine negotiations,

238 Unlike Georgine, Holden was tried for four months before a settlement was reached.
For purposes of the trial the class was certified to include "over 7,800 women who were
employed by [the railroad] . . . after July 27, 1977, and whose claims of discrimination
arose after that date." Holden, 665 F. Supp. at 1401. The settlement expanded the class to
include women employed or denied employment after March 3, 1970, and who 'as a result

of present poliies or practices" were or would have been discriminated against. Id. at 1404
(emphasis added). Although the Holden class may appear to include many "future claimants," the emphasized restriction demonstrates that it does not. It is nonetheless true that
the expansion to include those denied employment does introduce some plaintiffs into the
class who will not receive individual notice-depending on what kind of records the railroad kept on applicants-but those people are not as likely to ignore other notice reasonably calculated to inform them of the settlement as would the people in Ivy or Georgine
These Holden unknowns have already received all the injury they will receive from the defendant, unlike the people in Ivy or Georginewho were unidentifiable, notjust to the parties
and the court, but also to themselves. This last fact is what caused the Ivy court to state that
for those people notice and opt-out rights would "probably do little good." Ivy v. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denieA, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
239 Holden, 665 F. Supp. at 1426. The Georginecourt pointed out that in Georgine, "as in
Holden, the CCR defendants' settlement posture was well-known to the plaintiffs' and defense bars and the courts," but omitted any reference to Holden's notice to the class. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 328. Moreover, the words "settlement posture" in the above quotation
are carefully chosen. The settlement posture of the railroad in Holden was not the same as
that of CCR. The railroad in Holden may have said "no settlement for the Holden class
unless we settle all these other matters," but it did not say "no settlement for one group
until you agree to support a class action that will guarantee that we are never haled into
court on like claims again."
240 Holden, 665 F. Supp. at 1424.
241
Id. at 1425.
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leaving the objectors to question only witnesses whose knowledge of
2 42
the negotiations was largely secondhand.
In sum, the Holden court took steps to provide some additional
protections of the due process rights of the class when the adequacy of
counsel was put in question by the settling parties' simultaneous settlement of other matters. The court relied on notice that disclosed the
existence of the side-settlements, and on the sworn testimony of the
settling parties' counsel, as additional protections of the due process
rights of class members. In any event, the Holden class was less vulnerable than the Georgineclass because the Holden class was not composed
largely of "future claimants." Finally, nothing about the definition of
the class in Holden suggested that it was created to serve the interest of
some group not before the court.2 43 For all those reasons, the sup-

port Holden gives Georgine is minimal.
But there is more. Other courts have ruled on the propriety of
class counsel representing competing groups against a common defendant. Some have held that class counsel may not represent the
2 44
class while negotiating for others against a common defendant;
others permitted class counsel to proceed only with certain proce2
dural safeguards in place, safeguards that were absent in Georgine. 4
While these cases are often characterized as turning on the defendants' limited assets, 24 in almost all of them the "fact" that the defen242 The Georginecourt maintained that it gave objectors the "opportunity to probe into
facts surrounding the proposed settlement through depositions of relevant persons." Ceorgine, 157 F.R.D. at 260 n.9. It did not mention that it refused to order the depositions of
the most "relevant" individuals, class counsel and the lawyers for CCR. The two CCR witnesses whom the objectors were allowed to depose and who testified at trial were Mr. Fitzpatrick, President and CEO of CCR, and Mr. Rooney, CCR's Chief Operating Officer. Mr.
Rooney testified, however, that while he actively participated in the negotiations, he did
not become involved in the negotiations until after the parties had reached "basic conceptual agreements ... such as the concept of deferral of unimpaired cases." Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 175-77 (Feb. 28, 1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney). More
important, he testified that the "principal negotiators" for the CCR defendants were the
lawyers from Shea & Gardner, not himself or Mr. Fitzpatrick. Id. at 176. Mr. Fitzpatrick
continually pleaded ignorance as to the details of the negotiation, stating in response to a
number of questions that he was "not a party to the negotiations." See, e.g., id. at 90, 113
(Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick). Similarly, Mr. Rooney denied specific
knowledge of the inventory settlements negotiated with class counsel because he did not
negotiate them. Id. at 118 (Mar. 3, 1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney).
243 See supra note 238 (discussing scope of the Holden class).
244 See infra text accompanying notes 257-60, 268-71.
245 See infra text accompanying notes 261-66.
246 See, e.g., In rejoint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (In re Eagle-Pitcher), 133 F.R.D.
425, 432 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("All the cases [on parallel representation of other classes]
relied upon by the parties involved counsel that continued concurrent representation on
behalf of classes of plaintiffs potentially competing for funds from defendants with limited
resources."). Eagle-Pitcherinvolveda bankrupt defendant and thus the "limited fund" point
was particularly important.
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dant's assets were limited is founded on no more evidence than was
present in Georgine.
For instance, in Kuper v. Quantum Chemical Corp., 247 proof that the
defendants' assets were "limited" consisted of no more than allegations
in the plaintiffs' complaint that the defendant was "denude[d] ...of its
liquid assets and net worth" and that the value of the plaintiffs' shares
was 'jeopardized by the resulting decline in Quantum's value." 248
Quoting JackshawPontiac,Inc. v. ClevelandPressPublishingCo.,249 one of
the earliest cases to address parallel representation in class actions,
the Kuper court found that "it is 'not inconceivable that the amount
sought by [the other group] and the proposed [class] here will exceed the total assets" 250 of the defendants. This is hardly a tough
2 51
standard to meet
To judge whether the Georgine class was competing with the present clients for limited funds, one must assess the financial situation of
the defendants before settlement because that is when such competition might have affected the strategy of the lawyers conducting the
simultaneous negotiations. No matter how likely it is that the defendants can meet their obligations to the class and the clients under Georgine, before the deal was struck no one was, nor could have been,
certain that the CCR defendants could satisfy all class claims, including those of future pleural claimants, and remain viable. The class
representatives did not think so; 52 the plaintiffs' bar was not convinced; 253 the defendants admit to worrying about their viability ab247 145 F.R.D. 80 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
248 Id. at 83 (brackets in original).
249 102 F.R.D. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
250 Kuper, 145 F.R.D. at 83 (quotingJakshaw,102 F.R.D. at 192) (emphasis added).
251 See alsoJackshaw, 102 F.R.D. at 192 (stating that it was "not inconceivable" that the
amount the plaintiffs sought would exceed the total assets of defendants); Sullivan v. Chase
Inv. Servs. of Boston, 79 F.R.D. 246, 258 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("The possibility that assets and
insurance of the defendants who may have committed fraud against the plaintiffs [in a

parallel suit] will be insufficient to satisfy an alleged liability to the class of over $20 million
is great enough to influence litigation strategy.").
252 See, e.g., Fairness Hearing, supranote 80, at 245-46 (Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of Ty
T. Annas) (quoting from letter Mr. Annas, a class representative, wrote to the Wall Street
Journa4 expressing his concern that without Georginethe defendants would in time go bankrupt because they cannot pay out on all the claims that are being filed against them); id. at
169 (testimony of AmbroseJ. Vogt, Jr.) (affirming that he agreed to be a class representative, even though he was not now seeking money damages, because he "wanted the assurance that there would be some money left over" if he got sick in the future).
253 Id. at 123-24 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick) (testifying that the
plaintiffs' bar was opposed to CCR's proposal of pleural registries, in part because registries were not funded and the companies might not be viable by the time a claimant moved
off the registry); id. at 174-75 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of plaintiffs' lawyer Robert R.
Hatten on behalf of the settling parties) (agreeing that one of the "serious benefits of the
class" in Georgine is that by limiting the kinds of claims that can be filed it reduces the risk
that the CCR defendants will be driven into bankruptcy).
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sent the Georgine settlement; 2M and the Georgine court itself voiced
concern that these now viable companies might face bankruptcy due
to future asbestos claims if the settlement was not approved.2 55 This is
much more proof that the two groups were competing for limited
funds during the negotiation period than was present in Kuper or its
25 6
antecedents.
The holdings of the "limited fund" cases fall into two categories.
First, cases such as Kuper, Jackshaw, and Sullivan v. Chase Investment
Services2 57 hold that counsel who attempt to represent simultaneously
the class and another group against a common defendant are inadequate representatives of the class. The decision in Kuperis particularly
instructive. Although the court found that there was no direct conflict
between the class and the other group, 258 and the would-be class
counsel maintained that any potential conflict was "speculative" because the defendant might very well be able to satisfy judgments
against it by both groups, 259 the Kuper court nonetheless refused to
2 60
certify the class because of the lawyer's divided loyalties.
254
See Proposed Conclusions of Law, supranote 64, at 29-30 (mentioning that over a
dozen companies have filed for bankruptcy as a result of the asbestos litigation and that
the MDL Panel was concerned with "exhaustion of assets"); see also supra note 166 (explaining how the protection Georgine allegedly provides future pleural claimants, which is not
provided by pleural registries, amounts to nothing more than an assurance that the defendants will remain financially viable).
255 Georgine 157 F.R.D. at 335:
It might appear, as the objectors argue, that the financial stability and potential future profitability of the settling defendants in this case would augur against the need for, or approval of, any group settlement of the future
claims of the asbestos victims exposed to their products. This Court has
concluded to the contrary because of the series of bankruptcies of similarly
viable companies which have succumbed to the onslaught of asbestos
claims. The time to prevent bankruptcies is before they occur.
256
See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text. One other point is important in
assessing the relevance of these cases: None of the so-called limited fund cases involved
classes whose shape suggests that some group was cut out for separate treatment. To the
extent that these cases turned on the possibility that the defendants' assets would be insufficient to meet the demands of both groups, they demonstrate that class counsel were
representing groups whose interests might at some point have diverged. When CCR insisted that it would not settle inventory cases until it received protection from the "futures,"
that settlement posture created at least as much potential as would a limited fund that the
interests of the two groups might diverge down the road. That settlement posture gave the
clients a strong interest in a solution on the "futures," no matter what that solution was,
whereas the interest of the "futures" in a futures solution was limited to a good solution.
Thus, whether one believes, as I do, that the groups in Georginecompeted for funds in
the same way as the groups in Kuperor most of the other cases in this group, the holdings
in the so-called limited fund cases are relevant because the interests of "present and future
claimants" were potentially in conflict for other reasons.
257 79 F.1RD. 246 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
258 Kuper 145 F.RLD. at 82-83.
259
Id. at 83.
260 Id. The court concluded:

19951

FEASTING WILE THE WIDOW WEEPS

1101

A different result was reached in three other limited fund cases:
Ross v. BankSouth,26 1 Sheftelman v. Jones,2 62 and Anderson v. Bank of the
South.2 63 In those cases, the courts emphasized that the dual representation might never actually harm the class, and allowed class counsel
to proceed. 2 6 However, in each of those cases, the court based its
decision on the existence of three procedural safeguards designed to
ensure that the class would receive adequate representation: first, the
presence of at least one lawyer serving as class counsel who was "untainted by [the] alleged conflict"; 26 5 second, notice to the class disclosing the alleged conflict; and third, court approval of the final
settlement 2 6 6 Only the court approval safeguard was present in Georgine,2 67 and it can hardly qualify as an "additional safeguard" under
Ivy, given that it is necessary for the resolution of every class action.
In addition to the so-called limited fund cases, there is Fiandacav.
Cunningham.268 In Fiandaca,legal services lawyers simultaneously represented a class of women prisoners seeking improved prison facilities
and, in separate litigation, a class of mentally retarded persons seeking
improvements in the state institution charged with their care.2 6 9 The
state offered a settlement in the prison class action: temporary housing of the women prisoners at the state home for the mentally
retarded.2 70
Although few reported cases appear to address the propriety of simultaneously representing potentially competing classes, numerous decisions have
held that an attorney cannot act as both a class representative and counsel
to the class.... The rationale for those holdings-that class counsel should
not be subjected to divided loyalties-applies equally to the competing interests of separate classes vying for relief from the same limited source.
261
Nos. GV85-PT-044-S, CV85-PT-044-S, 1986 WL 2702 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 1986).
262
667 F. Supp. 859, 865 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
263
118 F.RD. 136, 149 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
264 The courts thus called the conflict "speculative." See Sheftelman, 667 F. Supp. at 865;
Anderson, 118 F.R.D. at 149; see also Ross, 1986 WL 2702, at *2 ("[A]ny possible conflicts
involving attorney Stotsenberg could be covered by the 'opt out' notices, through proper
court management and through the influence of attorneys Shutts and Cleveland.").
265
Sheftelman, 667 F. Supp. at 865.
266 See id.; Anderson, 118 F.R.D. at 149; Ross, 1986 WL 2702, at *2.
267 Only two of the three safeguards were present in Holden, which may in part explain
why it was the only case cited by the settling parties and the Georgine court. I say "in part"
because, in fairness to the court and the settling parties, it is also true that Holden made no
mention of the defendant's limited assets. But in fairness to the reader, neither does Ross,
which was the case that first mentioned the three safeguards, nor does Fiandaca,which may
most closely parallel the facts in Georgine. See infra text accompanying notes 268-71. But see
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 329 (distinguishing Fiandaca). Moreover, as I have argued, it is far
from clear that Georgine is any less a "limited fund" case than most of these other cases, and
the possibility that the defendant's funds are limited is not the only reason to insist on
additional procedural safeguards in this situation.
268 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987).
269

Id. at 826.

270

Id. at 827.
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The court held that this settlement posture created an impermissible conflict of interest for the lawyers. 27 ' The conflict was disqualifying not because the state's assets were limited, but because the state
had linked the two cases in its settlement offer, tempting counsel to
favor the prisoner class over the mentally retarded class. Similarly,
CCR's settlement posture in Georgin--refusing to settle present cases
without an agreement to defer future pleural claims-created a conflict between the interests of class counsel and the interests of the future claimants.
The Georgine court distinguished Fiandacaas involving a "direct
conflict of interest," because "[ilt was not in the interest of the second
class for the female inmates to inhabit [the facility for the mentally
retarded]. "272 The problem with this distinction is that it was the Fiandacaclass counsel who concluded that the offer of temporary housing was against the interests of their mentally retarded clients. If, as in
Georgine, the Fiandacacounsel had instead accepted the linked deal
and proclaimed it acceptable to the vulnerable, unknowing class of
mentally retarded people, the conflict would have appeared to be "indirect." Thus the Georgine's court's distinction is illusory, because
counsel's judgment cannot itself be enough to eliminate the conflict.
With the sole exception of Fiandaca,none of the cases involving
competing groups include "future" or otherwise unknowing classes
represented by class counsel who simultaneously represent a class of
identified claimants. Yet they all, including Holden,273 provide more
protection for the due process rights of class members than Georgine,
either by forbidding the lawyer from proceeding or by insisting that
the class be given notice of the lawyer's dual obligations. Moreover,
the cases that allow counsel to proceed, with the exception of Holden,
also require that the class have at least one lawyer of undivided loyalty
to monitor what the other lawyers do.27 4 Holden adopted another safeguard: examination under oath of class counsel and the lawyer negotiating for the defendants. The Georgine court ignored the
admonitions of Ivy and extended less protection for the due process
rights of future claimants than other courts have demanded in ordinary class actions.

Id. at 829.
Georgine, 157 FR.D. at 329. It is true that the Fiandacacourt at one point describes
the conflict as "direct." See Fiandaca,827 F.2d at 828. But that court did not analyze the
conflict under Model Rule 1.7(a), which deals with "direct" conflicts; instead, it analyzed
the problem as one governed by Model Rule 1.7(b), which governs conflicts between clients whose interests are not directly adverse. Id. at 829 (quoting MODEL Rut.s oF PROFES271
272

SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1994)).

273
274

See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Georgine court misused Ivy,citing it twice 275 for the
proposition that subclasses are not required to protect the interests of
"present and future claimants against [a] settlement fund" because
those interests are not antagonistic.2 76 Ivy did "[affirm the] district
court's rejection of separate subclasses for present and future claimants."2 77 However, the Ivy court "agree [d] with the district court that
designation of a subclass of future claimants and appointment of a
guardian to represent their interests was unnecessary 'because of the way
[the settlement] was structured to cover future claimants.'-"278
As Ivy makes abundantly clear, the "structure" that guarantees
due process-in the absence of subclasses with separate representation or a guardian-is the "even-handed treatment of both identified
and unidentified.., claimants." 279 Yet, even-handed treatment is precisely the element missing in Georgine. In citing Ivy, the Georginecourt
pretended that the class before it, like the class in Ivy, included all
present and future claimants; that the class did not have an unusual
shape; and that the separate client settlements that class counsel negotiated simultaneously with Georgine did not contain different terms
from those in the settlement for the unidentified class members.
It pretended that most identified plaintiffs were in the class and
were treated equally with unidentified plaintiffs. But, with the exception of the class representatives and other unlucky people who re280
tained lawyers after CCR had turned off the client settlement spigot
or who were too sick to go to a lawyer, most identifiable claimants
were outside the class and received different deals, not even-handed
treatment. Nevertheless, as its use of Berenson shows,2 81 the Georgine
court understood that the "conflict" question before it was no different from the question that would have been presented if the separate
275 The Georgine court cited Ivy only twice. However, it also cited its earlier decision in
this case, where it gave Ivy a different reading from the one I offer here. See Georgine, 157
F.R.D. at 259 (citing Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
In Carlough, the court said that Ivy did "not dispense with notice requirements." That is
true, although the implication that Ivy relied on notice to guarantee due process is not. In
Ivy, the Second Circuit stated that its view that notice was adequate had "not changed," but
it went on to admit that notice and opt-out rights were not likely to do any good in this
situation and proceeded to the "adequate representation" analysis that I have described.
See Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1435.
276 Georgine 157 F.R.D. at 318 (citing Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1435-36). The Georgine court
described Ivy as holding that the interests of present and future claimants against the settlement fund were not antagonistic and that no subclasses were required. Id.
277 Id. at 318-19 (describing Ivy).
278 Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1436 (quoting the lower court opinion in Ivy, 781 F. Supp. 902, 919
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)) (emphasis added) (brackets in original)
279
Id. at 1437.
280
Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 153 ("Once the inventory settlements
were concluded, no new additional cases were added to the settlements.") (citing Fairness
Hearing, supra note 30, at 208 (Feb. 28, 1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney)).
281
See supra note 233 and text accompanying notes 226-28.

1104

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1045

client deals had been a subset of an overall settlement submitted to
the court for approval.
The Georgine court distorted the holding in Ivy to support its conclusion that the "interests of present and future claimants ... [are]
not antagonistic."2 8 2 Ivy actually said that the even-handed treatment
of present and future claimants dispelled most of that court's concern
about whether the due process rights of the future claimants were violated when their lawyers simultaneously negotiated terms for present
claimants. 288 The Georgine court's use of Ivy perverts the meaning of
that decision. Ivy alone gave the Georgine court good reason to pay
more attention to the definition of the so-called "futures" class. It
gave the court reason to ask sua sponte what treatment the pending
"present claimant" cases would receive. Moreover, !.y dictates that
the court should have rejected the settlement as soon as it found out
that class counsel simultaneously negotiated different terms for the
"present claimants." Forget the competing ethics experts. Ivy says
that what the settling parties did denied the class due process.
C.

The Importance of Fair and Just Recovery Procedures

In Ivy, the Second Circuit said that due process for the unknowing lies not only in more than adequate representation, but also in
requiring "fair and just recovery procedures." 2 84 The Second Circuit
did not, however, elaborate on what it meant by the latter phrase.
The Ivy court's emphasis on even-handed treatment may have been
intended to guarantee that the recovery procedures for the "futures"
were fair and just. Whether similarly situated people are treated
equally is, after all, an important test of whether a process is "fair and
just." But the Second Circuit ultimately seemed to rely on the "more
than adequate representation" standard as a guarantee of due process
2 85
rather than the fairness of the recovery procedures.
However, in a case raising due process questions similar to those
in Ivy and Georgine, the Fourth Circuit did take the "fair and just" recovery procedure approach. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc. 28 6 involved a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (1) class action brought against
282 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 318. The Georgine court's only other mention of Ivy is a
citation of that case for the proposition that "subclasses for present and future claimants"
are not necessary. Id. at 319.
283 Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996
F.2d 1425, 1435-36 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
284 Id.
285 While the Second Circuit mentioned "fair and just recovery procedures," it never
elaborated on what it meant by this phrase other than to emphasize the equal treatment of
present and future claimants, which might be considered an allusion to the fairness of the
recovery procedures.
286 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
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Robins's insurer, Aetna, on behalf of those injured by the Dalkon
Shield, which was a Robins product. The class alleged a "common
undivided interest" in Aetna's insurance policy with Robins and
sought to vitiate an agreement between Robins and Aetna that
changed Aetna's obligation to pay the plaintiffs. 28 7 The plaintiffs also
sought damages from Aetna as a joint tortfeasor with Robins.
A settlement was filed with the court and approved. 28 8 Unlike
Georgine and Ivy, Robins did not involve a class composed largely of
unknowing plaintiffs. 28 9 Nevertheless, the right to opt out was unavailable because the court certified the class as a mandatory class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (1).
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit faced the question raised by Shutts.
Does this mandatory class action suit for money damages, brought
under Rule 23(b) (1), violate the due process rights of claimants because they were denied the right to opt out? The court held that even
if Shutts applied, due process was nonetheless satisfied because the settlement provided that any class member dissatisfied with the offer
made by the Trust in settlement of the claim could back out of the

deal and proceed to

trial.290

Robins is not all it pretends to be. 291 First, Aetna, not the bankrupt Robins, was the defendant 292 Aetna wanted its liability as ajoint
tortfeasor determined once and for all by this mandatory, non-opt-out
class action. Whether Aetna's interest, combined with the class members' interest in a uniform resolution of the liability issue, justified the
293
court's approval of a non-opt-out class is open to serious question.
287
288
289

Id. at 717.
Id. at 719.

290

Id. at 745:

Id. at 723, 741 (noting that class consisted of approximately 300,000 unnamed women who had used the Dalkon Shield).
The [Settlement] Plan gives every... class member [with a viable claim for
damages] the right to elect to have her claim settled in a trial with all the
procedural rights normally attaching to ajury trial. That is everything that
an express opt-out provision could give a class member if such right is required under due process.
The back-end opt-out was limited to Class A claimants and not provided to Class B claimants. Class A consisted of "those claimants who had complied with all the requirements for
proof as a claimant in the Robins bankruptcy proceedings." Id. at 717. Class B claimants
were "those who had failed to so comply." Id. Thus, given the Fourth Circuit's reasonable
assumption that the bankruptcy proceedings complied with due process, it was arguable
that the claims of Class B members against the insurer for damages as a joint tortfeasor
were waived, resolved, or otherwise no longer viable because of priorjudicial action, and
thus their rights to due process were not violated by the lack of a back-end opt-out.
291
See generally RicHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAw: THE STORY OF THE DALKON
SmELD BANtuiircv (1991) (describing the litigation against and the reorganization of
A.H. Robins Co.).
292 See supra text accompanying notes 286-87 (discussing the background of Robins).
293 The appellate court in Robins spent considerable time and energy-20 pages in the
federal reports-justifying its "liberal" approach to the use of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
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Second, the back-end opt-out provision is not all that the court
294
claimed: plaintiffs who back out cannot recover punitive damages,
295
and may be limited to $10,000 until all others are paid in full.
Although Robins may be seriously flawed, 29 6 the idea that a full
back-out option might serve to guarantee the due process rights of
unknowing class members seems sound.2 97 It was the route taken in
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.,298 a class action settlement concerning a defective heart valve that had already killed hundreds of people and remained within tens of thousands of others who have not yet
manifested injury.2 99 The Bowling settlement paid cash to all class
members for their claims for emotional distress and devised a system
of compensation for future injury and wrongful death claims.3 00 A
class member who is injured by the valve in the future is entitled to
reject the compensation scheme and go to binding arbitration or
dure 23 to resolve mass tort claims and to the use of a non-opt-out class to resolve damage
claims against a financially viable company like Aetna. Robins, 880 F.2d at 727-48. For
criticism of the use of Rule 23(b) (1) in class actions for money damages against nonbankrupt entities, see In reDennis Greenman Secs. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987)
(noting that existence of "receivership fund" and mere risk of bankruptcy were not adequate bases for certification under Rule 23(b) (1) (B), absent specific findings of defendant's financial status); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court for Cent.
Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that neither subdivisions
(b) (1) (A) nor (b) (1) (B) permit certifications of a class whose members have independent
tort claims arising out of the same occurrence and whose representatives assert only liability for damages), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506
F. Supp. 762, 789-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (refusing to certify claims under Rule 23(b) (1) (B)
because there was no evidence of defendant's insolvency), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 882, 389 (D. Mass
1979) (denying certification under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) because plaintiffs offered no evidence of the possible insolvency of the defendant), vacated on othergrounds, 100 F.R.D. 336
(D. Mass. 1983).
294 Telephone Interview with Brian Wolf-nan, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 11, 1995) (attorney at firm that represented objectors in Robins). Punitive
damages would be available in a front-end opt-out under Rule 23(b) (3). Id.
295 See In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc. (Anderson v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust), 42
F.3d 870, 872-73 (4th Cir. 1994). The $10,000 limit was not an explicit part of the original
deal but was made clear only after appellate approval of the settlement.
296 Despite the flaws of the back-end option, Robins had other protections not present
in Georgine. Robins involved a class of people who knew they had been exposed to the
allegedly defective product, and notice was provided to all claimants, although no frontend opt-out right was provided. Furthermore, the claimants in Robins voted on the settlement in accordance with procedures applicable to bankruptcies, although the class action
was technically not controlled by bankruptcy law. Almost 95% of Class A claimants voted
in favor of the settlement, and 98% of Class B claimants voted in favor of the settlement.
See Robins, 880 F.2d at 747. For definitions of Class A and B claimants, see supra note 290.
297 Robins itself was not a class of unknowing plaintiffs, like the classes in Georgine and
Ivy. See supra text accompanying note 289.
298 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993).
299
Id. at 147. Those tens of thousands were not quite as unknowing as the plaintiffs in
Georgine or Ivy because they at least knew of their exposure to the product.
00

Id. at 149-50.
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trial,30 1 just as any person who opted out of the class action at the
front end would be entitled to sue or seek binding arbitration.
The due process protection in Bowling and even in Robins was
much greater than that provided to the Georgine "futures" claimants.
The Georgine settlement provides that the maximum number of class
members who may back out of the deal and proceed to trial each year
shall not exceed approximately one percent of the maximum number
of qualifying claims CCR is obligated to pay each year.3 0 2 This is far
from the less-than-perfect back-out option provided the largely knowing (and voting) class in Robins and very far from the back-out option
provided the uninjured but otherwise identifiable class members in
Bowling.
D.

The Unfair Recovery Procedures in Georgine

Just as the representation in Georginefails to meet the "more than
adequate" test and even the test of adequacy used in ordinary class
actions, there are also aspects of the recovery procedures in Georgine
that fail to meet even a minimalist view of fairness. Specifically, several provisions in the Georgine settlement make the size of a claimant's
recovery dependent on the identity of his lawyer, not on the lawyer's
performance. In addition, the settlement contemplates that class
counsel will have continuing responsibilities to the entire class and
will be allowed at the same time, to handle individual claims in the
Georgine recovery system.
The Georginesettlement provides that one of the factors to be considered by CCR's claims evaluators in making what in most cases will
be the final recovery determination3 0 3 is the identity of the claimant's
301
302

Id. at 150, 166.

Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 281 n.27. For the precise percentages that apply to backouts, see supra note 99.
303
The settlement uses the term "offer" and provides that "[a]ny claimant... who
decides not to accept a settlement offer... may elect to resolve the Claim either through
the tort system or through binding arbitration." Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 100,
at 67. But the settlement provides that less than two percent of the maximum number of
claims CGR is obligated to pay each year can be resolved through the tort system or binding arbitration in a single year. See supra note 99. Before any claimant can try to squeeze
into the small group allowed to opt out, he must request the court to conduct a mandatory
settlement conference conducted by the court or a neutral third party. See Stipulation of
Settlement, supra note 100, at 68-69. The "offer" is thus a final determination for over 98%
of the people each year, if CGR decides not to modify it much, or at all, on the mere
urging of a neutral third party. There is little incentive for CCR to modify its offers, of
course, because less than two percent of the people in these conferences each year will
have any option but to accept the offer.
The fact that CCR's claim evaluator, not a neutral party, has what amounts to the final
say on what recovery a class member will receive can hardly be described as "fair and just
recovery procedures." What saves this procedure from itself being enough to make it incumbent on a court to reject Ceorgine is that each year the recoveries must fall within the
negotiated average range, which the Georginecourt determined was a fair range. That does
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lawyer.30 4 The other factors to be considered are the type of claim,
the nature and extent of injury, evidence on causation, disability, age,
number and age of dependents, special damages, pain and suffering,
amount and likelihood of exposure to the asbestos products of the
defendants, job history, location of forum in which the claimant could
maintain a claim, and historical recoveries in comparable cases in that
jurisdiction, type of release to be given by the claimant, and any other
3 05
relevant criteria used in the settlement of litigated cases.
I have listed these other factors in detail for a reason. The "identity of counsel" factor does not mean that a person's selection of a
lawyer may affect the recovery received because one lawyer may be
more skillful than another in presenting evidence on the factors to be
considered by the evaluator or may be more skillful at arguing that
one or more of these factors are particularly important and should
outweigh others. If this were so, there would be no need to consider
the identity factor separately; it would be built into the consideration
of the other factors. Instead, the "identity of counsel" factor means
the lawyer's record of settlement with CCR.30 6 A claimant who inadvertently chooses a lawyer with a low or nonexistent settlement average
with CCR will do worse than a claimant whose lawyer has a high settle3 07
ment average.
not prevent the possibility of individual injustice for some claimants who may receive far
below the negotiated average range merely on the say-so of CCR, which is not a neutral
figure. However, this deal has too many problems for me to concentrate individually on all
of them. See supranote 30.
304 While the settlement does not use these words, it is clear from the testimony of
CGR's wimesses that the factor expressed in the settlement as "judgments in comparable
cases involving various plaintiffs' counsel," -eorgine, 157 F.R.D. at 277, means the historical
settlement record of the claimant's lawyer, or as the CCR witnesses put it,"identity of
counsel." See, e.g., Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 120 (Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of
Lawrence Fitzpatrick) ("The identity of the plaintiff's firm is a factor [under the settlement] that CCR is to take into account in evaluating claims. Mr. Baron's firm [for example) would probably receive a higher offer, all other things being equal."); id. at 125-38
(explaining that the identity of the law firm is to be taken into account, although if the law
firm's reputation slips over time the "identity" factor would be adjusted); Fairness Hearing,
supra note 30, at 129-32 (Mar. 3, 1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney) (testifying that
the identity of the lawyer is a factor and that, all other things being equal, claimants who go
to law firms with historically high settlement averages would get more money than claimants who go to other law firms).
305
Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 100, at 57.
306
See, e.g., Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 131 (Mar. 3, 1994) (testimony of
Michael F. Rooney) (responding that if two lawyers submitted identical claims, the only
difference being the historical settlement averages of the lawyers submitting the claims,
there would be a difference in the recovery offered). Mr. Fitzpatrick testified to the same
effect. Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 86-87 (Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick) (affirming that under Geargineif two class members with identical claims walk
into two different law firms, one firm with asbestos experience, and one without, the class
members could receive different settlement offers).
307
See Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 86-87 (Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick); see also id. at 120 (affirming that a class member who went to Baron &
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This provision does not benefit the class, but it does benefit law
firms with historically high settlement averages, such as class counsel's
law firms.30 8 Rewarding excellent performance in a particular case
benefits class members because it gives lawyers an incentive to perform well. Outside the class-settlement context, paying higher settlement awards to clients who choose lawyers with historically high
settlement awards presumably reflects what the parties believe would
happen if the case went to trial. What people believe would happen at
trial depends notjust on objective factors but on the lawyer's ability to
marshal and present the facts.
Because the class settlement removes the trial contingency, there
is no reason to try to assess what might happen at trial. As a general
proposition, a lawyer's past trial record or reputation for success at
trial should not matter at all in assessing how large a recovery to offer
in the individualized payment process because in only one percent of
the cases can people back out and proceed to trial. Accounting for a
law firm's past settlement record only freezes in place a firm's past
trial performance and amounts to a method for established asbestos
lawyers to hold on to their share of the asbestos plaintiff market. The
settlement eliminates the need for firms to demonstrate they are still
worth premium awards and denies new entrants to the asbestos bar
the opportunity to show they are just as good or better. This harms
consumers because it does not encourage continued excellence and it
deters competition over price or performance.
CCR's witnesses claimed that CCR would adjust the "identity factor" every so often to account for poor performance in cases against
non-CCR defendants.3 0 9 However, this is at odds with all of the other
testimony on "historical averages," 3 10 and there is no guarantee that
CCR will operate this way. CCR has no incentive to go to the expense
of collecting information on performance by counsel in non-CCR
cases because the settlement caps OCR's yearly maximum liability.
The "identity factor" makes entry into the asbestos-lawyering market difficult and, thus, tends to keep fees up to the twenty-five percent
ceiling the settlement sets. 311 While I am not an expert on antitrust
Budd, one of the law firms representing the objectors, would automatically get more
money because of Baron & Budd's past record in the asbestos field).
308 See supranote 138.
309 Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 137 (Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick).
310 See testimony cited supranotes 304, 306 (describing how historical averages would
be used in assessing recoveries).
311 See Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 32-35, 168 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of
Robert R. Hatten) (expressing concern about how new lawyers, by forcing defendants into
bankruptcy and clogging the courts, were ruining the value of asbestos claims brought by
the more established asbestos bar); see also supranote 111 (explaining fee caps in the settlement agreement).
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law, the "identity factor" provision of the settlement seems to raise
serious antitrust problems. 3 12 Most important, under the present
analysis, it cannot be characterized as a "fair and just" procedure. The
Georgine court "infer[red] from the record that the 'identity of counsel' factor means that the claim evaluator for CCR will consider the
demonstrated skill, ability, talent and experience of a claimant's counsel."3 1

But if "demonstrated" means "demonstrated in the case under

consideration," there is no need for an "identity factor"; and if it
means "demonstrated in past cases," it is subject to all the criticisms I
314
have raised.
The court, apparently understanding this problem, offered two
additional reasons not to worry about the identity factor: There was
no evidence that the identity factor will "dominate" other factors and,
as only one of many factors, it is of "minor significance."3 15 But there
is evidence in the record that the factor will play a "significant" role in
the payments to class members under Georgine.31 6 Moreover, regard812
Those who are experts in antitrust might be interested in the testimony of Robert
Hatten, a plaintiffs' lawyer testifying on behalf of the settling parties. On direct examination, Mr. Hatten testified to his concern over the "new lawyers [who] were getting into the
asbestos litigation, feeding on the success of the original plaintiffs bar," and how that concern led plaintiffs' lawyers to begin "consolidating trials" and "fil[ing] class actions." Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 32-35 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of Robert R. Hatten). He
reiterated these concerns on cross-examination. Id. at 168 (affirming his concern that
these new lawyers would "kill the goose that was laying the golden egg"). Equally, if not
more interesting, is the testimony of Mr. Rooney, CCR's Chief Operating Officer, asserting
that the provisions that allow for ordering of plaintiffs' claims based on the identity of the
class members' lawyer, were "negotiated [at the request of class counsel] after a report
[from] ... many plaintiffs' counsel." Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 133 (Mar. 3, 1994)
(testimony of Michael F. Rooney).
318 Georgine 157 F.R.D. at 281 (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that these settlement
provisions were the product of an agreement among competitors.
314 It should also be noted that CCR's witnesses repeatedly affirmed that it was the
firm's identity, not the individual lawyer's identity that mattered, and thus the court's reference to "counsel" should be read as counsel's firm, not the individual lawyer. See Fairness
Hearing, supra note 30, at 86-87, 120 (Feb. 24, 1994) (testimony of Laurence Fitzpatrick)
(affirming that the firm's average would be considered). See also infranote 316 (discussing
the questions posed to Professor Coffee).
815
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 281.
316 The court said that "[t]here is no suggestion that the identity of counsel factor will
dominate substantive factors." Id. One should hope not. However, there actually is more
than a mere "suggestion" of this in the record and in the settling parties' Proposed Findings of Fact that the factor will play a substantial role in determining what class members
receive under Georgine. For example, Mr. Hatten, a plaintiffs' lawyer testifying on behalf of
the settlement, stated that he had been assured by CCR's Chief Operating Officer that his
historical averages would be "a significant factor" in the payment his clients would receive
under Georgine. Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 81 (Mar. 18, 1994) (testimony of Robert R. Hatten). Also in the record are the questions class counsel posed to Professor Coffee. Class counsel disputed Professor Coffee's chart, which purported to show that the
inventory settlements were much higher than the negotiated averages under Georgine.
They emphasized that the chart did not consider that the inventory settlements were made
by class counsel's firms, which had high historical settlement averages with CCR. Fairness
Hearing, supra note 30, at 236-39 (Mar. 29, 1994) (questioning of Professor Coffee by Mr.
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less of the weight given the factor, its inclusion is significant because it
is one of a series of provisions that put in place unfair procedures in a
case where procedural fairness is of critical importance to the due
process rights of the unknowing class members.
The next provision that makes recovery rights dependent on the
identity of one's lawyer is the provision that explains how claims will
be ordered in years when the number of claims exceeds the annual
maximum. The settlement provides that claims will ordinarily be paid
in the order submitted, but that where the number of claims in a compensable medical category exceeds the maximum for that year, CCR
may alter the order "to ensure that a disproportionate number of the
17
Claimants paid ... are not represented by one attorney or firm."3
The settlement provides an example: If in a given year the number of
claims in a category exceeds the maximum by ten percent, "to the
extent feasible, ten percent (10%) of the Qualifying Claims presented
by each attorney or firm in that... [m]edical [c]ategory in that year
shall not be paid until the next year."3 18 A similar provision governs
the order in which claimants can exit to the tort system in any year in
3 19
which more claimants seek to exit than the settlement allows.
These provisions determine when claimants recover not by "first
in, first out" order or by relative need, but by their choice of law firm.
The court stated that these provisions were included "to accommodate the concerns of plaintiffs' counsel with fewer cases" who were
3 20
afraid that larger firms would be able "to control the case flow."
The court interpreted this as "intended to protect class members who
are represented by small law firms."3 2 ' But why should class members
represented by big firms suffer because of their selection of firm any
more than class members represented by small firms should suffer
from a procedure that might allow big firms "to control the case
flow"? Moreover, if the court was actually concerned about equity for
Motley implying that Coffee's chart was flawed because it failed to consider that Ness, Motley's firm might receive higher than average settlements from CCR based on the firm's past
record). Class counsel thus "suggested" that a significant portion of the 50-70% difference
in their inventory settlements could be reconciled with Georgine's averages because under
Georgine identity of counsel was a factor. This argument also appears in the settling parties'
Proposed Findings of Fact, see Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 191-92, although
the court did not repeat that "fact" put forth by the settling parties. Indeed, the court's
discussion of the "identity factor" diverges from that presented by the settling parties. The
settling parties did not argue that the factor was of "minor significance" or that it would
not "dominate" other factors. They argued that "[tihe factor... plainly falls within this
category" of "relevant criteria generally utilized in the settlement of litigated tort cases"
and as such was "reasonable." Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 44, at 102.
317 Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 100, at 59.
318

Id.

319
320

Amendment to Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 99, at 7-8.
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 305.

321

Id.
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clients who retained smaller players in the asbestos plaintiffs' bar, one
must wonder why that concern did not surface in the court's review of
the "identity of counsel" factor.
The truth is that ordering claims by choice of law firm was a provision designed to appease small law firms, not to protect the interests
of their clients. Had class counsel wanted, they could have protected
class members represented by small law firms with a provision that
ordered recoveries in excess years based on some calculation of need
and by ignoring their own interest in having an "identity of counsel"
factor.
The final procedural irregularity in Georgine that raises serious
doubt about fairness involves the settlement's approval of a dual role
for class counsel as counsel to the entire class and counsel to individual claimants within the class.3 22 On this matter the court again ex-

pressed insufficient concern. The court first concluded that class
counsel's role in monitoring and supervising the activities of CCR "is
neither unusual nor inappropriate," although no one had contended
that role was either unusual or inappropriate. The court then turned
to the concerns that had been raised:
The Objectors, however, argue that this class action settlement is
unique because Class Counsel will have the opportunity to represent individual class members who submit claims to the CCR for
compensation under the Stipulation. The Objectors argue that this
"dual role" creates an impermissible conflict of interest. The Objectors point out that in fulfilling their monitoring and supervisory duties, Class Counsel will acquire information about the workings of
the claim procedure, including the settlement offers made by CCR
to qualifying claimants and CCR's willingness to accept offers made
by claimants. Such inside information will not be available to other
claimants. In addition, the Objectors argue that Class Counsel's
role in selecting arbitrators, physicians and pathologists before
whom class counsel will represent individual claimants creates an
impermissible conflict of interest.
The Court finds that because of the "dual role" of class counsel
under the terms of the Stipulation, there exists a potential for conflict. The Court also finds, however, that this conflict does not
render the Stipulation unfair to the members of the class because
the Court can and no doubt will exercise its power to appoint additional class counsel who can fulfill the vital monitoring and supervisory responsibilities of class counsel under Parts V.C.L.a.i, V.C.2.a.i,
V.D.1, IX.D, XXIIIA, and XXVI.B of the Stipulation, and who
322 Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 100, at 7 ("'Claimant's Counsel' shall mean
any attorney who represents a Claimant for purposes of submitting a Claim for processing
under this Stipulation. Claimant's Counsel shall not mean Class Counsel unless the Claimant retains Class Counsel to represent him or her for purposes of submitting a Claim for
processing under this Stipulation.").
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would not represent individual class members who submit claims
for compensation under the Stipulation.3 23

The vital functions that, according to the court, can be fulfilled
by additional counsel include all but one of class counsel's continuing

obligations to the class specified in the settlement. The sole exception is under Part VII.B, which requires class counsel to "commence
negotiations on any adjustments to the Compensation Schedule" with

CCR at the beginning of the tenth year of the agreement's operation.3 24 The court did not mention the appointment of additional

counsel to "fulfill" that obligation.

This is an interesting omission

and may shed some light on what the court leaves hopelessly ambigu-

ous: whether "additional" means Messrs. Locks, Motley, and Rice will
participate in addition to other counsel or whether "fulfill" means that
the "additional" counsel will discharge the listed functions to the exclusion of Messrs. Locks, Motley, and Rice and their partners.
If Messrs. Locks, Motley, and Rice will continue to have exclusive
responsibility for renegotiating the compensation schedule in year

ten, then they will need access to the "inside information" referred to

by the court 3 25 This suggests that they will jointly participate in the
audit and monitoring duties with additional counsel, and perhaps in
the selection of decisionmakers as well. But if that is true, the court's
"solution" to the problem of the dual role is no solution. Class counsel's clients will still have a leg up on all other class members to whom
class counsel have an equal duty of loyalty.
Alternatively, if the court meant that class counsel would only be
involved in year ten negotiations and substitute class counsel would
handle everything else, Messrs. Locks, Motley, and Rice would still
need access to the inside information as year ten approached. More
important, one wonders why substitute counsel, who would not handle individual claimants, were not given the task of renegotiation.
Leaving this task in class counsel's hands still gives CCR claim evaluators a powerful incentive to keep class counsel particularly happy
with high awards in the years preceding the renegotiation of compensation levels, thereby putting class counsel's clients in a better position
than all other class members.

More telling, why didn't the court simply hold that class counsel
were disqualified from representing individual claimants in the system
because of the conflict? Such an order would certainly have been
within the court's power. 326 Could it be that the court understood
Georgin, 157 F.R.D. at 804 (citations omitted).
Stipulation of Settlement, supranote 100, at 51.
See supra note 323 and accompanying quote.
See CHARLES W. WoLFRAi, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 332 (1986) (discussing the inherent power of courts to remedy conflicts of interest by ordering disqualification).
323
324
325
326
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that an integral part of the deal struck between class counsel and CCR
was that Ness, Motley and Greitzer and Locks could exploit their role
as class counsel, particularly given the "identity of counsel" factor, to
capture an even greater share of the asbestos-client market than in the
past?
In sum, the procedures I have just discussed all make the choice
of counsel a factor that determines how much money a class member
will receive and when that person will receive it, again not because of
that counsel's skill but merely because of that counsel's identity. To
call such procedures "fair and just" distorts those words.
E. The Third Circuit's Problem
Ivy is the only precedent that specifically holds that due process
can be satisfied in a class action, like Georgine, that involves a class
composed largely of unknowing plaintiffs. However, the settlement in
Georgine lacks the unique circumstances relied on in Ivy to explain
how due process was met without effective notice or opt-out rights.
Indeed, the unique circumstances in Georgine present the mirror image of the unique circumstances in Ivy uneven treatment of present
and future claimants, not even treatment, and substantial interests at
stake for members of the class, not minimal interests. Robins is the
next best authority, but Georginelacks the protections relied on in Robins. Instead of procedures that ensure fair and just recovery, Georgine
includes unfair recovery procedures that place the interests of lawyers
above the interests of members of the class.
The Third Circuit's problem is, however, even greater than this
summary suggests because Ivy pushes the envelope of due process,
and Robins is not too far behind. To uphold Georgine, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit would have to find that due process can
be satisfied with less than Ivy or Robins demanded.
The Third Circuit cannot uphold Georgineby claiming it is consistent with Ivy without ignoring the client settlements. It cannot say
that the client settlements demonstrate even-handed treatment of
"present and future claimants" because the district court made no
such finding. Moreover, the district court's suggestion that the deals
might be equivalent is unsupported by the record and, in my opinion,
would have to be rejected as clearly erroneous as well as insufficient.
Finally, neither Robins nor Bowling can be relied on as alternatives to
Ivy because Georgine falls far short of the due process protection afforded in those cases. That leaves the Third Circuit with the option of
upholding Georgine by rejecting Ivy and ignoring Robins.
The obstacles to such a holding are enormous. The Georgine
court did not just fail to demand the additional safeguards Ivy mentioned: a court appointed guardian or even-handed treatment. It did
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not just ignore the absence of the procedural protection afforded in
Robins. It refused to demand any of the safeguards used by other
courts in "ordinary" class actions: (1) disclosure in the notice that
class counsel had made client settlements simultaneously with Georgine, (2) the presence of one counsel free of the alleged conflict; (3)
the examination of the negotiating lawyers, including class counsel,
under oath. Nor did the Georgine court suggest a creative substitute
for those safeguards to protect the due process rights of class members. Instead, the Georgine court simply accepted that class counsel's
simultaneous negotiation of different deals for their 14,000 clients was
appropriate. It even went so far as to praise class counsel for their
27
willingness to do so much for so many.
F. The Inadequacy of Adequacy Review
A number of commentators have argued persuasively that notice
and opt-out rights do little good in most class actions and that adequate representation is all the due process many litigants actually receive or need. 328 The evidence suggests, however, that when
substantial personal injury claims are massed in a class action, class
members do pay attention to notice and exercise their right to opt
out.329 I do not want to engage here in the theoretical debate about

whether there are due process values that may only achieve expression
through notice and opt-out rights. 33 0 Instead, I will discuss whether
"adequate representation" or "more than adequate representation"
can be given enough meaning to make those promises more than
empty words. 33 1
327 Geogin 157 F.R.D. at 299 ("Based upon the testimony of [the ethics experts for
the settling parties], and [the court's] findings of fact, this Court finds that Class Counsel
were not conflicted, and indeed acted responsibly, diligently and ethically in representing
their present clients while negotiating on behalf of the Georgine class."). Notice the separation in that sentence between class counsel's "clients" and the "class."
328 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Allure ofIndividualism, 78 IowA L. REv. 965, 977 (1993)
(arguing that those who have been "adequately represented" should be bound by prior
judgment, so long as the prior judgment was litigated, not settled); Robert G. Bone, Personal and ImpersonalLitigativeForms: Reconceiving the Histy of Adjudicative Representation, 70
B.U. L. REv. 213, 214 (1990) (book review) (noting that the concept of representation "is
used in a number of different procedural settings tojustify imposing the effects of a lawsuit
on a person who had no opportunity to participate personally in the litigation and sometimes no knowledge that the suit was even pending").
329 For example, in the breast implant lawsuit, which affects approximately 200,000
women, at least 11,000 women initially opted out. David Lawder, Dow Coming to Take
Charge on Implant Suits, REuTER Bus. REP., Jan. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
WIRES file.
330 For an interesting exchange of views on this topic, see Fiss, supranote 328; Laycock,
supra note 216; Joan Steinman, Reverse Remova4 78 IowA L Rrv. 1029 (1993); Susan P.
Sturm, The Promise of Participation,78 IowA L. REv. 981 (1993).
331 While Professor Fiss champions adequate representatibn as the core of due process, his concept of adequacy focuses on whether the named parties' interests are suffi-
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As applied now, I believe the promise of adequate representation
is an empty one. Georgine is unique because it adopts a casual approach to adequacy and to the possibility of collusion-an approach
all too common in many ordinary class actions-in a situation in
which adequate representation is just about all the "process" promised
the class members. But while the Georgine court's eagerness to find
class counsel adequate is striking given the nature of the Georgine
class-its size, the interests at stake, and the extreme vulnerability of
the class members-the court's lax approach to adequacy is otherwise
a familiar judicial attitude, and one that needs to change.
As others have noted, courts are too busy heaping praise on almost every class counsel that walks into a courtroom to worry much
about what adequate representation entails or whether it has been
provided.3 3 2 While I have pointed out many things that make Georgine

a unique decision, one thing about the decision is all too familiar: the
court recites laudatory statements about class counsel's reputation,
past experience in litigation, and prominence in the relevant subject

area.333 These statements serve thereafter as an almost irrebuttable

presumption that class counsel were adequate. If "adequate represenciently aligned with the interests of absent persons whose interests will be affected by the
litigation. See Fiss, supra note 328. He does not address how courts should assess the adequacy of the lawyers, whose interests are never perfectly aligned with the people they represent, whether those people are present or absent. Given the dominant role lawyers play in
large-scale litigation, any due process theory with "adequacy" at its core must address what
suffices as "adequate" lawyering, particularly for absent parties.
332
See, e.g.,Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in Class
Action and DerivativeLitigation: Economic Analysis and RecommendationsforRform, 58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 47 (1991) ("In approving settlement, courts often engage in paeans of praise for
counsel or lambaste anyone rash enough to object to the settlement."). It is interesting to
note that Professors Macey and Miller cite Holden v. Burlington N., Inc., 665 F. Supp.
1398, 1431 (D. Minn. 1987), as an example of this practice, because the Georgine court
relied on Holden for the proposition that the simultaneous representation of competing
classes does not taint the settlement. See supra text accompanying notes 234-43. For an
example of how far a court will go to avoid criticizing class counsel, see infra note 355.
333 See, e.g., Georgine, 157 F.1.D. at 293-94 (reciting the impressive credentials of class
counsel, emphasizing their long experience as leaders of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar); id. at
294 (finding class counsel to be "highly respected for their skills and experience in asbestos litigation" and to "have the knowledge and credibility necessary to negotiate on behalf
of future asbestos victims .... ."); id. at 329 ("All three Class Counsel were unquestionably
experienced, highly respected leaders of the plaintiffs' asbestos bar."); id. at 335 (describing class counsel as "extraordinarily competent and experienced" and "highly respected"
and asserting that it is "clear to this Court that they intended to negotiate this settlement in
compliance with the ethical rules").
For examples of other courts praising class counsel, see South Carolina Nat'l Bank v.
Stone, 139 F.R.D. 325, 331 (D.S.C. 1991) ("Plaintiffs' counsel have now practiced before
this court in a number of securities fraud class actions, and the court is aware from firsthand experience of their competency in this complex area of law. The court is satisfied
that the plaintiffs and their class counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class."); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Secs. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1392
(D. Ariz. 1989) ("Both Class Counsel and counsel for Chemical Bank deem the settlements
to be fair, reasonable, adequate and deserving of the Court's approval. Counsels' opinions

1995]

FEASTING WtI1

THE WIDOW WEEPS

1117

tation" is the whole content of due process, then due process is built
on the courts' professed belief that experienced lawyers with good (or
even middling) reputations and good (or not too terrible) records of
past performance are adequate, would not "sell out" the class for some
other group, and would put the class's interests above their own. Assuming courts actually have the faith in experienced lawyers that they
profess to have, (something I seriously doubt), 3 is that faith enough
to constitute due process?
In Georgine the court correctly noted that the "[o]bjectors forthrightly stated that they were not challenging the qualifications or experience of Class Counsel," 33 5 but the objectors did raise serious
concerns about collusion. 336 In any class action, even an ordinary
one, the burden should rest with the settling parties to demonstrate
the absence of collusion once any credible evidence has been introduced. Not only are they in possession of the evidence that could best
refute any such allegation, but they are also the parties assigned the
7
burden under Rule 23.33

At a minimum, the court in Georgine had to find that the evidence
showed that it was more likely than not that collusion did not occur.
Moreover, the court in Georgineshould have required that the settling
parties demonstrate this by clear and convincing evidence, not just
because this class was composed largely of unknowing plaintiffs, 338 but

because this was a settlement class action-an action filed along with a
proposed settlement. As the Georgine court itself notes near the end of
33 9
its opinion, quoting Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co.:
The [Third Circuit] recognized that ... where a lawyer "unofficially
represents the class during settlement negotiations," [it] can result
in plaintiffs' counsel being "under strong pressure to conform to
the defendants' wishes." In these circumstances, where a settlement
is not negotiated by a "court designated class representative the
court must be doubly careful in evaluating the fairness of the settle3
ment to the plaintiff's class." 4
warrant great weight both because of their considerable familiarity with this litigation and
because of their extensive experience in similar actions.").
334 Instead, I think the courts are motivated to find counsel adequate so that the courts
may accept settlements and move on to other business. On the federaljudiciary's interest
in Geogine, see discussion infra accompanying notes 465-75.
335 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 329.
336 See discussion suprapart 11.
337 See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach., & Furniture Workers
v. Unisys Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1243, 1264 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("the proponents [of a proposed
class action settlement] have the burden of proving that.., the settlement is not collusive
but was reached after arm's length negotiations"); Triefv. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 840 F.
Supp. 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same).
338
See supra text accompanying notes 211-18 (discussion of "adequacy plus" standard).
339
453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
340
G-mogine, 157 F.R.D. at 330 (quoting Ace, 453 F.2d at 33) (citations omitted).
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The Georgine court did not, however, cite Ace to explain the standard it would have to apply to assess the fairness of the settlement or
the adequacy of representation or the settling parties' burden in refuting the objectors' evidence of collusion. Instead, it cited Ace to justify
its conclusion that it did not matter that CCR picked class counsel and
341
that the settlement was filed and negotiated on the same day.
In Georgine,the court set a standard for finding collusion that virtually guarantees a finding of no collusion. Relying on the definition
of collusion given in Black's Law Dictionary,3 42 the court said:
[F]or this Court to conclude that the Geoigine settlement was the
product of collusion, it would have to find that Class Counsel and
the CCR defendants "sought to accomplish an improper purpose,
perpetrated a fraud," and acted "secretively." Acting secretly, moreover, does not mean "out of the public eye." Intense negotiation
necessarily must proceed with a limited number of actors; that does
not make the negotiations collusive. 343
There are two problems with this standard. First, it places undue emphasis on secrecy, which is not critical to the definition of collusion
offered in Black's Law Dictionary.3 The passage quoted above suggests that the absence of "secrecy" prevents a finding of collusion even
if the evidence demonstrates that the settling parties sought to perpetrate a fraud. This notion is ludicrous, but seems to be how the court
used the "secrecy" element upon which it placed so much emphasis.
The court pointed out that "there is no evidence that class counsel or
Difficult though this may be to believe, the court said:
Thus, applying the AceHeatinganalysisto the Georginesettlement, this Court
concludes that the fact that CCR chose to negotiate with Messrs. Locks,
Motley and Rice, who had not yet been designated as class counsel but who
were publicly known to be accountable as co-lead counsel in the MDL proceedings or in other high profile cases, does not support a claim of ineffective representation or conflict of interest. See also Bowling v. Pfizer, 143
F.R.D. 141, 157 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (a settlement was not "flawed because
settlement preceded class certification").
Id. at 330.
342
Georgin, 157 F.R.D. at 331 (citing Point Pleasant Canoe Rental, Inc. v. Tinicum
Township, 110 F.R.D. 166, 169-70 (E.D. Pa. 1986)). The court quoted Black's Law Dictionary to define collusion:
An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his
rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. It implies
the existence offtaud of some kind, the employment offraudulent means, or of lawfid
means for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose. A secret combination,
conspiracy or concert of action between two or more persons for fraudulent or deceitful purpose.
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DIcnoNARY 240 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added).
34
Georgine 157 F.R.D. at 340 (citing PointPleasant 110 F.R.D. at 169-70). The court
also alluded to Bowling v. Pfizer, 143 F.R.D. 141, 156 (S.D. Ohio 1992), for the proposition
that neither class counsel nor the defendants must inform other lawyers about their
negotiations.
344 See supra note 342 (defining collusion).
341
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CCR attempted to keep the fact of their negotiations secret."M5 But if
secrecy is to be an element of collusion, surely it must be read to require only that the settling parties tried to keep secret that the client
settlements were consideration for the Georginesettlement, which they
did try to conceal.
Second, the court's standard would require evidence of criminal
conduct before a court could find class counsel inadequate on the
grounds of "collusion." I accept that Black's definition of collusion
means that colluders are guilty of a crime. But criminal conduct cannot be the standard for disqualifying class counsel. Certainly, if due
process rests solely on adequate representation, then adequate representation must mean something more than having a lawyer with some
experience who did not commit a crime against the client. Indeed,
even if due process also rests on notice and the opportunity to opt
out, adequate representation must mean more than this, particularly
given how little good notice and opt-out rights probably do in class
actions that involve small stakes for individual class members.
Even if such a low standard could satisfy due process, the crimecollusion standard is impractical. This standard would almost certainly guarantee that no court ever found collusion because judges do
not run around suggesting that the lawyers before them engaged in
criminal conduct-even when the evidence suggests that in all likelihood the lawyers did. I can, in fact, think of nothing a court is less
likely to do, with the possible exceptions of suggesting that a fellow
judge engaged in criminal conduct or stopping a war.3 6
Courts routinely recite that a settlement can only be approved in
the absence of collusion.3 47 They rarely define what collusion is, what
evidence would show its existence, or how much evidence of collusion
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 331 (E.D. Penn. 1994).
In earlier work, I discussed in depth how courts abandon their commitment to law
in cases involving charges that lawyers have been unethical or have otherwise broken the
law. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L REv. 1389, 1461-78
(1992) [hereinafter Koniak, The Law]; Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law
and Others Frame It to Their Wl, 66 S. CA. L. R v. 1075, 1079-91 (1993). Courts routinely
find methods to excuse lawyer misconduct, to avoid enforcing sanctions against lawyers,
and, most important to the present discussion, to abandon responsibility for elaborating
on the law that lawyers are expected to follow. See Koniak, The Law, supra, at 1474-76
nn.369-72 (citing numerous examples).
347
See, e.g., Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that district
courts must examine the terms and the process of settlements to ensure that settlements
are not the product of collusion); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir.
1987) (noting that district courts have a "fiduciary responsibility" to ensure that settlements are not collusive) (quoting In reWarner Communications Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37
(2d Cir. 1986)); Ficalora v. Lockheed Cal. Co., 751 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Before
approving a class action settlement, the district court must reach a reasoned judgment that
the proposed agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion
among, the negotiating parties .. ."); Officers forJustice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d
615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983).
345

346
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must be found to justify rejecting a settlement. 348 More to the point,
one must search long and hard to find any court opinion that has
3 49
disapproved a class settlement on the ground that it was collusive.
Thus, the "absence of collusion" standard is meaningless as now
applied.
G.

Replacing Compliments with Content

The Eisen standard-which I quoted earlier 5 0 and which the
Georgine court cited as well, though not in its conclusions on collusion 3 51 -suggests a very different approach. It requires the court to
"eliminate so far as possible the likelihood that the litigants are involved
in a collusive Suit."352 The duty to eliminate the likelihood of collusion suggests a concern with whether a suit appears to be the product
of collusion, not just a concern about whether the suit is actually
collusive.
The Third Circuit itself has recognized the importance of eliminating the appearance of fraud, not just the reality of fraud, in class
actions. In holding that class counsel could not act also as the class's
named representative, Judge Aldirsert said: "[I]mportant as it was that
people should getjustice, it was even more important that they should
be made to feel and see that they were getting it."35 3 Of course, if
settlement class actions are to be allowed, the fact that something is a
settlement class action cannot be taken as enough of an appearance
of collusion to warrant dismissal of the action. But the court should
forbid some practices that provide a great opportunity for collusion to
348 At least one other court has cited the definition from Black's Lazw Dictionaryused by
the Georginecourt, although without placing special emphasis on the "secrecy" component.
SeePoint Pleasant Canoe Rental v. Tinicum Township, 110 F.R.D. 166, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
I have found no discussion by any court of the nature or quantity of evidence necessary to
find collusion. This itself demonstrates how empty the "collusion" standard is.
349 For example, a leading treatise on class actions cites no examples. See NEWBERG &
CoNTE, supranote 191, ch. 15. Nonetheless, some examples exist. See, e.g., Miller v. Calvin,
No. 82-02258 (D. Colo. Dec. 20, 1984) ("[P]laintiffs' sincerity... [is] insufficient to expunge the taint of collusion, champerty and maintenance marring this lawsuit."). As this
Article was being edited for publication, Judge Sear rejected the settlement in the Ford
Bronco class action, citing the possibility of collusion. In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II
Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8507 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1995). There are undoubtedly other examples, but I assure you from my extensive research that such opinions
are extremely rare.
350
See supra text accompanying note 212.
351
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 326 (emphasis added) (quoting Eisen test in a general discussion of legal standard of adequacy).
352
Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
353
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088 (3d Cir.) (quoting Lord
Herschell in 2, J.B. Ariay, Victorian Chancellors 460 (1908)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976). Judge Aldisert added: "the appearance of conduct associated with institutions of
the law [is] as important as the conduct itself." Id. The opinion states that "a class action is
a special type of legal proceeding," one in which "the appearance,not the fact, of impropriety" must be eliminated. Id. at 1091.
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occur. At present only one prophylactic rule is in place: Class counsel
35 4
cannot serve as the class representative.
One rule is simply not enough. Courts must have standards that
reduce the possibility of collusion, not just because appearances
count, but because courts are more likely to apply standards that do
not require the court to say anything negative about the lawyers
before them. Indeed, courts can apply these standards to disqualify
class counsel and still compliment the lawyers as models of competence and integrity.3 5 5 General standards would give the courts the
cover they crave.
I could not agree more with the oft-made remark that the ethics
rules cannot be mechanically applied to class actions.35 6 But it does
not follow from that observation that no rules should be applied or
that nearly every class lawyer to appear before a court is, by virtue of
some years of practice, an adequate representative.
Given that all class actions, by definition, involve multiple "clients," the ethics rules on conflict of interest cannot be applied
mechanically to evaluate the conduct of class counsel. Mechanical application is not, however, the only option. Courts regularly apply the
ethics rules on conflict of interest to decide ordinary disqualification
motions without doing so mechanically.3 57 Instead, they regularly
state that a party's right to choose a lawyer and the potential disrup354 Kramer, 534 F.2d at 1090 (disqualifying class counsel and class counsel's law partners from serving as class representatives). This rule has been criticized as empty or, at
worst, counterproductive. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supranote 332, at 104. The courts have
nonetheless held on to it. See, e.g., Hoffman Elec., Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 754 F. Supp.
1070, 1077 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (referring to the rule). This gives them at least one rule to
point to as evidence that adequacy demands something objective.
355
Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983), provides an example of how courts cannot resist complimenting class counsel even when disapproving a
class settlement that appears blatantly unfair to the class. Under the settlement in Holmes,
the eight named class representatives were to receive one-half of the back pay awarded to
the class. The remainder of the class, approximately 120 people, were to share the other
half. Id. at 1146. The Eleventh Circuit neatly avoided an actual finding of collusion, stating, "Settlements entailing disproportionately greater benefits to named parties are proper
only when the totality of the circumstances combine to dispel the 'cloud of collusion which
such a settlement suggests.'" Id. at 1148. The court continued: "Without intending any
disparagement of the eminent class counsel in this case, we conclude that the attorney's
opinion [that the settlement was fair] is an insufficient basis upon which to approve the
disproportionate and facially unfair allocation of this back pay award." Id. at 1150 (emphasis added).
356
See supra note 29 (discussing how my approach is to concentrate on legal obligations, not ethical precepts, in an effort to critique the actual practices of lawyers and
courts, as opposed to using ethical insights or rules in an attempt to reshape the law). For
a fuller discussion of my approach to the intersection between law and ethics, see Koniak,
The Law, supra note 346.
357 See WoIrmaAM, supra note 326, at 332-33 (noting that courts may and do deny disqualification motions, although the lawyer has committed a violation of the ethics rules,
which could be the subject of a disciplinary action).
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tion to a trial must be considered in applying the ethics rules.3 5 8
Whether to apply the rules mechanically, or at all, is a false issue. The
real issue is whether the courts apply any standards to judge class
counsel's "fidelity and vigor."
If the courts are unwilling to replace compliments with content in
their review of adequacy, and if notice and opt-out lights are to be
abandoned as futile gestures that do little good, then the courts will
have to adopt meaningful substitutes to ensure due process. For example, courts could regularly appoint guardians or special masters to
monitor the adequacy of representation. Courts could insist that all
future claimants who have not manifested injury at the time of the
class settlement be allowed to back out of the settlement, should they
so choose, when they get sick. But the class action as it is developing is
making class counsel one of the many indignities visited upon someone with the ill fortune to be injured by a defendant who injures many

others,3 59 an indignity foisted on an unsuspecting public by courts eager to clear their dockets 3 60 That is not due process of law.
If we abandon the fig leaves that we use to explain how class actions are consistent with individual dignity, we must at least hold on to
the notion that due process means conformity to something that can
be objectively measured. Perhaps beauty exists in the eye of the beholder; due process that is similarly subjective loses any claim to its
name. Moreover, by definition, due process must mean something
other than that the result is just, otherwise some lynchings would be
consistent with due process. A "fairness" hearing that appraises a settlement made outside the court's presence only as to the substantive
fairness of the terms provides no more process than would be pro-

358
See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (noting that in ruling on disqualification motions courts recognize that "disqualification has an
immediate adverse effect on the client by separating him from counsel of his choice" and
that such motions "are often interposed for tactical reasons"; the court therefore rejected
strict application of ethics rules to disqualify a former government lawyer in favor of disqualification only when conduct tends to "taint the [underlying] trial"), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F.
Supp. 418, 430-31 (D. Del. 1986) (in ruling on a disqualification motion, court took into
account the difficulty the client would have in finding new counsel in a small city that was
hosting a multi-party case, the timing of the disqualification motion, and the resulting
delay in the proceedings); see also United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 887 n.3 (2d Cir.
1982) (no disqualification, although violation of ethics rules may have occurred); Unified
Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1350.n.15 (9th Cir. 1981) (same).
359 SeeJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 764 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing
majority's holding that counsel on appeal can refuse to make nonfrivolous arguments
urged by criminal defendant as turning the lawyer into "one of the many indignities visited
upon someone who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the criminal justice system").
360
See infra text accompanying notes 465-75 (discussing the judiciary's incentives to
accept settlements like Georgine).
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vided by a post-lynching hearing that assessed whether the dead guy
3 61
really did commit the crime
If courts are to replace compliments with content, where would
the courts look for standards that might fill out the concept of adequate representation and give it meaning? For a start, the courts
might follow the lead set in the "limited fund" cases and limit class
counsel to one class action against a defendant at a time. Almost all
class actions are settled.3 62 Allowing class counsel to have a pocket
hidden from the court where money belonging to the class might be
put is inappropriate. There is simply no way for the court to monitor
attorney's fees or to ensure that the class was not ripped off when class
counsel simultaneously negotiates deals on the side that the court can
review in only a cursory manner, if at all. The limited fund cases are
not really limited fund cases.3 63 They are expressions of the courts'
concern that the opportunities to cheat the class are too great when
lawyers engage in parallel representation. Courts are, however, so adverse to suggesting that lawyers might actually take a little client
money on the side that they hide behind the limited fund rhetoric.
With due process at stake, courts will have to admit the possibility that
lawyers might do wrong.
The idea expressed in some of the limited fund cases, that class
counsel should be prohibited from simultaneously representing other
classes against a common defendant, is similar to the concern ex361 There is, however, ample precedent to suggest that in assessing class action settlements courts are accepting "fair results," whatever that means, as the test for adequate
process. In the oft-quoted words of the Fifth Circuit:
It is, ultimately, in the settlement terms that the class representatives'judgment and the adequacy of their representation is either vindicated or
found wanting. If the terms themselves are fair, reasonable and adequate,
the district court may fairly assume that they were negotiated by competent
and adequate counsel; in such cases, whether another team of negotiators
might have accomplished a better settlement is a matter equally comprised
of conjecture and irrelevance.
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added),
affd, 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998, and cert denied, 456 U.S. 1012
(1982). These words were, in fact, quoted and relied on by the Georgine court. Ceorgine,
157 F.1.D. at 328. But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts:
Wien the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. Rnv. 1159, 1207-11 (1995) (arguing that the
courts should concentrate on how fair the results are when they assess class action
settlements).
362 Available empirical evidence strongly supports the widely accepted statement in the
text. An empirical study of shareholder and class action suits brought against the 190

largest publicly owned corporations as ranked by Fortune Magazine showed that 70.7% of
all suits filed were settled before trial, 17% were dismissed, 4% were denied class action
status, and only 4.3% were litigated to verdict. See Thomas M.Jones, AnEmpiricalExamination of the Resolution of ShareholderDerivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L Ruv. 542,
545 (1980); see also Laycock, supra note 216 (discussing due process standard requiring

individual notice).
363 See supra text accompanying notes 246-51.
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pressed in the federal bribery and illegal gratuity statutes, which are
designed to ensure the integrity of public officials.3 64 Given that a
federal court must appoint class counsel and that class counsel have
duties to members of the public by virtue of that appointment, it
seems sensible to consult the statutes on corruption of federal officials
for guidance on the standards a court might apply in assessing the
propriety of class counsel receiving money, outside the class action
3 65
pending before the court, from the defendant in the class action.
Not only do these statutes prohibit the receipt of money in exchange
for an explicit promise to perform some official duty, they also prohibit the receipt of money from another who hopes for some generalized benefit from the donation or who is expressing gratitude for
3 66
some past official action.
364

See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (Bribery of Public Officials and Wimesses).
Indeed, an argument could be made that these statutes provide more than guidance-that they apply to class counsel. The statutes apply to persons acting "for or on
behalf of the United States" as a "public official." They are concerned not just with the
reality of corruption but are also concerned with the appearance of corruption. Courts
have held that these statutes apply to such "public officials" as the president of a private
nonprofit corporation who was managing a contract for HUD, see United States v. Hinton,
683 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 482 (1984), and an employee of the San
Francisco Federal Reserve Bank who was obtaining bids for Federal Reserve Bank projects,
see United States v. Hollingshead, 672 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1982).
365

The tests applied in these cases [interpreting the federal bribery statute]
focus on the degree of government involvement in the potential public official's activity and whether important federal objectives are involved. This
test leaves the courts a great deal of discretion and promotes a broad interpretation of the "public official" requirement of section 201 bribery
prosecutions.
RandyJ. Curato et al., Government Fraud,Waste and Abuse: A PracticalGuide to Fighting Official Corruption, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1027, 1076 (1983). For my purposes, however, one
need only accept that the concerns with corruption expressed in those statutes and the
cases interpreting them might guide a court in assessing what constitutes "fidelity" to the
class.
366 Although the bribery statute prohibits only the "corrupt" acceptance of money to
perform a public duty, the gratuity statute does not require "corruption,"just the receipt of
money in connection with one's duties "otherwise than as provided by law":
The bribery subsections prohibit the receipt of anything of value "in return
for being influenced in [the] performance of any official act," while the
gratuity subsections prohibit the receipt of anything of value "foror because
of any official act performed or to be performed by him." The bribery subsections' "in return for" language contemplates a quid pro quo exchange.
The gratuity subsections' "for or because of" language encompasses a wider
range of situations.
Because the official may accept a gratuity for an act he has already
performed, the statute contains no requirement of an exchange or quid pro
quo. A gift to an official for an act already performed may thus fall within
the scope of this section. As stated in United States v. Evans, "specific intent
is not an element of Section 201 (g) ... the gravamen of each offense, then,
is not an intent to be corrupted or influenced, but simply the acceptance of
an unauthorized compensation." For example, goodwill gifts and favors to
government officials that are motivated by a donor's generalized hope of
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Class counsel who simultaneously negotiate deals outside of the
class action with a common defendant accept payment that might very
well be motivated by the donor's generalized hope of benefit. It is
almost impossible for a court to determine what the defendant gained
or hoped to gain by the side settlements when reviewing a class action
settlement for fairness and adequacy of counsel or when appointing
class counsel to litigate a class action when those lawyers are simultaneously litigating and potentially settling other cases against the defendant. Therefore, to help ensure the integrity of class counsel and
the process, courts should prohibit such simultaneous
3 67
representation.
But one need not resort to the criminal statutes to find support
for a standard that bars class counsel from representing competing
groups against a common defendant. Under bankruptcy law, a
trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of a debtor for an antecedent debt made ninety days before bankruptcy, if that transfer leaves
the creditor better off.3 68 There is little doubt, as I explained earlier,3 69 that class counsel's clients did better outside Georgine than they
would have done within the class, and that class counsel thereby
benefitted.3 70 The bankruptcy rule is justified as a prophylactic measure against fraud; I am suggesting a similar prophylactic rule for class
actions.
In the same way that transfers of assets soon before bankruptcy
make it too easy for potential bankrupts to avoid the protection bankruptcy law affords creditors, side settlements made by class counsel
make it too easy for class counsel and the defendants to avoid the
protections supposedly afforded class members by Rule 23(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Due Process Clause of the
benefit will not satisfy the requisite intent for bribery, but will probably be
construed to be an illegal gratuity.
Curato et al., supra note 365, at 1082 (citations omitted).
367
President Kennedy explained the importance of the federal statutes aimed at
preventing conflicts of interest in federal officials:
There can be no dissent from the principle that all officials must act with
unwavering integrity, absolute impartiality and complete devotion to the
public interest. This principle must be followed not only in reality but in
appearance. For the basis of effective government is public confidence,
and that confidence is endangered when ethical standards falter or appear
to falter.
1 PUB. PAPERS 326 (1961) (PresidentJohn F. Kennedy), reprinted in 107 CONG. REc. 6835
(1961). The basis of effective government lies no less in public confidence in the processes
of the courts. To squander that confidence and the promise of due process out of a fear of
offending lawyers or out of a perceived need to do something about the backlog of cases
involving mass torts is shortsighted and irresponsible.
368 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). The debtor must be insolvent for 90 days prior to the
transfer, but the bankruptcy law presumes this to be true. Id. § 547(f).
369
See suprapart I.C.
37o See supratext accompanying notes 117-18.
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Constitution. Of course, a rule that allowed class counsel to represent
competing groups, as long as no settlement was made for the other
group in close proximity to the settlement of the class's claim, would
be unworkable. Thus, to be effective, any prophylactic rule against
fraudulent side deals would have to ban parallel representation
against a common defendant completely.
When all is said and done, the case law on class actions provides
precious little to draw on in the way of standards. More shocking, the
Georgine court ignored the standards that do exist along with the due
process concerns of Shutts and Ivy. If the case law provided more in
the way of standards, we wouldn't be in this mess. The courts will have
to begin to develop some standards on adequacy of representation
and begin the habit of enforcing them. A due process built on faith
alone cannot stand.
IV
TELLING STORIES TO THE COURT

The comment to Model Rule 3.3, "Candor Toward the Tribunal,"
states: "Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of
presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in
reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be
presented by the opposing party. '3 7 1 However, when a class action
settlement is presented to a court for approval, there may be no "opposing party." The settling parties are aligned, and there may be no
objector represented at the fairness hearing. These proceedings are
thus analogous to ex parte proceedings, where a lawyer's duty of candor to the court is much greater than in an ordinary adversarial
372
proceeding.
Sometimes, as in Georgine, there are objectors represented by
counsel who appear to challenge the settlement. However, this does
not transform a fairness proceeding into an ordinary adversary proceeding. Fairness hearings are not supposed to resemble fall blown
trials, 3 73 and they do not. Objectors are rarely allowed to conduct extensive discovery on the compromises made by the settling parties in
their negotiations. 374 Even when the court is persuaded to allow disMODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUIT Rule 3.3 cmL (1994).
372 Id. 3.3(d) ("In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all
material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed
decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.").
373 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX ITIGATION (Second) § 30.41 at 237 (1986) (explaining that
judge is not to adjudicate merits of underlying lawsuit in assessing fairness of settlement).
371

374 See generallyWilliam E. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' ActionsPart1, 23 Sw. LJ. 765, 803-06 (1969) (arguing that courts do not receive adequate information about a settlement even when there are objectors because the objectors often lack
sufficient information to raise or sustain challenges).
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covery into the negotiation process to expose collusion or other evidence of unfairness, it is highly unlikely to. order the depositions of
class counsel or defendants' lawyers. Thus, objectors are routinely denied the best evidence by which to establish their position.
Although I believe there are times when a court should order the
depositions of the lawyers who negotiated the settlement,3 75 this section is concerned with the duties of the lawyers for settling parties in
the vast majority of cases where the courts deny the objectors meaningful discovery.3 76 While the presence of objectors makes the proceedings adversarial in fact, the objectors are handicapped by the
limits ordinarily placed on their access to relevant evidence. When
the opposing party is forced to operate largely in the dark, just as
when there is no opposing party, the court must be able to rely on the
lawyers who are informed and present to convey to the court "all material facts known to [them]" that are reasonably necessary for the
court to reach an informed decision, "whether or not the facts are
adverse."

377

The special nature of the court's responsibility in approving settiements likewise supports imposing a greater duty of candor on lawyers for settling parties in a class action. 378 Normally, the court is
expected to be a neutral umpire between the two parties. However, in
approving a class settlement, the court sits as a guardian for the absent
class members. 3 79 Class counsel also have fiduciary obligations to the
class, but only if the court approves of class counsel assuming that
role. Of course, a lawyer owes the guardian for his client more than
an advocate's presentation of one side of the story. The guardian, like
the client for whom the guardian stands in, is owed all material facts.
Class counsel therefore owes the court greater candor in petitioning
for approval of a settlement than an ordinary advocate normally owes,

See supra text accompanying notes 240-42.
There are many sound reasons for limiting discovery in fairness hearings, including
the sensitive nature of the material exchanged in the settlement negotiations, the undue
delay and expense of deposing the negotiating lawyers, and the potential that routine discovery into settlement negotiations may deter settlements, unduly protract negotiations, or
chill candid conversation.
377 For an interesting and somewhat parallel discussion, see Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen
J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Chargingand BargainingPractices
Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines,66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 506-09 (1992) (discussing how
prohibition on fact-bargaining in sentencing has had some significant effects).
378 Cf Stephen J. Schulofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 738, 733-78
(1980) (arguing that judicial control over pleas should be greater than judicial control
over dismissals because authority of the court is at stake in sentencing decision).
379 In assessing the fairness of a settlement, the court sits "as the guardian of the interests of the absent members of the class." Liebman v. J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 73
F.LD. 531, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
375
376

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1128

[Vol. 80:1045

whether or not there are objectors and whatever the scope of
380
discovery.
The lawyers for the settling parties in Georginedid not forthrightly
put before the court all material facts known to them. The court, supposedly acting as a guardian for the class but acting instead more like
an umpire, did not demand that they do so. The record is thus quite
muddled on a number of matters material to the question of collusion, and the court permitted the settling parties to make alternative
arguments about their conduct. The settling parties made arguments
of the following form: If when we signed the client inventory settlement we intended x, then that is not unethical because of a, b, c; and,
on the other hand, if we intended y, that is not unethical because of d
or because the client settlements are irrelevant. Yet, the lawyers making these arguments knew what was intended because they were the
ones intending whatever was intended. As explained earlier, what the
client settlements were intended to accomplish was material to the
court's determination.38 ' This kind of advocacy is inconsistent with
the duties of lawyers presenting a class settlement for court approval,
and the court as guardian should not have tolerated it.
The most egregious example of the settling parties' lack of candor and the court's indifference involves the changing stories told by
the settling parties to explain the "futures provisions" in the inventory
settlements made for the present clients. To understand the various
stories told by the settling parties and to establish that these stories
concern a material matter, it is first necessary to review the alleged
problems with the futures provisions. The original futures provisions
stated that in the future, class counsel would not handle or file cases
against CCR that did not meet certain medical criteria.3 8 2 These provisions appeared to violate Model Rule 5.6 (b): "A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: an agreement in which a restriction on
the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy
between private parties."3 8 3 This rule "prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim
3 84
on behalf of a client."
380
In Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979), the Fifth Circuit described how difficult it was for courts to
review class action settlements: "Lacking a fully developed evidentiary record, both the
trial court and the appellate court would be incapable of making the independent assessment of the facts and law required in the adjudicatory context." Id. at 1169. This problem
further illustrates the proposition in the text.
381
See supra text accompanying notes 157-85.
382 The court set out the original versions of the Greitzer and Locks and Ness, Motley
futures provisions in its opinion. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 299-300.
383

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.6(b) (1994).

384

Id. cmt.
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I am hardly one who believes that rules can be slapped on facts in
some mechanical fashion to produce an answer. However, if Model
Rule 5.6(b) means anything, it was violated by the inclusion in the
client settlements of a promise not to file certain cases in the future.
Indeed, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
38 5
so held.
After the ABA issued its opinion, the settling parties changed the
agreements in several ways.38 6 First, Ness, Motley executed new documents with CGR to memorialize the present client settlements, excising the original futures provisions, and simultaneously executing
documents entitled "Settlement Agreements" that contained nothing
but the new futures provisions 3 87 Second, the new futures provisions
asserted that class counsel believed that the minimum medical criteria
for bringing suit were "fair and reasonable" because they protect "clients from being forced prematurely to litigate, or settle and release"
388
their asbestos claims.
Third, instead of promising not to represent pleural claimants in
the future, class counsel agreed, "unless in the exercise of its professional judgment, given some unforeseen circumstances, it determines
otherwise, to recommend" to their clients that they defer pleural
3 89
claims in exchange for a tolling of the statute of limitations.
Fourth, class counsel remained free to sue GCR on behalf of any client
who refused to accept the advice to defer filing suit. Fifth, the futures
provisions were to remain in effect until Georgine was approved and all
appeals exhausted. 390 Sixth, upon final approval of a Georgine settlement "which includes medical criteria substantially comparable to the
criteria" in the futures provision, the futures provision "shall be superseded" by the class settlement, except as to any people who opted out

of Georgie.391
In my opinion, these changes exacerbate the violation of Model
Rule 5.6(b).3 92 Instead of obligating counsel to send future pleural
clients away free to seek unbiased advice, the new provisions seem
designed to obligate counsel to advise future clients to accept CCR's
offer to toll the statute of limitations in exchange for a commitment
by the potential plaintiff to defer bringing suit unless and until they
ABA Formal Op. 371, supra note 175.
See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 300 (quoting Greitzer and Locks settlement revisions of
July 9, 1993); id. at 300-01 (quoting portion of Ness, Motley amended agreement ofJune
11, 1993).
387 See SP Exhibits 302A, 302B, supranote 114.
388
See Georgine 157 F.R.D. at 300-01.
389 Id. (emphasis omitted).
385

386

390
391

Id.
Id.

392 But see In re Asbestos III, No. 92C-8888 (Circuit Ct. Kanawha County, W. Va. June
23, 1993) (holding that such futures provisions do not violate Model Rule 5.6(b)).

1130

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1045

get a qualifying illness. And, as the settling parties readily acknowledged, clients usually take the advice of their lawyers.3 93 Moreover,
class counsel's assertion in the new provisions that they "believe" in
the advice they will be offering suggests that class counsel would tell
clients they are offering this advice because class counsel believe in it
and not because class counsel signed a contract with the entity the
client wants to sue. Throughout the fairness hearing, class counsel
reiterated their position that these futures agreements represented
their best judgment and were not promises made to get the client
settlements.3 9 4 I can only infer from this that class counsel would feel
no obligation to tell future clients that they had made some form of
commitment to the defendants to give this advice.
Putting aside my opinion that the amendments are worse than
the original, none of the changes could reasonably be said to cure the
original violation. First, segregating the futures provisions into separate settlement documents does nothing. It is clear from the Model
Rule 5.6 comment that the rule prohibits all restrictions on future
practice made "in connection with settling a claim."3 95 It is thus irrelevant whether the provisions are in the client settlements. Similarly,
the assertion that class counsel believe in the advice they are to give
future clients is incapable of curing the Model Rule 5.6 violation. The
rule makes no allowances for future restrictions that the lawyer thinks
are good ideas. Of course, a lawyer is free to adopt a restriction on his
future practice independently, but restrictions lose any claim to "independence" when they are written into contracts with defendants as
part of settling the claims of present clients. If Model Rule 5.6(b)
were held not to apply whenever a lawyer asserted that the future restriction was in the best interest of his future clients or would have
been adopted independently, the rule would be gutted.
As for the change from agreeing "not to file" suit to "advising"
clients not to file suit, the rule covers all restrictions on future practice, including restrictions on the advice to be given. The changes
that link the new futures provisions to Georgine do not cure the viola393 Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 44, at 163 ("CCR understood that Class
Counsel would recommend to clients that they defer their claims if they did not satisfy the
medical criteria, and that, in CCR's experience, clients in the normal coursefollowed the advice
of counseL") (emphasis added) (quoting testimony of Michael F. Rooney, Chief Operating
Officer of CCR).
394 See, e.g., id. at 170 (provisions represent "sober, sensible, humane professional judgment7 exercised for benefit of future clients). The court accepted this story. See Georgine,
157 F.R.D. at 302-03 (rejecting my testimony about these provisions and the testimony of
Professor Roger C. Cramton because we lacked experience in "mass tort cases, class actions
and asbestos litigation" and thus "[did not understand] how such a good faith commitment could reflect sensible professional judgment of lawyers with extensive experience in
asbestos litigation").
395

MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUTcr Rule 5.6(b) cmt. (1994).
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tion; on the contrary, they provide evidence of the connection between the client settlements and the class action, contradicting the
settling parties' claim that the side settlements and Georgine were independent. 396 The fact that the futures provisions were to remain in
effect even if Georginewere not approved also shows that class counsel
were willing to try to impose the Georgine terms on people even if a
court found the terms unfair.
Finally, the only change that arguably eases the Model Rule 5.6
violation is the inclusion of a bunch of fudge language around counsel's duty to give the advice promised. But the fudge language seems
to mean no more than that in some small number of future cases
involving unforeseen circumstances counsel might not be bound to
give the advice promised. With class counsel's asbestos experience, it
is, however, doubtful that many "unforeseen circumstances" will crop
up or that many were contemplated by the parties who wrote this language. Moreover, the settling parties admit that the fudge language
was not expected to affect many, if any, cases. 39 7 Thus, none of the

changes cured the problem with these provisions; they remain restrictions on future practice made in connection with settlements.
The Model Rule 5.6(b) violation affects the class action because it
shows that class counsel were bound to support Georgine, court approval or not, and because it demonstrates the link between the two
deals. But even more troubling than the violation are the various conflicting stories that the settling parties put forth tojustify these futures
provisions. Keep in mind that class counsel and the CCR lawyers from
Shea & Gardner drafted and negotiated the futures provisions and
thus knew the true story. 398 Yet while witness after witness proposed
conflicting accounts of these provisions, the CCR lawyers and class
counsel took no action to set the record straight. Here are the various
stories told about these future provisions.
First, the CCR lawyers asserted-not under oath, but in a document subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requirements of

See supra text accompanying note 157.
Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 44, at 166 ("[t]he new language did not
change the initial import of the futures provisions"); see also supra note 393.
398 While the record does not make clear whether CCR's lawyers from Shea & Gardner
or Messrs. Locks, Motley and Rice took primary responsibility for drafting the futures provisions, it is clear that partners from Shea & Gardner, including Messrs. Aldock and Hanlon,
were the principal negotiators for CCR, and that the negotiators for the class were Messrs.
Locks, Motley and Rice. These attorneys actively participated in the questioning of witnesses at the Georginefairness hearing. See Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 176 (Feb. 28,
1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney) (identifying principal negotiators for CCR and the
class); id. at 118 (Mar. 3, 1994) (Mr. Rooney asserting that he did not negotiate the inventory settlements).
396
397
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candor 99 -that the original versions of the futures provisions meant
that class counsel "agreed not to file future asbestos [cases] against
any CCR defendant unless the medical criteria (the same criteria [as
in Georgine]) were satisfied."40 0 They also asserted that the original
versions were revised "to avoid any possible suggestion that such
agreements were unenforceable." 40 ' The original futures provisions
included no sunset provision that would cause one to believe that they
would expire upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any event,
and no mention of any such intent is made in the proffer. The modified provisions stated that they would be superseded by Georgine upon
final court approval of the class settlement but would remain in effect
as to those who had opted out of Georgine. The modified version states
that the provision is to remain in effect "unless and until" Georgine is
finally approved, 40 2 which suggests that if Georgine were not approved
the provisions were to be considered in effect. Now the testimony.
Mr. Rooney, who signed the futures provisions on behalf of CCR,
testified in a deposition that he understood that the original futures
provisions were designed to restrict the kind of cases class counsel
would file against CCR 40 3 and that they were designed to remain in
effect should Georgine be rejected by the court.40 4 This is consistent
with the proffer. On the other hand, Professor Stephen Gillers testified at his deposition that the lawyers for the settling parties told him
on the morning of his deposition to assume that the original versions
of the futures provisions were intended to be temporary agreements
to remain in effect pending the presentation of the Georgine settlement to the court 4o 5 and that they were not intended to remain in
effect should Georgine ultimately fail.406 This is inconsistent with the
proffer and Mr. Rooney's deposition testimony. On these assumed
facts, Professor Gillers testified that the provisions did not violate
399

At the time in question, Rule 11 provided that a lawyer's signature on any paper

filed in federal court represents the lawyer's warranty that, among other things, the lawyer
believes the paper is well grounded in fact. Furthermore, it provided that sanctions for
violating the Rule were mandatory. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (as amended in 1983).
400
CCR Proffer, supra note 157, at 21.
40' Id. at 21-22.
402
See SP Exhibits 802A, 302B, 302C, 303, supra note 114.
43 Deposition of Michael F. Rooney at 421, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 930215 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 1994).
404 Id. at 412.

405

Deposition of Stephen Gillers at 36-41, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-

0215 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 25, 1994). "[A]t the meeting [this morning], I was told to assume for

purposes of my opinion, that [the original futures provisions] represented a standstill arrangement between Ness, Motley and CCR, pending the final approval, should it come, of
the [Georgine] class action settlement." Id. at 40.
406 Id. at 41 ("I was told to assume for purposes of my opinion ... that [the original
futures provision] would not. . . continue to bind Ness, Motley [if Georgine were not
approved].").
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Model Rule 5.6.407 He further testified that the provisions would violate Model Rule 5.6 if they were designed to outlast court rejection of
08

Georgine.4

The settling parties did not pursue the "temporary provision"
story, although there is no reason to doubt that it was told to Professor
Gillers by the lawyers. After all, no lawyer for the settling parties objected to his recounting this story about the provisions being temporary. More troubling, the settling parties later not only dropped the
"temporary" story, they advanced its opposite. At the fairness hearing
Mr. Rooney testified, consistent with his deposition testimony, that the
futures provisions were designed to dutlive court disapproval of

Georgine.409

Professor Hazard then took the stand and was asked by CCR's
lawyer to give the basis for his opinion that the futures provisions did
not violate Rule 5.6. He began by stating that it was his understanding
that the provisions in question cover pending or inventory cases, not
future claims "that are the subject of this class action"; the CCR lawyer
affirmed that his understanding was correct.41 0 But it was not and is
not. The terms .of the futures provisions make clear that they are to
govern "future cases" that are the subject of the class action. Until
Georgine is approved on final appeal, class counsel agreed, "unless...
given some unforeseen circumstances," that they will recommend that
pleural claimants accept a tolling of the statute of limitations instead
Id. at 41.
Id. at 56-57.
409 Fairness Hearing, supra note 80, at 221 (Feb. 28, 1994) (testimony of Michael F.
Rooney). This testimony is consistent with the story Rooney told at this deposition, but it
does not explain the interim story told to Professor Gillers. Consider too that Professor
Hazard's testimony stands in complete contrast to the understanding provided to Professor
Gillers that the futures provisions were intended to protect against the contingency that
Georgine would not be approved. Id. at 64 (Feb. 25, 1994) (testimony of Geoffrey C.
Hazard).
410 Professor Hazard testified:
[Professor Hazard: A]s I understand it the [modified futures provisions]
have to do with so-called pending or inventory cases, not as such the futures
cases that are the subject of this class suit. But the suggestion is that because the settlement of the pending cases was a part of the negotiations or
concurrent with the negotiations, that it is relevant to the question of the
class suit. I think my understanding is correct in that respect.
Now, on that understanding, I am correct that the CCR settlement
agreement is an agreement about the pending cases and is not the stipulation concerning the futures class. Am I correct in that'
[Ms. White of Shea & Gardner for CCR]: Yes sir, you are.
[Professor Hazard]: Yes, I thought I was.
Now, so my initial question is why is there any objection concerning
the futures class that's based on an agreement counsel made concerning
the pending cases and... an agreement that in the future those pending
cases would be handled in a way that is indicated in this agreement ....
Id. at 63-64 (Feb. 25, 1994) (testimony of Geoffrey C. Hazard).
407
408
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of suing.41 ' In other words, class counsel and the other lawyers who
signed similar futures provisions with CCR agreed to give this advice
to individual class members who asked for advice on opting out. More
telling, the terms of the provision make explicit that they were to govern the advice given to opt-outs after Georgine was approved.
Immediately before and after Professor Hazard's testimony, witnesses told a story that contradicts the story put forward through Professor Hazard that the provisions were not intended to affect the
advice given class members. This next story was that the futures provisions were about "future cases" but were never intended to be enforceable. 412 The provisions were moral commitments and nothing more.

This story was told despite the fact that the original version of the
futures provisions are embedded in a contract that provides that any
dispute will be subject to binding arbitration, and despite the fact that
the modified version is the entire substance of a contract that ends
with the following clause:
If the validity or enforcement of any provision in this agreement is
challenged in any legal proceeding, [Plaintiffs'] Counsel agrees to
notify CGR of such challenge so that appropriate steps can be taken
to respond to the challenge. If final judgment is rendered, by an
appropriate court, with all appeals exhausted, holding the provision
...unethical

or unlawful, then the provision shall be deemed null
41

and void .... 3
Finally, the "we never intended these provisions to be enforceable"
story, which was retold by the settling parties in their Proposed Findings of Fact, 414 is flatly contradicted by CCR's proffer, which stated
that the provisions were modified to ensure that they would be
4 15
enforceable.
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 301.
Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 188 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence
Fitzpatrick):
411
412

[Mr. Fitzpatrick]: I'm not sure that we view these futures' agreements as
necessarily legally binding documents. I'm not sure that our remedy would
be to sue upon them, if they were breached ....
[Mr. Aldock on behalf of CCR]: If we don't view them as-as binding legal
agreements, what do we view them as?
[Fitzpatrick]: A moral commitment.
[Aldock]: Have you every [sic] sought to enforce such an agreement?
[Fitzpatrick]: I have not.
[Aldock]: Has [CCR]?
[Fitzpatrick]: Not to my knowledge.
Id. at 138 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick); see also id. at 220 (Feb. 28,
1994) (testimony of Michael F. Rooney) ("[W]e always viewed both versions [of the futures
provisions] as a commitment, a good faith commitment by those law firms with respect to

future cases.").
413
414
415

See SP Exhibit 302A, supra note 114.
Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 166.
See supra text accompanying note 401.
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In an ordinary adversary proceeding, the stories a lawyer'may
present through witnesses are restricted by prohibitions against knowingly presenting false testimony. 4 16 There is a case to be made that
the settling parties violated that prohibition. Be that as it may, settlement proceedings are not ordinary adversary proceedings, and, as I
have argued, a higher duty of candor should be demanded. 4 17 I believe that CCR's lawyers and class counsel violated Model Rule 3.3 by
presenting these changing stories to the court. Any such violation
should be considered evidence tending to show collusion and thus
should be considered relevant to the question of whether the court
should approve a particular settlement. Further, class counsel's participation in the presentation of these changing stories is directly relevant to the determination of whether the court, as guardian for the
class, should allow class counsel to serve as an agent for the absent
class members. 4 18 Although I brought this issue to the court's attention, it did not address the propriety of the settling parties' presentation of changing stories. The court simply ignored class counsel's
416 The ethics rules prohibit lawyers in ordinary adversary proceedings from offering
"evidence the lawyer knows to be false" and require lawyers who discover after the fact, but
during the proceedings, that they have offered false evidence to "take reasonable remedial

measures." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a) (4) (1994).

See supra text accompanying notes 371-80.
At the fairness hearing I testified about my concern with the changing stories told
about the futures provisions:
[W]hy I find the changing stories troubling is that at the heart of what's
going on in this procedure, is that you're asking this Court, which sits as a
guardian for the class... [to appoint you] as the lawyers [for this Court's
ward].
417
418

It is your obligation to forthrightly and clearly explain to this Court
before you can expect to be appointed as counsel for this class what it is
that you did. [Wihether [these agreements] were supposed to be temporary, whether they were supposed to be real agreements, whether they were
supposed to... [cover] present or future people ....
And if I was a guardian for [a] senile person... and you had signed
some agreement beforehand that may affect [that person's rights] and then
you came in and [said here are] five people they'll tell you all these different stories about what it mean [s] and... guess [which is true] .... I would
say you're out of here. There's no way I could possibly fulfill my responsibilities to my ward when you won't tell me directly and forthrightly for the
record, after changing stories, [whatyou did]. [I]t's wholly superseded ....
it's the key to our whole agreement, it's designed to make sure there's
something in place. It's a moral commitment. It's designed to mean
nothing.
Which is it?
Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 202-04 (Mar. 17, 1994) (testimony of Susan P. Koniak).
The court interrupted me at this point to say that I was repeating myself "unmercifully"
and to remind me of my "obligation to be professional and speak in the third person.
You're not here to lecture anybody." Id. at 204-05. I apologized. Id. at 205. Class counsel
moved to strike my testimony on this point, and the court denied the motion. Id. at 20506.
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evident lack of candor in assessing their fitness to represent the
419
class.
The legal arguments the settling parties presented to defend the
futures provisions were nearly as misleading as the factual testimony.
In its proffer, CCR argued that the policies beneath the ethical rules
the original futures provisions allegedly violated "are not implicated
by agreements in asbestos litigation limiting the nature of a plaintiffs
lawyer's future representations." CCR explained:
These agreements do not remove limited competent counsel from
the marketplace, and they do not keep discovery under "wraps."
Rather, these agreements further other responsible public policy
aims by ensuring that claimants with significant injuries resulting
from asbestos exposure are fairly compensated. The medical criteria are established to screen out those potential claimants whose
injury, if any, is not sufficient
to warrant compensation unless and
4 20
until it progresses further.
First, the statement that these provisibns do not remove limited competent counsel from the marketplace is disingenuous at best. CCR
was asking every plaintiffs attorney to sign such an agreement as the
price of getting an inventory settlement. This practice was clearly intended to deplete the marketplace of available lawyers. Second, CCR
did not mention that the ABA opinion specifically addressed futures
provisions in asbestos litigation. Nor did CCR disclose that the ABA
identified policies in the ethics rules that are directly implicated in
this case-policies other than those mentioned by CCR in its
argument.
The rationale of Model Rule 5.6 is clear: First, permitting such
agreements restricts the access of the public to lawyers who, by virtue of their background and experience, might be the very best
available talent to represent these individuals. Second, the use of such
agreementsmay provide clients with rewards that bear less relationshipto the
merits of their claims than they do to the desire of the defendant to "buy off"
plaintiffs counsel. Third, the offering of such restrictive agreementsplaces
the plaintiff's lawyer in a situation where there is a conflict between the
42
interests of present clients and those of potentialfuture clients. '

The settling parties did not mention the policy against "buying off'
lawyers and against creating "conflict[s] of interest between present
clients and future" claimants.
Later, the settling parties switched to other arguments: the original versions did not mean what they said; 422 the modified versions
Id.
CCR Proffer, supranote 157, at 22 n.9.
ABA Formal Op. 371, supranote 175, at 4 (emphasis added).
Proposed Findings of Fact, supranote 44, at 166 (claiming original version did not
require class counsel to refrain from filing certain suits against CCR, which is what it said,
419
420
421
422
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were not modifications at all, but clarifications of the original; 423
Model Rule 5.6 cannot be violated without intent,424 even though it
does not include the word "knowingly," as do the ethics rules requiring intent;4 25 and the ABA ethics opinion stating that futures provisions in asbestos cases are unethical is evidence that before the
opinion was issued the practice was ethical. 426 The court adopted this
gobbledygook, even the last argument that the ethics opinion demonstrates the opposite of what it says. Nor did the settling parties point
4 27
out that the 1993 ethics opinion cited a 1968 opinion as authority.
That the settling parties made such questionable legal arguments
might not seem terribly egregious, 428 but when combined with the
changing stories on the underlying factual matters, the strained legal
arguments suggest that the settling parties were trying to hide what
they had actually done. The court, for its part, seemed perfectly content to be treated in this fashion. If courts are to sit as guardians, they
need to act as the law would expect a guardian to act.
V
FEASTING WHILE THE WIDOW WEEPS

Three of the named class representatives are widows: Anna
Baumgartner, Nafssica Kekrides, and LaVeme Winbun. Pavlos
Kekrides, Mrs. Kekrides's husband, was a named representative until
his death on April 18, 1993.429 In late July 1992, a doctor told Mrs.
Kekrides that her husband was dying of mesothelioma caused by expobut that counsel had made a good faith commitment to advise clients that it was wiser to
defer suit but that class counsel was free to file should the client so desire).
423 Id.

424 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding
that it was not class counsel's intent to restrict their right to practice in signing the futures
provisions); id. at 303 (citing the testimony of Professor Samuel Dash that intent is required to find a violation of Model Rule 5.6(b)).
425 The words "intent" or "intentionally" do not appear in any of the Model Rules.
Instead, the distinction is made between rules that require "knowledge" as an element of a
violation and those that do not. The Terminology section of the Model Rules provides that
the words "knowingly," "known," and "knows" denote actual knowledge of the fact in question. See MoDEL RULES OF PRoFEsSIoNAL CoNDucr Terminology (1994). None of these
words is used in Model Rule 5.6, which simply forbids "offering or making" a restrictive

agreement. Id. Rule 5.6. Compare, for example, Model Rule 3.3(a) (4) ("A lawyer shall
not knowingly... offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be flse.").
426
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 302.
427 ABA Formal Op. 371, supranote 175 (describing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1039 (1968), as dealing with "a similar question").
428 Although, if we draw an analogy to ex parte proceedings, the lawyer has a greater
obligation to be forthright about legal arguments as well as factual statements. See MODEL
RuLEs oF PRoFESSIoNAL CoNDuar Rule 3.3 cmt. 15 (1994).
429
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. 261-62. Mr. Baumgarmer was also a named representative
when Georgine was filed, but he died before the fairness hearing began. Id. at 261.
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sure to asbestos. 4 0 Mr. Kekrides was a painter, not of pictures, but of
structures. 43 1 Until the doctor told Mrs. Kekrides that her husband
had asbestos-related cancer, she did not know what asbestos was or
that her husband had ever worked around it.432
Spouses of people exposed to asbestos may themselves contract
asbestos-related illnesses and are included in the class. Had Mr.
Kekrides died in a car accident before his asbestos illness had manifested itself, Mrs. Kekrides would have been one of the unknowing
members of the Georgine class-a person who would have ignored any
notice of the Georgine suit because she would have had no idea that it
applied to her. But Mr. Kekrides did not die in a car accident, and in
July 1992, Mrs. Kekrides learned what asbestos was and what it could
do. She contacted a lawyer on July 28, 1992. 433
The lawyer referred her to Steve Wilson, a lawyer at Greitzer and
Locks, who she was told specialized in asbestos litigation. 4M Greitzer
and Locks mailed the Kekrideses a retainer form to sign, which they
did.43 5 The form stated that the Kekrideses agreed to retain Greitzer
and Locks to "institute and maintain an action.., to recover damages
...or to effect an amicable settlement. "43 6 The form is dated Septem43 7
ber 8, 1992, and makes no mention of a class action.
Two months later, on October 26, 1992, Greitzer and Locks and
CCR settled "the entire present inventory of Greitzer and Locks's
cases, consisting of 2,602 Pennsylvania cases." 438 This included seventy-nine mesothelioma cases, 43 9 but not Pavlos Kekrides's case. At
the time of the settlement, the Kekrideses lived in Florida; but for
many years earlier, and apparently when Mr. Kekrides was exposed to
asbestos, the Kekrideses lived in Philadelphia.440 And in February
1993, when Greitzer and Locks filed suit against non-CCR companies
on behalf of the Kekrideses, that suit was filed in Pennsylvania state
court.4 4 ' Thus, on October 26, 1992, the Kekrideses' case could very
well have been considered one of the cases in Greitzer and Locks's
present inventory of Pennsylvania cases, but it was not.
430
Deposition of Nafssica Kekrides, sup-a note 193, at 17 ("Well, the doctor made the
operation for my husbandJuly 27, 1992. He say, Mrs. Kekrides, 'Your husband have asbestos, mesothelioma, and does not have life and he need chemotherapy to see.'").
431
Id. at 11.
432 Id. at 13-14.
433
Id. at 17-18.
434 Id.
435 Id. at 19-20.
436
Id. Exhibit 1 (entitled "Power of Attorney, Contingent Fee Agreement").
437 Id.
438
See SP Exhibit 302C, supra note 114.
439 Id.
440
Deposition of Nafssica Kekrides, 4upra note 193, at 11.
441 Id. Exhibit 3.

1995]

FEASTING WHILE THE WIDOW WEEPS

1139

Why was the Kekrideses's claim excluded from the settlement of
"the entire present inventory" of Greitzer and Locks's Pennsylvania
cases? CCR was willing to settle some unfiled cases." 2 Why not this
one? Alternatively, in the nearly two months before October 26, 1992,
why didn't Greitzer and Locks get the Kekrideses's claim in good
enough shape to be filed in time to be included in the Pennsylvania
inventory settlement? Did the Kekrideses insist on waiting to be included in the "better" Georgine settlement, even though that would
mean considerable delay before they saw one dime of money from
CCR? Mr. Kekrides was dying. Did the Kekrideses decide that they
would be better off serving as class representatives than having their
case settled in the inventory settlement? Did anyone tell them that
that choice meant that they might have to sit through a deposition
and answer questions on their fitness to represent the class? Did anyone tell them that the fairness hearing could be a year or so away and
that Mrs. Kekrides, who might very well be a widow by then, might
have to testify in open court on her adequacy to serve as a class representative? Did anyone tell them that the people included in the Pennsylvania inventory settlements might receive some part of their
payment from CCR as early as April or May of 1993 and that the inventory folks were guaranteed to receive all their money no later than the
end of 1996?74
The Kekrideses were apparently told none of these things. They
were told little, if anything, about the inventory settlements that
Greitzer and Locks was negotiating for its other clients. 444 Instead,
they were asked to be class representatives. What did Mrs. Kekrides
See sup ra note 79.
See supra note 114.
444 Mrs. Kekrides was not called to testify at the fairness hearing. She testified only in a
deposition; that testimony is unclear on what, if anything, Greitzer and Locks told her in
the fall of 1992 about the inventory settlements. At one point, she seems to state that
Greitzer and Locks communicated to her an offer of some amount of money from the
CCR defendants in September 1992, and that she rejected that offer. Deposition of Nafssica Kekrides, supranote 193, at 26. But it is unclear whether that offer was from the CCR
defendants as opposed to some other asbestos defendant. Id.
It is clear that she did not see the settlement document signed by Greitzer and Locks
regarding its Pennsylvania cases until the day before her deposition. Id. at 28. Moreover,
Mr. Weingarmer, the Greitzer and Locks lawyer defending her deposition, objected to
questions about what she knew about the inventory settlements on the ground that her
case was not filed against non-CCR defendants until February, thus implying that the
Kekrideses's claim against CCR was not eligible for inclusion in the October inventory
settlement.
Q: Did you understand that a settlement had been made with Greitzer
and Locks in October of 1992 to settle every single case that they had for
asbestos victims pending in the State of Pennsylvania?
Mr. Weingarmer. .... Now, Fred, again you've misstated the facts. Now,
Mrs. Kekrides's case [against non-CCR defendants], as I think you full well
know, was not filed in Pennsylvania until February of 1993.
Id. at 28-29.
442

443
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understand about this "choice" to be a class representative? She
testified:
Q [by Mr. Baron]: At the time your husband died [three months
after the class action had been filed], did you know anything about
what was happening in the class action case that had been filed in
Philadelphia? Or did you learn that information later?
A [by Mrs. Kekrides]: Yeah, I know from my lawyer.
Q: What did your lawyer tell you.., about the class action case in
Philadelphia?
A: Yeah, I have case; my husband case, I have case for asbestos.
Q: Yes?
A: Because my husband died from asbestos.
Q: Yes?
A: And that's all.
Q: So you understood that you had a case because your husband
died from asbestos?
A: Yes.
Q: And that's all you really knew about the case?
A: Yes.

Q: Before yesterday [January 11, 1994], had you been told that
there was a settlement in the class action case?
A: Yes.
Q: When were you told that?
A: Two weeks before.
Q: Two weeks ago?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Before two weeks ago, did you know that there had been a settlement in the class action case?
A: No. Two weeks ago, I know I come here in Philadelphia for
today for deposition.

Q: Were you surprised two weeks ago to learn that the class action
had been settled?
A: No, it's not surprise. I know I have case because my husband
died from asbestos.
Q: Do you know what a class action is?
A:

For the people have problem for asbestos.

Q: When did you learn what a class action was?
A:

My son explained to me here. I have one son.

Q: When did he explain that to you?
A: A couple months before.

Q: Do you feel like you can represent people that have different
types of problems than the kind of problem your husband had?
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A: Yes.
Q: Why are you able to represent other people besides people that
have mesothelioma?
A: I don't feel to help people sick same thing as my husband. I
don't like it.
Q: You don't like it when people get sick?
A: No.
Q: Nobody does, believe me.
A: Especially the asbestos and mesothelioma, very bad.
Q: Did anyone before two weeks ago ask you what you thought
should be in the settlement agreement on the class action?
A. No.
Q: Do you know whether they ever asked your husband that, what
he thought should be in the class action settlement? Do you have
any information that your husband knew about the class action?
A: Yes. And my husband talked to Mr. Jim Long at my house,
"Please, I want to fight for this case, because I am very sick."
Q: That was for his own case, was it not?
A: Yes.

Q: Did your husband ever instruct the lawyers to fight for other
people's cases besides his own?
A: No. I don't know.

Q: Did anyone explain to you why two different lawsuits were filed
on your behalf [the class action against CCR and an individual action against non-CCR defendants]?
A: Because my husband working for a lot of different companies
that made asbestos.
Q: And that's the only reason that was given to you why two different suits were filed in two different courtrooms?
44 5
A: Yes.
It seems that the Kekrideses agreed to be named representatives
because they thought this was the only way to get money from the
CCR defendants. If there was another way, as it seems there was, it was
up to the Kekrideses, not their lawyers, to forego that route (inclusion
in an inventory settlement) in favor of serving as class representatives.
That decision should not have been made for them, and information
relevant to the decision should not have been kept from them. If Mrs.
Kekrides can show damages, such as receiving less money from the
Georgine settlement than a similarly situated inventory claimant received from CCR, then her lawyers' breach of their duty to communi445

Id. at 37-40, 42-45, 52-53.
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cate with her and to allow her to make the decision on settlement
might be the basis for a successful malpractice suit.446

The court did not directly address whether class counsel
breached a duty to any of the three widows by not providing them
with a choice on how to settle with CCR. The court's only reference
to this question was: "There is no evidence in this record that Class
Counsel themselves actually used their knowledge of the forthcoming
class action suit to file premature claims to avoid the class, or to refrain from filing and settling appropriate cases in order to ensure the
viability of the class representatives." 44 7 Professor Cramton did, however, address the treatment of the widows in his testimony, and Mr.
Locks cross-examined Professor Cramton on this issue. Mr. Locks
stressed that Mrs. Baumgartner and Mrs. Winbun did not become clients of Greitzer and Locks until after it had concluded its inventory
settlements with CCR in the states in which their suits would have
been brought.448 We will come back to the adequacy of that response
to the widow problem in a moment, but first what of the Kekrideses?
The Kekrideses had been clients of Mr. Locks nearly two months
before the Pennsylvania inventory cases were settled. Less than complete candor helps:
446 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(a) (1994) (stating that client
has the right to make decision on whether to accept a settlement). When I raised the
possibility during my deposition testimony that class counsel could be sued by Mrs.
Kekrides for malpractice, Mr. Motley seemed eager to clarify that Mrs. Kekrides was a client
of Greitzer and Locks, not of his firm. Deposition of Susan P. Koniak at 157-58, Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1994). Of course, she is a client of
his firm too, because he jointly serves as class counsel in an action in which she serves as a
named class representative. What she was told and what she was not told about that choice
is also something for which Ness, Motley bears responsibility.
447 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
448 Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 150-52 (Mar. 16, 1994) (testimony of Roger
Cramton):
Q [by Mr. Locks]: If my inventory settlement in Kentucky occurred in August of 1992, could you please tell me how I could have put Mrs. [Winbun]
in that inventory settlement if she didn't become a client of our office until
at least a month or two later?
A [by Prof. Cramton]: It would have had to have been a supplemental arrangement or amendment or supplemental agreement. There have been
numbered documents or agreements that have been made in this case that
have been subsequently amended.
Q: Tell me one document or one fact that my Kentucky present inventory
settlement was supplemented.
A. I know of none on that-

Q: Now, let's go to Mrs. [Baumgarmer] ....
Q:

And are you not also aware... that settlement was made of all of my
Maryland cases in August of 1992 and Mrs. [Baumgarmer] and her husband did not become clients of our firm until November or September of
1992?
A
I don't know, at this time recall the actual chronology in that case.
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Q [by Mr. Locks]: Now, you seem to talk about Mrs. Kekrides...

Q: Did you read that deposition thoroughly?
A [by Professor Cramton]: Yes.
Q: Did you realize that she and her husband were class representatives because he was alive at the time the suit was filed?
A. That's right. He retained Greitzer and Locks I think September, sometime in September of 1992 and then he died the following
April.

Q: And he was a resident of Florida, you knew that?
A: Well, no, it wasn't clear. He was from the Philadelphia area
and-well, it wasn't clear to me whether he was-I assumed that

his-that-I didn't know whether he made a permanent change of
residence or was merely there for-had moved there because Mr.
Kekrides was sick and dying.
Q: Did you read the class action Complaint in this proceeding?
A: I believe I've seen it, but I did not -

Q: Was it another picky-A; If his citizenshipQ: -detail?
A: -or her citizenship is stated in that, it escaped me.
Q: That's another picky detail that you didn't pay attention to,
9
right?44
This was inappropriate cross-examination, given class counsel's increased duty of candor to the court in proceedings such as these.45 0
Whether or not Professor Cramton could recall the facts while on the
stand, Mr. Locks knew that his law firm had filed suit in Pennsylvania
state court on behalf of the Kekrideses against non-CCR defendants
and that his firm treated the Kekrideses's case as a Pennsylvania, not a
Florida, case. Mr. Locks knew the truth of the matter, and the court
was entitled to rely on his representations. Mr. Locks misled the court
by suggesting that the Kekrideses's case was a Florida case, not fit for
inclusion in the Pennsylvania inventory.
More important, class counsel's other response to the "widow"
problem-that the inventories were closed by the time two of the
three women became clients-is no response at all. In the settling
parties' Proposed Findings of Fact, this is the only response given to
the "widow" problem: no cases were added to the inventory settlements after each was signed. 45 ' Presumably, this was because CCR cut
class counsel off from further settlements for their "present clients"
state by state as inventory settlements were reached. 45 2 If this were
449

Id. at 154-55.

450

See supra text accompanying notes 371-80.
See supra note 280.
This story is inconsistent with the testimony of CCR's Chief Operating Officer that

451

452

CCR continued to settle cases with Ness, Motley afterJanuary 15, 1993-cases that had not
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true, what happened to clients from Indiana, Illinois, Maryland, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, or Virginia who walked into
Greitzer and Locks offices on August 21, 1992, the day after inventory
settlements for those states were concluded?
Greitzer and Locks would have had five months to file suit against
CCR before Georgine was filed. To the extent that the futures provisions obliged Greitzer and Locks not to file suit, that was just as to
pleural claimants. What of the August 21 client with mesothelioma?
Did class counsel just sit on that person's case as part of some unspoken promise to CCR? Did class counsel explain to each of those people that they could only offer to put them in the class but not to settle
their cases now, while another law firm like co-class counsel, Ness,
Motley, or some other firm, might get that person in an inventory
settlement and thus home with some money before Christmas of
1994?453 Apparently not.
Mr. Locks suggested in his cross-examination of Professor Cramton that perhaps the dead Mr. Kekrides had understood a lot more
about his choices than did his surviving spouse. 454 This is a dubious
been filed beforeJanuary 15, 1993, and thus were technically within the class definition.
Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 117-19 (Mar. 3, 1994) (testimony of Michael F.
Rooney). Such unexplained contradictions make it clear that the settling parties succeeded in obscuring the true nature of their operating relationship from the court.
453 Ness, Motley's settlements were reached after the completion of Greitzer and
Locks's settlements. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295-96. Moreover, Ness, Motley continued to
settle with CCR after January 15, 1993, and even settled cases that had not been filed by
that date. See supra note 452. Mr. Hatten also was settling with CCR afterJanuary 15, 1993.
See supra note 78.
454 Fairness Hearing, supra note 30, at 155 (Mar. 16, 1994) (testimony of Roger
Cramton):
Q: In reading [Mrs. Kekrides's] deposition, did you realize or did you
read that her husband knew about the class action?
A: I think it did mention that there was a conversation when someone
came out to his house in-in-I can't remember the precise date, but there
was a conversation in which he was involved when he was still alive.
Q: And you don't remember what other things he knew?
A. I don't remember the details of it.
Q: But you assumed that she and he could have been manipulated in and
out of a present inventory settlement, right?
A- You're the one that's using the word "manipulation."
The deposition shows that Mrs. Kekrides contacted a lawyer in late July because her husband was too sick after his operation to do so. Deposition of Nafssica Kekrides, supranote
193, at 18. Lawyers from Greitzer and Locks then visited the Kekrideses on three other
occasions: in September 1992, when they told the Kekrideses they would be filing suit; in
February or March 1993, after Georginewas filed and settled, when they told Mrs. Kekrides
and presumably her husband that they were working on the case but were not finished;
and in April right before Mr. Kekrides passed away when they videotaped Mr. Kekrides's
physical condition "because he was very bad." Id. at 22-23. On the last visit, nobody could
talk to Mr. Kekrides because he was too sick. No one told Mrs. Kekrides in April 1993 that
Georgine had been filed and settled. Id. at 24.
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claim, given Mrs. Kekrides's deposition testimony. 45 5 Moreover, the
deposition testimony of Mrs. Baumgartner and Mrs. Winbun demonstrates that neither was aware that Greitzer and Locks had made inventory settlements with CCR in their states before they showed up at
class counsel's doorstep, that CCR was still making inventory settlements with other firms prior to January 15, 1993, or that Greitzer and
Locks was no longer eligible to settle their claim with CCR apart from
the class action.45 6 Not one of the widows suggested in her deposition
testimony that class counsel had offered to refer her to another lawyer
who might be able to get her, through inclusion in an inventory settlement, either more money than she would get in Georgine, or the same
money but at least some of it now rather than later, or even less
money sooner rather than later, and without testifying as a class representative or as an individual for that matter.
But these were the clients' decisions to make, not the lawyers'.
To suggest that some agreement with CCR, written or unwritten, justified not trying to get these people in inventory settlements or justified
not explaining to clients what their choices were is to suggest that a
conflict of interest created by an agreement with the defendants justifies less than adequate representation. This is wrong.
The inadequate representation provided to these women and
their dying husbands demonstrates the problem with the representation provided to the class. The shape of the class means that certain
people "lucked out" by showing up at a law firm early enough to get
into an inventory settlement and that everyone else got Georgine. If
Georgine is truly better, then there are over 14,000 clients out there
who may have a viable claim for malpractice against class counsel, for
cheating them out of Georgine to collect higher fees. But the evidence
strongly suggests that the inventory clients did better, not worse. If so,
then the class representatives may have a viable claim for malpractice
against class counsel. And if the class representatives have such a
455 See testimony quoted supra text accompanying note 445. The settling parties' Proposed Findings of Fact states: "Mr. and Mrs. Kekrides and their son-Mrs. Kekrides's first
language is Greek-were informed of the nature and terms of the class action suit, and Mr.
and Mrs. Kekrides agreed to serve as representative plaintiffs in support of the settlement."
Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 44, at 22. Nowhere is there an assertion that the
Kekrideses or their son were informed about the inventory settlement of Pennsylvania
cases or the fact that CCR was still making inventory settlements with other lawyers. See also
supranote 454 (giving deals on contacts with Mr. Kekrides).
456
Deposition of LaVerne Winbun, supra note 193, at 34-38 (testifying to no knowledge of inventory settlements or why CCR defendants were not named in individual lawsuit
filed against other asbestos defendants on her behalf); id. at 41 (testifying that she was not
given any information by which to compare what she might receive in an inventory settlement to what she might receive under Georgine); see also Deposition of Anna Baumgartner,
supra note 193, at 78-80 (testifying that she has never thought about whether she would
accept-or presumably whether she would prefer-the money without the rigmarole of
the class action).
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claim, why not the rest of the class? The "widow" problem is, after all,
the class problem writ small.
At least two cases have suggested that class members might maintain an action for malpractice against class counsel: Zimmer PaperProducts, Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P. C.457 and Peters v. National Railroad
PassengerCorp.4 58 In Zimmer, the court stated that a class member who
seeks to challenge as malpractice the notice procedure used by class
counsel that had been ordered by a district court "faces a standard at
least as high as abuse of discretion."45 9 On the plaintiffs second allegation, that class counsel's implementation of the notice was negligent,
the court said:
[I]n determining whether an attorney for a class has breached a
fiduciary duty, we should afford considerable weight to the fact that
he or she has done all that is generally done, all that due process
requires, and all that the court ordered.
The bounds of fiduciary duty are undoubtedly not easy to define, but certainly we must be guided by thefact that the practice here alleged to breach such duties is a customary one, and has been approved, after
4 60
careful judicial scrutiny, not only in this case but in legions of others.
The practices in Georgine were, however, neither customary nor approved in "legions of cases"-not the futures provisions, not the definition of the class, not the failure of class counsel to request that the
class receive notice of the simultaneous negotiation, and not the uneven-handed treatment of "presents" and "futures" by class counsel.
Moreover, unlike the notice challenges at issue in both Zimmer
and Peters, class counsel's simultaneous negotiation of the two deals
was performed not "after careful judicial scrutiny," but before. Class
counsel also agreed, in a side deal with the defendants, to give certain
class members certain advice whether or not the court-approved the
class settlement; this was not approved by the court beforehand.
Moreover, the Georginecourt did not exactly approve the "futures provisions." 46 1 Instead, it concluded that they did not adversely affect the
class. But what if some class members can show otherwise? The ABA
457 758 F.2d 86, 93-94 (3d Cir.) (recognizing cause of action by class member against
class counsel for negligence in providing notice), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
458 966 F.2d 1483, 1487 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting collateral attack on class action
based on failure of notice and stating that "redress, if any, should come from those responsible for causing his harm") (citing Zimmer, 758 F.2d at 93-94).
459 Zimmer, 758 F.2d at 93.
460
Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
461
Georgine 157 F.R.D. at 330 ("[t]his Court need not decide, however, whether or not
a state bar disciplinary board would conclude that these provisions technically violated
Rule 5.6, since that issue is not before this Court").
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ethics committee certainly saw many ways that such provisions might
adversely affect the clients of lawyers signing them. 462
I understand how reluctant courts would be to entertain suits for
malpractice against class counsel for breach of fiduciary duties owed
class members. 463 A malpractice suit is, however, another way to guarantee due process to class members. It also gives expression to individualism, a value otherwise muted by all class actions. The threat that
malpractice actions might deter lawyers from serving as class counsel,
and thus undermine the public good that class actions seek to achieve,
seems unjustified, given the substantial fee awards garnered by class
counsel. One might ask instead why class action lawyers, who stand to
make so much money, should be somehow less accountable to their
464
clients for negligent performance than every other lawyer.
A more serious problem with malpractice suits against class counsel is that they would reveal the shoddiness of court review of adequacy and undermine public confidence in the class action form. But
the courts can accept only so many Georginesbefore word gets out that
the courts are doing nothing to check the possibility of lawyers selling
out clients who have much to lose.
Nonetheless, the judiciary may not be able to resist Georgine's
promise of fewer asbestos cases or of similar settlements that promise
462

See supra text accompanying note 421.
See, e.g., Zimmer, 758 F.2d at 91-92:
If class counsel in this case have breached their fiduciary duties, attorneys
throughout the country who have complied with court orders and a
Supreme Court-approved notice procedure may well be subject to malpractice lawsuits by anyone who alleges that he or she did not receive notice of
the opportunity to file a claim.
And, id. at 91 n.7:
If the line is difficult for the courts to trace after the fact, it is even more
difficult for counsel to draw in the course of a proceeding. This may not
excuse any breach of fiduciary duty, but it does raise serious questions
about the propriety of applying a malpractice penalty after the fact where
counsel did everything they were then expected to do.
464 As this Article was being edited for publication, a malpractice suit was filed against
a Texas law firm in connection with that firm's settlement of the tort claims of its clients.
Peter Passell, Challenges to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y.
Timris, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. The firm had represented over 100 families who had had a
family member killed or injured when 40 tons of flammable vapor were accidentally released and ignited at the Phillips Petroleum Company's Houston Chemical Complex. Id.
According to allegations in the malpractice complaint, the law firm had little or no contact
with its clients until a settlement had been worked out with Phillips. Id. The firm then
allegedly scheduled brief meetings with the clients in which the clients were urged to take
the money offered and told that the firm would not take their cases to court if the settlements were rejected. Id. According to those now bringing suit and supported by documents obtained in discovery, 26.of the clients who rejected the offered amounts were then
offered more money. Id. That extra money was then deducted from the amounts offered
more complaisant clients to keep the overall settlement down to the $190 million that the
firm had agreed to'accept from Phillips. Id. This conflict of interest is the heart of the
malpractice claim.
463
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to lighten court dockets. To ensure that the judge presiding at the
fairness hearing had the concerns of other judges in the forefront of
his mind as he considered the fairness of Georgine, on the first day of
the fairness hearing, the settling parties presented the testimony of
Dean Mary Kay Kane of the Hastings College of Law. Chief Justice
Rehnquist had appointed Dean Kane to serve as the reporter for the
U.S. Judicial Conference's ad hoc committee on asbestos litigation. 46 5
Her testimony at the fairness hearing reviewed the concerns expressed byjudges at meetings of this committee. 46 6 In arguing against
an objection that her testimony was hearsay, CCR's lawyers stated:
"It's not for the truth of the matter, but the perceptions of the judges
and what she heard, and she provides the texture and fabric of what
was going on."46 7 The judge overruled the objection, allowing testi-

mony on the perceptions ofjudges to be presented. 468 In many ways,
the Georgine hearing was something one had to see to believe.
Dean Kane testified that the judges were "very concerned" with
cases "piling up ... [and] clogging the court system." She testified
that "they were concerned that not only were the courts being cluttered with criminal litigation, but now asbestos was coming in as a
major piece of litigation."46 9 She had been asked by the committee to
draft some legislative proposals for the judges to consider recommending to the Judicial Conference, 470 which would then presumably
decide whether to recommend them to the Congress. After Dean
Kane drafted some legislative proposals, the judges reviewed them
and "realized... that many of the solutions really took on the cast of
something beyond just the prototypical proposals that come from the
judicial conference about judicial administration. They really crossed
the line into some substantive areas .... 471
The judges decided, presumably with separation of powers in
mind, not to "suggest to Congress that they were indeed legislating
because that was not their task, and that it would be more prudent
465
See Fairness Hearing, supranote 80, at 147-48 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Mary
Kay Kane). Dean Kane had conducted "a quick review" of an early draft of the Georgine
settlement for the Pfizer corporation, one of the CCR defendants. Id. at 182-83. She testified that she spent only two hours on that review, had only one telephone conversation
with Pfizer's General Counsel about the settlement, and never saw the final settlement
until the fall of 1993. Id. Her involvement as a consultant for one of the defendants nonetheless raises questions about the credibility of her testimony that Georginewas the kind of
solution the judiciary was seeking. See infra note 475.
466
Fairness Hearing, supranote 30, at 151-68 (Feb. 22, 1994) (testimony of Mary Kay
Kane).
467 Id. at 151.
468 Id. at 152 ("The objection is overruled. It's offered for the concerns expressed as a
state of mind, rather than the truth of the matter, as I understand the offer.").
469
Id. at 157.
470 Id. at 163.
471
Id. at 165.
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instead simply to write a report... to be forwarded to Congress setting out the history, the kinds of problems that were posed by asbestos
litigation," 472 and to urge Congress to consider seriously adopting
some legislation. 473 The judges, however, apparently thought it unlikely that Congress would make an active effort to pass comprehensive legislation. They were concerned that a comprehensive legislative
solution, like the proposals drafted by Dean Kane, "as a practical matter... simply wasn't going to happen" in Congress. 4 74 Dean Kane was
then allowed to testify, over objection, that the Georgine settlement, as
described to her in a question by CCR's lawyer, did address the concerns that the federal judges expressed in the meetings she
attended.4 7 So testimony was offered showing that the judiciary had its own
interest in Georgine. Forgive me, but what kind of justice system considers the perceptions, desires, wishes, hopes, dreams, or fears of
judges relevant to whether a particular settlement is fair to thousands
of people exposed to a dangerous product? On the other hand, what
testimony could be more telling about the true nature of Georgine and
the judicial overreaching it involved?
The origin of modem judicial activism was the protection of the
constitutional rights of minorities. These rights were systematically
neglected and abused by the two mechanisms usually relied on to
guarantee freedom: the majoritarian political process and the decentralized power guaranteed by federalism. If either or both of these
472

473
474

Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 165.

475 Id. at 168-71. This remarkable question and answer is worth quoting verbatim, for
those who find it difficult to believe my characterization of what occurred:
Q: Dean Kane, I know you're not familiar with all aspects of the proposed
settlement here, but I would ask you to assume for purposes of this question, that it sets up an administrative claims mechanism for handling future
asbestos claims, that it pays claims reasonably quickly with low transaction
costs and it treats similarly-situated claimants similarly, that it pays only
claimants with impairment due to asbestos exposure and defers unimpaired
claims and that it provides assurance that future claimants would be paid.
Is that a solution that is along the lines that the judges were after as
recognized by what they said to you in your presence, both the Rehnquist
Committee and at the Federal Judicial Center?
[The court overruled an objection by counsel for the objectors.)
... Yes. In fact, I think that the factors that are mentioned, those
factors are the kinds of factors that the judges were concerned about incorporating in some sort of a solution.
Id. The audacity it took to ask such a question probably made it easy to describe the
settlement as one that treats similarly situated claimants similarly. Given the analysis
presented in this paper, that description must, however, be taken with a grain of salt: first,
because of the different treatment given similarly situated present clients, and second, because of the different treatment accorded similarly situated class members based on the
identity of their counsel.
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processes fail to address the concerns of asbestos victims or corporate
defendants, it is not because they are somehow structured to disfavor
systematically asbestos victims or corporations. If no legislative solution, national or local, is forthcoming, then this situation is no different than any other so-called "failure" of democratic process. The
countermajoritarian difficulty is presented in its starkest form by this
case, and all the wishes, hopes, and dreams ofjudges cannot make it
go away.
But due process and separation of powers are mere words on paper-paper that must be cleared from the table so that dinner may
begin. So we all sit down to feast: the judges who can smile as they
see the beginning of the end of the asbestos backlog; the ethics experts, including myself, who were paid fat fees to disagree with one
another and who ultimately shed little light; the doctors who joined
their legal counterparts testifying and disagreeing and going home a
little richer; the executives of twenty corporations who can brag about
cash flow control, the end of asbestos anxiety, and cash payments they
can meet without too much strain; the lawyers at Shea & Gardner who
managed the unimaginable, lost a little of their innocence, and got
paid plenty for their trouble; and, of course, class counsel who are
today much richer than even they could ever have imagined they
would be. Come to the feast.
And what of the class members, you ask? Everyone assures me
that most of them will be all right. If they get really sick, they'll probably be paid what some, if not all, people would consider to be a fairly
reasonable amount. They'll be all right as long, that is, as no one tells
them too much about their lawyers-as long, that is, as no one explains in too much detail how it came to be that they cannot bring a
case in court. They'll be all right. And Mrs. Kekrides? She'll probably
be paid someday soon.
Q [by Mr. Baron]: Were you happy when you found out two weeks
ago for the first time that the class action had been settled?
A [by Mrs. Kekrides]: I not happy because I lost my young husband,
but, you know, I do not have a choice.

Q: How much money do you have outstanding in medical bills?
A- Right now?
Q: Yes.
A.

I say more than $200,000.

Q: Is that after you've paid some of them?
A:

I pay something because since they collect.

Q: They sent the bill collector by?
A- Yes.
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Q: If all you can get from this settlement with all twenty of these
companies for your share is $250,000,476 and you have to pay all of
your medical bills, do you think that would be a fair settlement?
A- I cannot give me more, how you going to do? I can't fight. You
47 7
know what I mean?
Yes. Justice is feasting while the widow weeps. 478
AF=ERWORD
Just after the foregoing article was completed, the Third Circuit
issued an important opinion on settlement class actions that may spell
trouble for the Georgine settlement on appeal. More important, it signals that some appellate judges are quite concerned with the apparent
feasting during the settlement of class action suits. The case involved
certain GM pick-up trucks, which the plaintiffs alleged had fuel tanks
located in a place that made the trucks especially vulnerable to fuel
fires in side collisions. 479
The class included GM truck owners across the nation who had
purchased the allegedly defective GM trucks over a fifteen-year
period. 48 0 The complaint filed on behalf of the class sought, among
other things, an order requiring GM to recall the trucks or pay for
their repair. 48 1 After the complaint was filed some discovery took
place, (mostly on class certification issues),482 while the parties began
exploring the possibility of settlement.48 3 Their discussions bore fruit
and the lawyers for the class and GM jointly presented a proposed
settlement to the district court requesting that the class be certified
for settlement purposes only.48 4 The settlement provided that every
class member would receive for each truck owned a $1,000 coupon
that could be used to purchase any new GMC Truck or Chevrolet light
duty truck. 48 5 These coupons were redeemable over a fifteen-month
period, but could not be transferred freely to persons outside the class
members' immediate family unless that transferee was a purchaser of
the class member's used truck. 486 In lieu of the $1,000 coupon, a class
476 The Georgine settlement provides compensation for mesothelioma as follows: minimum, $20,000; maximum, $200,000; negotiated average range, $37,000-60,000; extraordinary claim negotiated average, $300,000. See supra note 189.
477 Deposition of Nafssica Kekrides, supra note 193, at 40, 60.
478 WILuAM SHAESPEARE, THE RAPE OF LUCRECE Line 906 (Penguin Books 1971).
479 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 777 (3d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter In re GM].
480
Id. at 777, 779.
481 Id. at 779.
482 Id. at 780.
483 Id.
484 Id.
485 Id.
486

Id.
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member could elect a $500 coupon, which could be sold to any third
party provided that the class member first identified that party.48 7
The third party could not resell the $500 coupon or use it in combination with any other GM rebate offer. Further, the coupon could only
be used to purchase GM's more expensive truck models.48 8 The settlement also provided that class counsel could apply to the court for
attorneys' fees and expenses to be paid by GM.48

9

While GM reserved

the right to object to the fee request, it did not object. 490
After individual notice to the registered owners of 5.7 million GM
trucks4 91 and the recognition of objectors, 492 the district court held a
brief fairness hearing 493 and subsequently issued an opinion confirming its provisional certification of the class and approving the settlement.494 The court did not make specific findings that the class

satisfied the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), but it did set forth findings of
fact and conclusions of law to justify its approval of the settlement as
fair, reasonable, and adequate. 4 95 Four days after approving the settlement, the district court approved class counsel's request for $9.5
million in attorneys' fees. 496 The Third Circuit, in an opinion written
by Judge Becker, vacated the district court's orders certifying the class
and approving the settlement and remanded the case "for further pro49 7
ceedings consistent with [its] opinion."
The Third Circuit's opinion is wide-ranging and expresses many
concerns about the present state of settlement class action practice.
The court defined a settlement class as a "device whereby the court
postpones the formal certification procedure until the parties have
successfully negotiated a settlement, thus allowing a defendant to explore settlement without conceding any of its arguments against certification." 498 Armed with this definition the court set out in exhaustive
detail the many problems inherent in the settlement class action device. For example, the court alluded to the difficulties in assessing the
487
488

Id.
Id.

489

Id. at 781.

490

Id.

Id. Publication notice was provided to class members who had not registered their
ownership of the trucks with GM. Over 5,200 truck owners opted out of the settlement.
492 Id. Approximately 6,500 truck owners, including many fleet owners who own as
many as 1,000 trucks each, objected to the settlement.
493 "A settlement fairness hearing was held on October 26, 1993 during which the
objectors who submitted written briefs were permitted to speak." Id.
491

494

Id.

495 Id. at 781-82.
496 Initially the district court indicated that it did not need to review fees that GM
agreed to pay. However, it later issued an "amplified order"justifying the fees as reasonable under both a lodestar and percentage-of-recovery basis. Id. at 782.
497 Id. at 822-23.
498

Id. at 786.
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fairness of a settlement when the number of class members is uncertain. 499 This problem is exacerbated in "futures" settlement class actions like Georgine because the number of future claimants is always
uncertain. More ominous for the proponents of Georgine, the court
stated:
With less information about the class, the judge cannot as effectively
monitor for collusion, individual settlements, buy-offs (where some
individuals use the class action device to benefit themselves at
the expense of absentees), and other abuses. For example, if the
court fails to define the class before settlement negotiations commence, then during the settlement approval phase the judge will
have greater difficulty detecting if the parties improperly manipulated the scope of the class in order to buy the defendant's
acquiescence.5 00
The improper manipulation of the class definition to benefit the defendants and class counsel is exactly what I claim went on in Georgine,
although there was no evidence that manipulation was a problem in
GM. Moreover the court's reference to "individual settlements" in the
midst of a sentence discussing "collusion" and "buy-offs" is particularly
interesting given that the case before the court did not involve individual settlements made alongside the class settlement, although Georgine
does.
The court acknowledged that settlement class actions with selfappointed lawyers negotiating for an inchoate class provide lawyers
with an incentive to jockey for position, each seeking to be the first to
"cut a deal" with the defendants and thereby gain the defendants' acquiescence to the class action, settlement, and award of attorney's fees
to that lawyer. 50 1 The court also discussed how settlement class actions risk transforming the courts into "mediation forums"50 2 that dispose of cases filed "without any expectation or intention of
litigation"5 03-"cases that arguably do not belong" in the courts at
all.5 0 4 The court made its only reference to Georgine,as a prime example of a case filed without any intention of litigation, at this point. In
a footnote the court wrote: "Because the parties do not come before
the court until the action has settled, some courts have even expressed
concern that such cases do not present a case or controversy for Arti499

Id. at 787.
Id. (citations omitted).
501 Id. at 788. In a footnote the court said, "[tihese sorts of dynamics have led some
critics to accuse class action attorneys of ethical violations. While we emphasize that counsel here committed no such violations, we do not preclude the possibility that these violations could occur." Id. at 788 n.9.
502
Id. at 790.
500

503

Id.

504

Id.
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cle III purposes. Cf. Carloughv. Amchem Products,Inc."50 5 Carloughwas
an early decision before Georgine replaced Carlough as the class representative of what is now known as Georgine. In that case the district
court rejected the objectors' claim that the case did not present an
Article III controversy.
Despite all the problems it saw with settlement class actions, the
Third Circuit acknowledged that they were useful devices, particularly
in mass tort actions. 50 6 The court stated that some critics underestimate the safeguards that exist to protect absent class members in settlement actions. 50 7 For example, the court pointed out that the judge
"can still monitor the negotiation process itself to assure that both
counsel and the settlement adequately vindicate the absentees' interests. ' 508 This is not true, however, in settlement class actions like Georgine, in which the action is not filed until it is settled. Thus, the
statement may mean that the court will scrutinize actions like Georgine
more closely than other settlement class actions.
There is also reason to believe that the Third Circuit will be particularly attentive to the special problems of "futures" classes. First,
the court mentioned the problem of turning the courts into mediation forums. 50 9 Second, the court emphasized that the right to opt
out helped guarantee the due process rights of absentee members in
settlement class actions. 5 10 But, as the Second Circuit recognized, and
I have argued, the right to opt out is illusory for future claimants.
The Third Circuit held that settlement class actions were, cognizable under Rule 23 as long as the requisites of Rule 23 were rigorously
enforced. 51 1 District courts must make specific findings that Rule 23's
requisites have been met. The judge in Georgine did this with some
care. However, the Third Circuit held that a court's findings must
include a finding that the settlement class is a class that could be certified for litigation. 5 12 This requirement may deal a fatal blow to Georgine, all similarly shaped "futures-only" actions, and many other mass
tort class actions.
Under the litigation-class standard, some mass tort class actions
might be triable in federal court provided that the patterns of injuries
sustained by class members are reducible to a finite and manageable
505

Id. at 790 n.10 (citing Carlough v.Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1462-67

(E.D. Pa. 1993)).
506 Id. at 790-91.
507 Id. at 791.
508
509
510

Id.
Id. at 790.

Id. at 792. The court argued that the opt-out right was enhanced in at least one
respect in settlement class actions because class members know precisely what the class
action will offer them when they decide whether to stay in. Id.
511

Id. at 794.

512

Id. at 797-99.
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number and the differences in applicable state law are similarly man-

ageable. 513 But even if claims for personal injury from asbestos were
conceded to be thus reducible and manageable, something I tend to
doubt,5 14 how would one go about trying a class action comprised almost entirely of future claims? The number of claimants is uncertain;

the law that would apply to the claims at the time they accrued is unknowable; and the extent of future injuries of any particular type is, at

best, speculative. 515 Thus, I do not see how the Third Circuit can approve Georgine or any similarly shaped class under the litigation-class
standard In re GM set out. Indeed, the court acknowledged that its

holding might be fatal to the resolution of many mass tort class
5 16

actions.
The Third Circuit's discussion of Rule 23's requirement of adequate representation also spells problems for Georgine. The Third Circuit said that the GM "class appears to fail to meet Rule 23(a)'s
513

Id. at 799.

514 The Third Circuit provided only one example of a mass tort class action that might
have been certifiable as a litigation class action, In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996
(3d Cir. 1986). In re GM, supra note 479, at 799 n.22. The court noted that in that case
counsel had produced evidence to satisfy the court that the claims and defenses were reducible to four patterns. The court stated that this was a small enough number to have
been amenable to trial through a series of special verdicts. Id. n.22. The claims involved
were claims for property damage, not personal injury claims. Personal injury claims are
not as easily reducible to a finite and manageable number of patterns.
515 While the Georgine court, unlike the GM district court, did discuss commonality,
typicality, numerosity and the other requirements of Rule 23, the Georgine court did not
find that the Georgine class was a class that could be certified for litigation purposes. Moreover, as I suggest in the text, even if the Georgine court had made such a finding it is unclear
that that finding could withstand scrutiny on appeal.
516

Id. at 799.

Certifying a class without the existence of questions common to the class
(or where the class representatives' claims are not typical) perverts the class
action process and converts a federal court into a mediation forum for
cases that belong elsewhere, usually in state court. On the other hand, the
cases that make the settlement class device appear most useful are cases
presenting the most unwieldy substantive and procedural issues, i.e., those
diversity cases in which plaintiffs from many states are confronted with differing defenses, differing statutes of limitations, etc.-precisely those cases
that stretch the Rule to its outer-most limits.
This is a troublesome issue-and a close one. Many mass tort actions
have this problem. The School Asbestos cases and the Breast Implant cases
had it, and this case does, as well. It may initially seem difficult to envision
an actual trial of these cases because of the differing defenses certain to be
raised under the various bodies of governing law. While the problem may
be overstated, settlement classes still serve the useful purpose of ridding the
courts-state and federal-of this albatross even though the case may never
have been triable in class form. But if that were the primary function of the
settlement class, the federal courts would have become a mediation forum,
a result inconsistent with their mission and limited resources. In sum, "a
class is a class is a class," and a settlement class, if it is to qualify under Rule
23, must meet all of its requirements.
Id. at 799-800.
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adequacy of representation test"5 17 because the terms of the settlement created an intra-class conflict between the fleet owners (for
whom the coupons were of dubious value) and individual owners of
GM trucks. 5 18 The court found additional evidence of intra-class conflict in that the settlement included certain provisions, such as the
intra-household transfer option, which were of no use to fleet owners.
The court concluded that "[a] t the very least, the class should have
been divided into sub-classes." 5 19 The Georgine settlement also provides benefits to some sub-groups, such as the pleural plaintiffs and
lung cancer class members who cannot meet Georgine's standards of
proof, that are of dubious value. The Georginesettlement also includes
provisions that are of no use to most class members, such as the provisions that make the ordering of claims or the amount of recovery dependent on the identity of counsel. The Third Circuit's opinion
strongly suggests that in such situations subclasses are not discretion520
ary, but mandatory.
The Third Circuit also expressed serious concern about the possibility that "counsel may have pursued a deal with the defendants sepa521
rate from, and perhaps competing for the defendant's resources."
The court's concern that a side deal between the defendant and class
counsel tainted the GM settlement was based on much less evidence
than was presented to the district court in Georgine. In GM, the court
was concerned about a side deal based on "strong indications that simultaneous negotiations [of the class settlement and class counsel's
attorneys' fees] in fact transpired," the district court's finding to the
contrary notwithstanding. 522 The Third Circuit acknowledged that
the United States Supreme Court in Evans v. Jeff D.,523 had held that
simultaneous negotiation of attorneys' fees and class settlement was
517
518

Id. at 800.
Id. at 800-01.

519
520

Id. at 801.
The Third Circuit noted that the GM settlement did not involve a class in which

some members share the prospect of a future claim with other class members who currenty have such a claim, presumably distinguishing such a class from a class like that in GM
where there were significant intra-class conflicts. Id. But this remark by the court did not

foreclose the possibility of intra-class conflict in classes including present and future claims,
particularly if those classes include members whose claims differ dramatically from one
another in time and severity of injury.
521

Id. at 803.

Id. at 804. The Third Circuit cited one letter that suggested simultaneous negotiation of class counsel's fees and the settlement and chastised the district court for placing
"dispositive weight on the parties' self-serving" denials. Id. In Georgine,no one denied that
simultaneous negotiation of the present client cases occurred. However, the district court
did credit the settling parties' self-serving comments, explaining that the class settlement
was unaffected by the simultaneous negotiation of thousands of cases in which class counsel had a substantial financial interest.
522

523

475 U.S. 717, 734-38 (1986).
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permissible. But according to the Third Circuit, 524 permissible does
not mean unsuspicious, particularly when a defendant has acquiesced
to a substantial award of attorneys' fees to class counse 5 25 and
526
"fail[ed] to disclose the amount of the award in the class notice."
The Third Circuit's willingness to treat the simultaneous negotiation
of attorneys' fees as suspicious suggests that the court would be receptive to the approach I have suggested: a prohibition on the simultaneous negotiation of a class settlement and claims against the defendant
not covered by the class settlement. At least the Third Circuit has
signalled its intent to treat such simultaneous negotiations as strong
evidence that the class was not adequately represented.
The Third Circuit also affirmed "the need for courts to be even
more scrupulous than usual in approving settlements" negotiated
before a class has been certified by a court, stating that in those cases
there must be strong "indications of sustained advocacy" by lawyers
who purport to represent the inchoate class.5 2 7 In considering
whether the lawyers have met this heightened standard, the district
court should consider whether simultaneous negotiations occurred
and whether "major causes of action or types of relief sought in the
complaint [have] been omitted by the settlement."5 28 In Georgine, the
claims of some members of the class who will suffer from lung cancer
were settled for zero dollars, the consortium claims of all class members were settled for zero dollars, and the claims of many class members who will not meet the asbestosis criteria were settled for zero
dollars. There was simultaneous negotiation of the class claim and
the present client cases. All this took place in a case involving negotiation before the action was filed. This is a problem for the proponents
of Georgine.
In evaluating the fairness of the settlement terms, the Third Circuit held that the district court had "erred," failing to "adequately discharge its duties to safeguard the interests of the absentees," by not
paying more attention to the fact that "some segments of the class are
treated differently from others." 529 Here the court concentrated on
poorer class members who could not afford to purchase a new truck
in time to take advantage of the $1,000 coupon and on fleet owners
who could not replace their entire fleet of GM trucks in fifteen
months. The settlement treated those people less favorably than similarly situated class members, who happened to be rich individual owners of GM trucks. If this concerned the Third Circuit, it is difficult to
In re GM, supra note 479, at 804.
Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 805-06.
Id. at 806.
-529 Id. at 808.
524
525
526
527
528
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see how that court could accept the Georgine settlement, which provides less favorable terms for class members than those simultaneously
negotiated by class counsel for their similarly situated present clients.
The GM decision is a step in the right direction. 53 0 It sends a
strong message to the district courts that there are some limits to the
use of settlement class actions, although its discursive style serves to
obscure any precise understanding of what those limits are. All things
being equal, the Third Circuit's rejection of the GMsettlement dooms
Georgine, and if accepted by other courts, dooms Georgine's progeny.
But all things are not equal. Rejecting GM cost the Third Circuit and
the rest of the judiciary little; rejecting an asbestos settlement, on the
other hand, would cost the judiciary much. 53 l The judiciary's self-interest should not, of course, dictate the result in mass tort class actions. The reasoning in GM should apply equally to Georgine, but
conflicts of interest are dangerous precisely because they cloud vision.
The lawyers in Georgine convinced themselves they did the right thing.
Will the judiciary fall prey to similar self-interested thinking, and, if so,
at what cost to the integrity of that institution? Time will tell whether
the feast is over or whether it has just begun.

530
GM is not the only recent sign that some members of the judiciary are concerned
enough about the current state of class action practice to begin to stem abuses. On March
15, 1995, a district court in Louisiana rejected a proposed settlement of multidistrict litigation involving the Ford Bronco II vehicle's alleged tendency to roll over. In re Ford Motor
Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3507 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1995). The
court said "[n]ot only are the terms of the proposed settlement inadequate, but there is
evidence that class counsel's representation was also inadequate." Id. at *82. The court
even suggested that the settlement, which left class counsel with the prospect of receiving
substantial fees (unopposed by the defendant) and the class with no monetary relief,
"could possibly be the result of collusion between the defendant and class counsel." Id. at
*28-*29. However, like GM, rejecting the Ford Bronco II settlement cost the judiciary little
in terms of overloaded case dockets. See alsoIn the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting a writ of mandamus to decertify a nationwide
class brought on behalf of hemophiliacs infected by HIV by the defendants' blood products on the ground, inter alia,that the claims of the class were substantial and the value of
the claims was not readily discernible because there had been very few trials.
531 The Seventh Circuit recently echoed this point in distinguishing its rejection of a
nationwide class of hemophiliacs infected by HIV with the acceptance of nationwide class
actions in asbestos suits. "The number of asbestos cases was so great as to exert a well-nigh
irresistiblepressure to bend the normal ms. No comparable pressure is exerted by the HIVhemophilia litigation." In re Rhone-PoulencRorer, 51 F.3d at 1304 (emphasis added).

